Julia Braun

Does Exchange of Information between Tax Authorities Influence Multinationals’ Use of Tax Havens?

Since the mid-1990s, countries offering tax systems that facilitate international tax avoidance and evasion have been facing growing political pressure to comply with the internationally agreed standards of exchange of tax information. Using data of German investments in tax havens, we find evidence that the conclusion of a bilateral tax information exchange agreement (TIEA) is associated with fewer operations in tax havens and the number of German affiliates has on average decreased by 46% compared to a control group. This suggests that firms invest in tax havens not only for their low tax rates but also for the secrecy they offer.

A Legal and Economic Analysis of Austria's Double Tax Treaty Network with Developing Countries

To what degree developing countries gain from signing double tax treaties is being hotly debated. In this paper, we analyze the Austrian tax treaty policy. Combining legal and economic perspectives, we find that developing countries are likely to expect both positive and negative impacts from signing a double tax treaty (DTT) with Austria. On the one hand, the results of our econometric analysis suggest that middle-income countries that sign a DTT with Austria may expect an increased number of foreign direct investment projects from Austrian companies. On the other hand, the signatory states may suffer from limited withholding taxation rights established in the DTTs for the source country, which could lead to reduced tax revenues in the developing countries.

Tax Information Exchange with Developing Countries and Tax Havens

The exchange of tax information has received ample attention recently, due to a number of recent headlines on aggressive tax planning and tax evasion. Whilst both participating tax authorities will gain when foreign investments (FDI) are bilateral, we demonstrate that FDI receiving nations will lose in asymmetric situations. We solve a bargaining model that proves that tax information exchange will only happen voluntarily with compensation for this loss. We then present empirical evidence in a global panel and find that a tax information exchange agreement (TIEA) or a double tax treaty with information exchange (DTT) is more likely when the capital importer is compensated through official development assistence (ODA). We finally demonstrate how the foreign account tax compliance act (FATCA) and similar international initiatives bias the bargaining outcome in favour of capital exporting countries.

The Discrepancy between 'Ideal' and 'Real World' International Tax Rules - What Drives Politicians When Making the Rules?

The current international tax system diverges greatly from a theoretically ‘‘optimal’’ tax system. One reason for this discrepancy may be that politicians strive for other objectives rather than making tax rules that comply with the theoretical concepts of optimal taxation. In this article, I overview the approaches used in the economic and legal literature to explain the motivations of policymakers involved in international taxation and contrast them with ‘real world’ observations. The article illustrates that the making of international tax policy is affected by various factors: the structure of the international tax system, domestic pressure groups, along with self-interested politicians and bureaucrats. Considering the complexity of the conditions under which international tax policy is made, it is not astonishing that international tax law deviates significantly from the principles characterizing ‘‘ideal’’ taxation.