Joyotee Smith

Illegal logging, collusive corruption and fragmented governments in Kalimantan, Indonesia

SUMMARY The paper distinguishes between collusive and non-collusive corruption in the forestry sector and analyses their interaction with the political/institutional environment. While non-collusive corruption increases costs for the private sector, collusive corruption reduces costs for the bribee, therefore it is more persistent. Data from confidential interviews in Indonesia show that illegal logging, supported by collusive corruption, became widespread after the fall of President Suharto. While economic liberalisation and competition among government officials may lower non-collusive corruption, they exacerbate collusive corruption. During political transitions, countries are particularly vulnerable to collusive corruption because governments are often weak and fragmented, with underdeveloped institutions. Sustained wider reform and institutional strengthening to speed up the transition to a true democracy is needed to fight collusive corruption. For Indonesia greater accountability of government, legal and judicial reform and encouragement of public oversight could be useful corner stones for combating illegal logging and corruption.

Can Forest-protection carbon projects improve rural livelihoods? Analysis of the Noel Kempff Mercado climate action project, Bolivia

We studied the Noel KempffMercado Climate Action Project (NKMCAP),Bolivia, to assess whether forestprotection carbon (C) projects cansignificantly benefit local people. Wehypothesized that forest protection canonly securely deliver C if significantstakeholders are meaningfully andtransparently involved, traditional orcustomary rights are recognized and theirloss compensated for, and there are directlinkages between conservation anddevelopment objective. Our researchfocused on 53 members of the communities ofFlorida, Porvenir and Piso Firme and 36secondary stakeholders. In each of thevillages we held half-day meetings withcommunity leaders, complemented bysemi-structured one-hour interviews with 5,10, and 7 families, representing 20%, 10%and 8% of each community. The long-termimpact of the NKMCAP on the localcommunities may well be positive. However,in the short run, certain sections of thelocal communities are financially poorer. Forest protection projects clearly have thepotential to sequester C, protectbiodiversity and simultaneously contributeto sustainable rural development, but ifthey really are to improve rurallivelihoods, they must be designed andimplemented carefully and participatively.

Could payments for forest carbon contribute to improved tropical forest management

Abstract Under the Kyoto Protocol industrialized countries will be able to meet carbon emission reduction commitments by financing forestry projects that sequester carbon in developing countries. While this mechanism would compensate for missing markets in forest environmental services, it could also enable industrialized countries to avoid reducing energy use. This paper assesses whether such projects could contribute to improved logging practices in the tropics. Results from studies primarily in Asia and Latin America are analyzed in the context of the modalities of the Kyoto Protocol. Results show that the opportunity cost of shifting from conventional logging to improved practices may have been underestimated. At the same time the long-term carbon and biodiversity benefits of improved forest management may have been underestimated. These results follow primarily from the fact that most previous studies assume that a permanent forest estate is maintained under conventional logging and that cutting cycles are as long as 30–60 years. A more realistic scenario, however, consists of repeated harvesting at short intervals during the first few decades, resulting in the degradation of the forest into shrub and grassland. The implications of these results are that forest management projects may be less cost-effective than previously assumed. Therefore, expectations about their potential contribution to improved management should be scaled down. At the same time, the extent to which such projects will enable industrialized countries to avoid reducing industrial pollution is also unlikely to be significant. Cost-effectiveness is likely to be highest where timber volumes in the first few decades after initial logging are comparable under conventional and improved logging. This is likely where topography is relatively flat, biodiversity values are low, wastage of felled timber is high and the policy environment is favorable. A number of proactive measures are suggested to expand the niche for forest management carbon projects. These measures are justified because the incremental carbon and biodiversity benefits in the long run may be higher than previous studies have indicated.

Can 'legalization' of illegal forest activities reduce illegal logging?: lessons from East Kalimantan

Abstract Illegal activities are one of the most pressing problems facing the Indonesian forest sector today. The debate on illegal forest activities has focused primarily on legal and governance issues. Economic forces, however, are increasingly recognized as fundamental drivers of illegal forest activities. We ask the question whether the legalization of small logging concessions and their development can teach us anything about how to address the illegal logging problem. We find that legalization alone-when a legal timber concession is granted to a previously illegal operator-does not necessarily result in a significant reduction in illegal activities. When illegal activities are profitable, they can be expected to continue. Changing the regulatory framework to increase monitoring and enforcement can affect the profitability of these illegal activities. By changing the underlying economic incentives for logging, such interventions hold greater promise of success. In the medium to long term, however, legalization may help reduce illegal logging when it entrusts local people with ownership and control of forest resources and maintains a monitoring role for government agencies.

Management of Secondary Forests in Colonist Swidden Agriculture in Peru, Brazil and Nicaragua

Recent studies have shown that although swidden agriculture contributes to tropical deforestation in Latin America, swidden farmers also regenerate significant are as of secondary forests on their farms as part of the following process. This paper discusses the opportunities and constraints to farmers’ regeneration and management of secondary forests. The analysis generalizes findings from case studies of new and old settlement areas in Peru, Brazil and Nicaragua, to derive generic management principles. In each country diagnostic farm surveys, multi-resource forest inventories and farmer-participatory research were carried out. Results show that about 25% of farm area remains under secondary forest even after a century of settlement. Secondary forests are the only significant forest resource available to the rural poor in older settlement areas. Secondary forests consist primarily of secondary forest fallows. Small areas are also maintained more permanently. Results show that an integrated resource management approach will be required, with management of secondary forests complemented by policy reforms and management of soils and residual forests. Different management strategies will be required for new and older settlement areas. For older settlement areas, strategies to reduce pressures for shorter fallows are identified, as well as principles for management of secondary forest fallowsfor soil recuperation and forest products. For newer areas, policies and technologies for slowing down the conversion of residual forest to agriculture and secondary forest would result in more bio diversity conservation and less, but more productive,secondary forest at later stages of frontier development. Management of secondary forest for high timber productivity, complemented by trade in forest carbon,may induce farmers to convert some of their fallow forests to permanent secondary forests.