Judith C. Schneider

Cross-hedging minimum return guarantees: Basis and liquidity risks

We reveal pitfalls in the hedging of insurance contracts with a minimum return guarantee on the underlying investment, e.g.\ an external mutual fund. We analyze basis risk entailed by hedging the guarantee with a dynamic portfolio of proxy assets for the funds. We also take account of liquidity risk which arises since the insurer may need to advance funds for performing the hedge. Based on a least-squares Monte Carlo simulation, we study the economic implications of basis and liquidity risk. We demonstrate that both risks may be surprisingly high and show how the design of the contract and the hedging strategy may help to alleviate them.

Don’t lapse into temptation: a behavioral explanation for policy surrender

Many policyholders surrender their life insurance policies early, leading to substantial monetary losses for private households. Surrender can be explained rationally if it constitutes the last resort providing liquidity in the event of an urgent need of cash. Yet we find clear evidence in German panel data that for more than half of all surrendered contracts investors had cheaper options available to provide the required liquidity. This finding demonstrates that there must be other factors influencing this important life decision. We provide a behavioral explanation, focusing on the role of individual decision heuristics, financial literacy, and financial advice. In particular, we show that financial literacy and financial advice can mitigate the behavioral temptation to lapse, while the tendency to rely on heuristics increases lapse probability.

Minimum Return Guarantees, Investment Caps, and Investment Flexibility

We study the merits of capped retirement products with guarantee for investors who have the flexibility to dynamically adjust their investment strategy. All contracts under consideration are fairly priced such that the net profit of the provider is zero. Without the rider, an expected utility maximizing CRRA investor does not want an investment cap. Here, she commits herself to a strategy a priori. With the flexibility rider, the optimization problem changes and the optimal strategy is a response to an exogenously set price. A fair pricing then anticipates the optimal response of the investor. We show that the maximum expected utility of the investor can, for anticipated fairly priced products, be obtained for a finite cap. Thus, a capped product design can give a Pareto improvement to the otherwise uncapped contract version.