Joshua Rovner

The Perils of Shallow Theory: Intelligence Reform and the 9/11 Commission

Despite its unique influence on the current reorganization of American intelligence, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (the 9=11 Commission) got it wrong. In examining the theories of failure presented by the Commission and assessing how closely its recommendations are linked to those theories, two principal arguments are here presented. First, the proposed reforms are mostly unrelated to the postulated causes of failure. Second, the theories are underdeveloped, contradictory, and basically unsatisfying on their own terms. For these reasons, large organizational reforms are unlikely to significantly improve intelligence performance.

Hegemony, Force Posture, and the Provision of Public Goods: The Once and Future Role of Outside Powers in Securing Persian Gulf Oil

International relations theories emphasize the stabilizing role hegemons play in world politics. But little scholarship has examined the link connecting hegemony to its potentially positive returns in the security realm: force posture. We correct this deficit by developing and testing an argument about the consequences of different hegemonic force postures under varying threat conditions. We present a typology of force posture options and probe their effects through over-time analysis of how major powers have worked to provide one particularly important public good since 1945: access to Persian Gulf oil. Drawing on field work, we also explore the implications of our framework for current and future US force posture in the region. We conclude that hegemonic stability is a very real phenomenon in the Gulf, but it does not require the massive forward deployment of US forces that has characterized the past twenty years of US presence there.

Intelligence in the Twitter Age

Intelligence may have a bright future. Advances in imagery and signals processing technology mean that intelligence agencies can deliver remarkably accurate and timely intelligence to civilian officials and military commanders. However much leaders gripe about intelligence, few are likely to disregard such fine-grained information about threats and opportunities, especially when national security is on the line. Others contend that intelligence is central to the kind of wars that the United States is likely to fight in the foreseeable future. Counterterrorism, for example, depends on intelligence agencies to provide detailed descriptions of terrorist organizations, warning of impending attacks, and precise targeting information for offensive actions. U.S. counterterrorism operations will persist long after the country draws down from Afghanistan, because of the geographic expansion of groups associated with al-Qaeda, and because of the growing enthusiasm for special operations forces (SOF) and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strikes against them. Most importantly, policymakers have invested lavishly in intelligence for over a decade. President George W. Bush called for a large increase in the intelligence personnel in the wake of the 11 September 2001 (9=11) attacks on New York City and Washington, DC. Later, Congress created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), adding a new layer of bureaucracy above an already sprawling constellation of

Delusion of Defeat: The United States and Iraq, 1990–1998

Abstract This article challenges the widely held belief that that the United States ‘won the war but lost the peace’ following the war with Iraq in 1991. Fears of a resurgent Iraq grew throughout the decade, despite abundant evidence that Iraq was becoming desperately weak and was no longer a threat to regional security. In fact, the United States won the war as well as the peace by any meaningful definition of the term. The article also discusses the reasons why US policymakers and observers convinced themselves that they had lost. The final section considers implications for strategy and policy in wars of limited objectives.

Two kinds of catastrophe: nuclear escalation and protracted war in Asia

ABSTRACT China’s expanding strength and ambition may foreshadow a violent conflict with the United States. I describe two scenarios about how such a conflict would unfold. The article begins by examining the prospects for nuclear escalation, drawing on theories about politics, psychology, and inadvertent escalation. It then examines the prospects for protracted conventional war, a scenario that has received far less attention. I present a new theory of protraction based on technology, geography, and domestic politics. After assessing the logic of both scenarios against a hypothetical US–China conflict, I discuss which is more likely. The conclusion points to a sobering trade-off: efforts to avoid nuclear catastrophe increase the chance of a long and grueling fight.

Less is More: The Future of the U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf

Five years ago, the total number of U.S. military personnel in the Persian Gulf was over 230,000. Today, that number is well under 50,000. The rapid exit of so many U.S. fighting men and women has caused many observers to fear for the future of the Gulf. As one analyst put it, the regional forecast is bleak with “violence, followed by intermittent violence, and renewed violence.” Beyond the short-term problem of insecurity lies a raft of long-term nightmares, including political instability, oil shocks, and nuclear proliferation. Policymakers and military officials in Washington and the Persian Gulf share these concerns. The belief that a precipitous U.S. drawdown is creating a security vacuum and political breakdown is close to the conventional wisdom. Officials routinely cite the British withdrawal from the Gulf as a dangerous precedent. The British East India Company established a residency in Persia in 1763, and the government spent the next century building its influence in the region. British hegemony continued even after World War II while much of the rest of the empire was collapsing. In 1968, however, Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced that the United Kingdom would end its military commitments “east of Suez,” and in 1971 the Royal Navy officially left the

Questions about COIN after Iraq and Afghanistan

The intense debate over counter-insurgency (COIN) in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan revolved around three related questions. First, should COIN forces focus on attacking insurgents or protecting the civilian population? Second, was victory defined by destroying the enemy or by building a legitimate and self-sustaining government? Third, would heavy investment in COIN doctrine and training erode the Army’s conventional capabilities? These questions played out in fractious public debates pitting so-called ‘COINdinistas’, who emphasised the importance of population security and government legitimacy, against traditionalists who argued that the main role of the armed forces was to destroy armed enemies.