Joshua Sanborn

Unsettling the Empire: Violent Migrations and Social Disaster in Russia during World War I*

It is counterintuitive, perhaps even perverse, to look for a concise summary of the conditions of modern war from Leo Tolstoy. Nevertheless, his conclusion about the Napoleonic Wars in the epilogue to War and Peace was admirably brief: “The only thing worth recognizing is that the purpose of the upheavals of European peoples is unknown to us, only the facts are known. The murders, first in France, then in Italy, in Africa, in Prussia, in Austria, in Spain, and in Russia and the movements from west to east and from east to west are the facts that comprise the essence and end of these events.”1 In one sense, Tolstoy’s clear-eyed focus on “murders” and “movements” as the core social processes of warfare is not terribly revelatory. Even the most fleeting acquaintance with military practices is enough to reveal that, at the tactical and strategic levels alike, war plans hinge on moving men into the best positions to kill the enemy. Likewise, the most cursory survey of recent history shows that war has been (and continues to be) one of the primary causes for human displacement by impelling civilian populations to flee, by encouraging internal social and physical mobility through the transformation of the labor force, and by prompting states to engage in schemes of deportation in order to solidify a political community at war. Still, Tolstoy’s point was not that “murders” and “movements” both happen during periods of war, but that they comprise the “essence and end” of warfare. This passage is a crucial key to the double move Tolstoy performs in War and

The mobilization of 1914 and the question of the Russian nation: A reexamination

During those wonderful early August days Russia seemed to have been completely transformed. The German Ambassador had predicted that the declaration of war would provoke a revolution. He had even declined to listen to a friend who had advised him, on the eve of his departure, to send his collection of art to the Hermitage for safe keeping, as the Hermitage would, he foretold, be one of the first buildings to be sacked. Unfortunately for him, the only act of mob violence throughout the whole Russian Empire was the wholesale looting of the German Embassy on August 4. Instead of provoking a revolution, the war forged a new bond between Sovereign and people. The workmen proclaimed a truce to strikes, and the various political parties laid aside their grievances. 1

The genesis of Russian warlordism: Violence and governance during the First World War and the Civil War

The article looks at how the collapse of the tsarist regime in Russia and the civil war which followed created the conditions wherein a class of violent paramilitary entrepreneurs, usually veterans of the Great War, were able to operate almost entirely without restraint. The author terms this phenomenon ‘warlordism’, and shows how the rise and eventual fall of warlords was connected to the absence and restoration of state control during 1917–23. The article calls for an interpretation of violence during this period which eschews the reductive dualism of ‘red’ and ‘white’ terror in favour of an analysis which emphasises the role played by individual and largely autonomous warlords. For most of the period of the Cold War, the term ‘warlord’ was unpopular among scholars of politics. Only seven journal articles using warlord in the title can be found in Worldwide Political Abstracts between 1966 and 1993. One studied Lyndon Johnson, another examined Winston Churchill, and the remaining five dealt with China after 1911 .T heOxford English Dictionary reflects this limited definition by specifying two particular uses for ‘warlord’, the first simply for a military commander (and a translation of the German Kriegsherr), and the second a translation of the Chinese junfa – ‘In China, a military commander who had a regional power base and ruled independently of the central government, esp. in the period 1916–1928.’ Despite the frequent association of the term with events in early-twentieth-century China, it was even problematic to use ‘warlord’ in that historiographical context. This ambivalence about the term was most evident in the work of Hsi-Sheng-Chi,

What's New in Russian Military History and Why You Should Care

When one thinks of neglected approaches to the study of the Russian past, military history rarely comes to mind. In mass market publications and on television, military historians are, to say the least, well represented. At Borders Bookstore and on the History Channel, the feats and defeats of Russian arms occupy a large share of the space devoted to Russian history. One would also be hard pressed to argue that military history has been ignored in scholarly treatments of the Russian past. Military explanations have been adduced (and in many cases have become orthodox) for many important “social” events in Russian history, such as the implementation of serfdom and its later abolition. Nevertheless, there is a sense among active military historians that the most recent work in military history, by junior and senior scholars alike, remains unread by most of the field. Many scholars, of course, feel underappreciated, but

Russian Historiography on the Origins of the First World War Since the Fischer Controversy

This article examines Soviet and post-Soviet historiography on the origins of the Great War, paying special attention to the reverberations of western historiographical disputes in the Soviet Union and Russia. The author argues that Fischer’s thesis was mostly uncontroversial in Russia. Most Soviet historians were predisposed to view his stress on imperialism (and German imperialism in particular) in a favorable way. Later Russian historians have also mainly agreed with Fischer, though by now the controversy is far enough in the past that few of them refer to him directly in their works. Instead, current Russian historians largely seek to place their works both within the context of the Soviet historiography and with contemporary works in Europe and the United States.

RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM, 1914–2014: ANNEXATIONIST, ADVENTURIST, OR ANXIOUS?

This essay describes the modes of imperial action deployed during the July Crisis of 1914. It begins with an assessment of recent works on Russias role in the outbreak of the war before more closely considering the question of why and how Russia mobilized in late July. The essay concludes with some thoughts regarding Russias military and diplomatic assault upon Ukraine in 2014 and how the study of events a century ago may help us understand contemporary events more clearly.

Twenty-First-Century Views of Russia's Great War Effort: Guest Editor's Introduction

As the centennial of World War I approaches, Russian scholars reassess their countrys political, military, and social experiences during the war relative to those of other European nations.

Military Occupation and Social Unrest: Daily Life in Russian Poland at the Start of World War I

One of Sheila Fitzpatrick’s most durable interests over the course of her career was the effect of massive social upheaval on the daily existence of Soviet citizens. From her studies of student life in the 1920s to her investigation of collectivization in the 1930s, she seemed especially drawn to the ways that unusual events affected normal people.1 Even an article subtitled “the ‘return to normalcy’ ” concluded that normalcy did not return in the postwar period until after Stalin’s death in 1953 (and the end of the essay in question).2

Review: Roger Reese, ed., The Russian Imperial Army, 1796-1917, Ashgate: Aldershot, 2006; 458 pp.; 9780754625650, £115.00 (hbk)

article on the difficulties of confronting the past and the obstructive role played by large parts of the political elite. The psychological impact of war and nationalism on Serbian society is discussed in an interesting chapter by Sabrina Ramet, followed by a related chapter on social decay (including a somewhat disjointed discussion of Srdjan DragojeviN’s movies) by James Gow and Milena Michalski. Finally, a chapter on the MiloåeviN trail by Kari Osland concludes this part. The following two chapters in Part 3, on culture and values, look at the Serbian Orthodox Church (Ramet) and the role of women (Bijana BijeliN), both discussing the tensions arising from the attempted re-traditionalization of society. Particularly interesting is the discussion of the impact of the MiloåeviN era on Vojvodina, the Albanians of Kosovo and the Roma, all subjects which have received relatively little discussion in most studies on Serbia in the 1990s. While Kerenji’s text on Vojvodina and Trix on Kosovo’s Albanians succeed in filling this gap, the article by Reinhartz, while interesting, offers only little detail on the Roma in Serbia and the attempts by the MiloåeviN regime to instrumentalize the Roma in Kosovo in particular. Inevitably, as with all edited volumes, the quality of the chapters varies. However, most are well written and make for an interesting read. The book takes a broad look at Serbian society, even if not all relevant aspects (i.e. popular culture, media, the international and regional context) are discussed. Nevertheless, as a book which offers a broad overview of Serbia since 1989, it would have benefited from more documentary material, such as key election results, maps and a bibliography. In addition, the glossary contains numerous mistakes and is not very systematic. Ramet in her conclusions points out that the authors do not paint a unified picture of Serbia. Some of the controversies she highlights indicate areas for further research, such as the question of whether the NATO bombing in 1999 weakened or strengthened MiloåeviN. Despite these differences, there is a central message to this book: namely, that the legacy of Slobodan MiloåeviN’s misrule has left a lasting imprint on Serbia, even after his fall (and death). While this might seem like a statement of the obvious since the assassination of DjindjiN, the success of the Serb Radical Party and the intransigent policy towards Kosovo followed by prime minister Vojislav Koåtunica, when the chapters were written, this sobering view of Serbian reality was yet to become commonplace. Altogether, therefore, this book is a key collection in the study of Serbia and succeeds in discussing topics which have been neglected by many other texts.