Juha A. Vuori

Security, resilience and desecuritization: multidirectional moves and dynamics

In its current configuration, Security Studies tends to analyse the relationship between security, resilience and non-security politics in cases where the issue of concern has been securitized, when some issue already has the status function and label of a security issue. The literature consistently frames desecuritization and resilience as processes that take place after an issue has been securitized. The overarching objective of this article is to tell a different sociopolitical story of the connections between desecuritization, resilience and securitization. In order to do this, we present a triangular model of dual relationships among security, resilience and non-security politics. By doing so, we propose a theorization of the relations among these concepts that takes into account not only instances in which desecuritization moves and resiliencization moves follow security, but also instances in which desecuritization and resilience arise before security – when securitization is still brewing. Empirical vignettes are employed throughout our discussion to illustrate key points of our argument.

Regime Transition and the Chinese Politics of Technology: From Mass Science to the Controlled Internet

Abstract The article employs the concepts of the politics of technology and regime transition for analysing the connection between political power and the application of technology in contemporary Chinese history. Examining the Maoist policy of ‘mass science’ and the contemporary Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policies on information and communication technologies, and Internet control, shows how regime-determined policy goals, namely social transformation and political security, have been reflected in the politics of technology during the Maoist and the post-Maoist eras. Through this examination, the article shows how controlling technologies has always been closely connected to the political order in China and how this diagram of power has changed through time. The transition from a totalitarian to a post-totalitarian political order has shifted the Chinese politics of technology from the hard core of the political order to its protective belt. Accordingly, the criteria set for allowed forms of technology have been reduced from the Maoist plural must-nots to the single must-not: technology must not be allowed to jeopardize the position of the CCP as the exclusive holder of the ultimate political power in China. Still, maintaining a post-totalitarian autocratic system requires engaging in a distinct type of politics of technology.

To boldly torture where no one has tortured before – Star Trek and the transformation of the ‘progressive’ social imaginary of torture in the United States

Star Trek has become a staple for studying the interrelations of popular culture and international politics. In the literature on Star Trek and international politics, this quintessential component...

Let’s just say we’d like to avoid any great power entanglements: desecuritization in post-Mao Chinese foreign policy towards major powers

ABSTRACTPrevious studies on securitization in China have shown how security discourses can have various domestic political functions, how even security issues can be contested, and how China engages with the securitization moves of neighbouring states. Despite this growing literature, there is however no general view of desecuritization as a part of Chinese foreign policy towards the major powers. To fill this gap, the present article examines desecuritization in the foreign policy of post-Mao China. This discussion begins with the desecuritization of the Cold War, and then views how China has sought to prevent the securitization of China’s rise in the US. This discussion contributes to the study of Chinese foreign policy maxims by providing it with insights seen through the lens of desecuritization.

The politics of securitized technology

This is a reply to:Lacy, M. 2018. “Securitization and the global politics of cybersecurity.” Global Discourse 8 (1): 100–115. https://doi.org/10.1080/23269995.2017.1415082.