Julia R. Azari

Unwritten Rules: Informal Institutions in Established Democracies

Scholars of the developing world have driven a surge of interest in unwritten or informal institutions as determinants of political outcomes. In advanced industrial democracies, by contrast, informal institutions often remain consigned to the analytic margins. This article makes a case for greater attention to informal political institutions in established democracies, and it introduces a theoretical framework to support such analysis. Informal institutions, understood as the unwritten rules of political life, are seen to perform three functions: they complete or fill gaps in formal institutions, coordinate the operation of overlapping (and perhaps clashing) institutions, and operate parallel to formal institutions in regulating political behavior. These three roles of informal institutions are associated with different characteristic patterns of institutional stability and change. The article illustrates its theoretical framework with case studies from American politics, the subfield in which formal-institutional analysis has flourished most. These cases are the historical norm of a two-term presidency (a completing institution), the unwritten rules of the presidential nomination process (coordinating institutions), the informal practice of obstruction in the Senate (a parallel institution), and the normative expectation that presidents should address the public directly (which performs all three functions).

19 Things We Learned from the 2016 Election

ABSTRACT We can all agree that the presidential election result was a shocker. According to news reports, even the Trump campaign team was stunned to come up a winner. So now seems like a good time to go over various theories floating around in political science and political reporting and see where they stand, now that this turbulent political year has drawn to a close. In the present article, we go through several things that we as political observers and political scientists have learned from the election, and then discuss implications for the future.

Institutional Change and the Presidential Mandate

Often treated as a unified concept with a single definition, the presidential mandate actually encompasses multiple definitions, each connected to distinct ideas about democracy and presidential leadership. This article looks at how and when modern presidents have used mandate rhetoric and seeks to explain changes in presidential mandate-claiming patterns. Using an original dataset of 1,467 presidential communications from 1933 through 2009, I find that after 1969 presidents became more likely to use election results to justify their actions. However, they also became less likely to emphasize the magnitude of the election result, focusing their mandate rhetoric instead on campaign promises and distinctions between candidates and parties. Evidence suggests that this shift is the result of a combination of several factors: changes to the presidential nomination system, polarized party politics, and an overall decline in presidential approval ratings. Based on this research, I conclude that ideas about the presidential mandate are closely connected with the political conditions and challenges facing presidents. As the place of the presidency has shifted in American politics, the ways in which presidents interpret and communicate about elections have also changed.

Relic: How Our Constitution Undermines Effective Government and Why We Need a More Powerful Presidency. By William G. Howell and Terry M. Moe. New York: Basic Books, 2016.

more familiar ground. One may not be convinced that the novel theory advanced fully explains all the variation, but it is a compelling account. For my own taste, the risks and benefits of judicial extraterritoriality could have been exploredmore. But these are quibbles, andminor ones at that. As awhole, the book is a thoughtful, insightful, and welcome entry in a growing and important area. AUSTEN PARRISH Indiana University Maurer School of Law

Rejoinder: How Special was 2016?

Five responses from leading scholars of American politics have given us a great deal to think about. Several themes emerge from the responses. The first is the challenge of the addressing how relevant the 2016 election will be for understanding the future of American politics. Several of the discussants also challenge our thinking about the role of white working class pundits, and about how political scientists should think about demographics and politics more generally. In the study of comparative politics, the literature on case selection demands that scholars answer the question, “What kind of case is this?” before proceeding; see for example Gerring and Seawright (2008). Looking forward, is the 2016 typical with some unusual features, or will it in retrospect seem unusual? The answer to this question depends on the research question and the variables of interest. As a result, elections scholars may need to think more deeply about the kinds of questions we pursue and the theoretical assumptions we make. However, we must also wait to find out the impact of 2016 on subsequent contests. As we attempt to classify the 2016 election, we are stuck doing some guesswork. Noel urges scholars to ask how an outlier can sharpen our theories. Masket and Victor both pose the question of whether last year’s contest will turn out to have been anomalous or a new normal. Finally, Shapiro asks whether the election was really so unusual after all. These different classifications suggest not just different interpretations, but that the implications of 2016 depend on what the researcher seeks to explain.

Kumar, Martha Joynt. Before the Oath

Unfortunately, she misses some opportunities to shed new light on the debate over the “unitary executive” theory and presidentialism. The political and politicized origins of the “unitary executive” theory, its upside-down view of constitutionalism and originalism, its structural defects and perverse consequences are already amply analyzed elsewhere. Moreover, although the author relies appreciably on law journal articles, she mostly omits mention of the significant body of writing on the “unitary executive” theory outside of law journals. Still, Professor Kitrosser’s book is particularly helpful in at least one regard. Like other suspect public debates over matters such as global climate change and evolution, the “unitary executive” theory debate is simply not one of two equally matched opposing sides. Although one may certainly argue that the “unitary executive” theory is good or necessary on its own merits, the constitutional and historical arguments on its behalf simply fail. This conclusion, joined with the theory’s stubborn persistence—thanks to its advocates—encourages works such as Professor Kitrosser’s that continue to assail the “unitary executive” theory’s numerous flaws.