Julian Wucherpfennig

Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups across Space and Time: Introducing the GeoEPR Dataset1

This article introduces GeoEPR, a geocoded version of the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset that charts politically relevant ethnic groups across space and time. We describe the dataset in detail, discuss its advantages and limitations, and use it in a replication of Cederman, Wimmer and Min’s (2010) study on the causes of ethno-nationalist conflict. We show that territorial conflicts are more likely to involve groups that settle far away from the capital city and close to the border, while these spatial variables have no effect for governmental conflicts.

Transborder Ethnic Kin and Civil War

A series of studies has shown that civil wars are caused not only by factors inside countries, but also by effects operating across state borders. Whereas a first wave of quantitative studies demonstrated that such effects make the closed-polity assumption untenable, more recently researchers have identified particular causal mechanisms driving conflict. Despite these recent advances, a central puzzle remains unresolved, namely why ethnic groups that at least in theory could count on support from large transborder ethnic kin (TEK) groups often have remained surprisingly peaceful, such as the stranded Russian populations in the near abroad. We propose a theoretical framework that extends the analysis from the primary dyad between the incumbent and the challenger group by adding a secondary dyad that pits the incumbent against the TEK group. We postulate a curvilinear effect of the TEK groups relative size on conflict onset. Using a new data set on transnational ethnic links, we find that that the risk of conflict increases within the middle range of the size spectrum, consistent with our main hypothesis. This means that large TEK groups have a conflict-dampening effect, provided that they control their own state. Excluded TEK groups, however, are not associated with lower conflict probabilities.

Territorial Autonomy in the Shadow of Conflict: Too Little, Too Late?

This article evaluates the effect of territorial autonomy on the outbreak of internal conflict by analyzing ethnic groups around the world since WWII. Shedding new light on an ongoing debate, we argue that the critics have overstated the case against autonomy policies. Our evidence indicates that decentralization has a significant conflict-preventing effect where there is no prior conflict history. In postconflict settings, however, granting autonomy can still be helpful in combination with central power sharing arrangements. Yet, on its own, postconflict autonomy concessions may be too little, too late. Accounting for endogeneity, we also instrument for autonomy in postcolonial states by exploiting that French, as opposed to British, colonial rule rarely relied on decentralized governance. This identification strategy suggests that naïve analysis tends to underestimate the pacifying influence of decentralization.

Predicting the decline of ethnic civil war: Was Gurr right and for the right reasons?

Many scholars have detected a decrease of political violence, but the causes of this decline remain unclear. As a contribution to this debate, we revisit the controversy over trends in conflict after the end of the Cold War. While many made ominous predictions of surging ethnic warfare, Gurr presented evidence of a pacifying trend since the mid-1990s and predicted a further decline in ethnic conflict in an article on ‘the waning of ethnic war’. Leveraging more recent data on ethnic groups and their participation in ethnic civil wars, this study evaluates if Gurr was right about the decline of ethnic conflict, and if he was right for the right reasons. We assess whether an increase in governments’ accommodative policies toward ethnic groups can plausibly account for a decline in ethnic civil war. Our findings lend considerable support to an account of the pacifying trend that stresses the granting of group rights, regional autonomy, and inclusion in power-sharing, as well as democratization and peacekeeping.

Introduction: Forecasting in peace research

Prediction and forecasting have now fully reached peace and conflict research. We define forecasting as predictions about unrealized outcomes given model estimates from realized data, and predictions more generally as the assignment of probability distributions to realized or unrealized outcomes. Increasingly, scholars present within- and out-of-sample prediction results in their publications and sometimes even forecasts for unrealized, future outcomes. The articles in this special issue demonstrate the ability of current approaches to forecast events of interest and contributes to the formulation of best practices for forecasting within peace research. We highlight the role of forecasting for theory evaluation and as a bridge between academics and policymakers, summarize the contributions in the special issue, and provide some thoughts on how research on forecasting in peace research should proceed. We suggest some best practices, noting the importance of theory development, interpretability of models, r...Prediction and forecasting have now fully reached peace and conflict research. We define forecasting as predictions about unrealized outcomes given model estimates from realized data, and predictions more generally as the assignment of probability distributions to realized or unrealized outcomes. Increasingly, scholars present within- and out-of-sample prediction results in their publications and sometimes even forecasts for unrealized, future outcomes. The articles in this special issue demonstrate the ability of current approaches to forecast events of interest and contributes to the formulation of best practices for forecasting within peace research. We highlight the role of forecasting for theory evaluation and as a bridge between academics and policymakers, summarize the contributions in the special issue, and provide some thoughts on how research on forecasting in peace research should proceed. We suggest some best practices, noting the importance of theory development, interpretability of models, replicability of results, and data collection.

Polygyny or misogyny? Reexamining the "first law of intergroup conflict"

Kanazawa (2009) proposes a “first law of intergroup conflict,” suggesting that polygyny and its impact on access to reproductive women provides “the ultimate cause” for civil war. This controversial claim is supported by an empirical analysis at odds with most existing studies of civil wars. We reconsider the influence of polygyny in a more conventional statistical model. We fail to find evidence that ethnic groups with polygyny engage more frequently in civil wars, although it is possible to find results indicating that civil wars may be more common in states with legal polygamy. We detail how these findings seem at odds with Kanazawa’s theory and argue that misogyny seems a more plausible source of insights into the context for civil war and peace. We then show that civil wars are less common when women’s rights are better established and that legal polygamy has no discernable residual effect once women’s rights are considered.

The Diffusion of Inclusion: An Open-Polity Model of Ethnic Power Sharing:

While there is a growing consensus that ethnic inclusion produces peace, less is known about what causes transitions to power sharing between ethnic groups in central governments in multiethnic states. The few studies that have addressed this question have proposed explanations stressing exclusively domestic factors. Yet, power sharing is spatially clustered, which suggests that diffusion may be at play. Inspired by studies of democratic diffusion, we study the spread of inclusive policies with an “open-polity model” that explicitly traces diffusion from inclusion in other states. Our findings indicate that the relevant diffusion processes operate primarily at the level of world regions rather than globally or between territorial neighbors. Thus, the more inclusive the region, the more likely a shift to power sharing becomes. Shifts away from inclusion to dominance are less common since World War II, but they are more likely in regional settings characterized by ethnic exclusion.

International Conventions and Non-State Actors: Selection, Signaling, and Reputation Effects

Non-state actors (NSAs) play an important role in violent conflicts, but unlike state actors they cannot (be forced to) sign international conventions tying their hands. The nongovernmental organization Geneva Call has stepped into this void and solicits NSAs to sign and allow monitoring of conventions banning particular activities, for example the use of landmines. We propose a game-theoretic model to assess the motivations for NSAs (and states) to sign such conventions and how they affect conflict behavior on the ground. We find that selection issues are of crucial importance linked to the incentive to signal resolve, both by states and NSAs. Empirical analyses of conflict behavior in countries where Geneva Call has been active support the implications of the theoretical model.Whether international humanitarian norms are respected during and after civil conflict depends on the behavior of both governments and nonstate actors (NSAs). However, international conventions on the protection of civilians generally do not address NSAs, as such conventions are open only to the representatives of states. In a pioneering initiative, the nongovernmental organization Geneva Call has started to address this problem by soliciting NSAs to sign “deeds of commitment” to ban particular activities violating humanitarian norms. Focusing on the case of antipersonnel mines, we examine why NSAs would choose to sign conventions that limit their autonomy, and whether such conventions can change the behavior of governments and nonstate armed groups. We propose a game-theoretic model of how the interaction between governments and NSAs shape their incentives to commit to and comply with international humanitarian norms. Our empirical evidence highlights the importance of these interdependencies between governments and NSAs in the realm of humanitarian engagements.

The JPR Best Visualization Award 2016 goes to Brandon J Kinne

The jury consisting of Nils B Weidmann (University of Konstanz), Hanne Fjelde (Uppsala University) and Michael D Ward (Duke University) has awarded the fourth JPR Best Visualization Award to Brandon J Kinne (University of California, Davis). The prize-winning article is titled ‘Agreeing to arm: Bilateral weapons agreements and the global arms trade’ and was published in the 2016 special issue on ‘Networked International Politics’, Journal of Peace Research 53(3): 359–377. The author relies on different types of visualizations to illustrate key aspects of the theory, the data used for the analysis, and the results. Two line graphs at the beginning of the article help to motivate the research question. A set of carefully crafted, eye-catching network visualizations show the structure of the weapons agreement networks examined in the article, and how they evolved over time. This is supplemented with a map to illustrate the spatial distribution of these agreements. Finally, the author goes to great lengths to present the results from the model estimation using coefficient plots, using color to highlight significant results. These plots also illustrate how particular coefficients vary over time. The jury found this to be an impressive way to present a large number of results effectively. Overall, Kinne’s article is exemplary not only because of its interesting analysis, but also due to the number of aesthetically pleasing and informative graphics.

The Nils Petter Gleditsch JPR Article of the Year Award, 2016, goes to Charles Miller and Benjamin S Barber IV

A jury consisting of Indra de Soysa (Norwegian University of Science and Technology), Emilie Hafner-Burton (University of California, San Diego), and Vally Koubi (ETH, Zurich) has awarded the 2016 Journal of Peace Research ‘Nils Petter Gleditsch Article of the Year Award’ to Charles Miller (Australian National University) and Benjamin S Barber IV (IE Business School, Madrid). The jury was faced with the very difficult task of selecting one winner from among several exceptionally good articles. The prize-winning article, ‘It’s only money: Do voters treat human and financial sunk costs the same?’, Journal of Peace Research 53(1): 116–129, uses multiple survey experiments about a hypothetical US military intervention to evaluate the effects of sunk costs on public opinion. The authors find no evidence that sunk costs induce greater commitment to an intervention. Rather, public reaction to sunk costs is contingent on the type of costs incurred: sunk financial costs induce a desire to cut losses, while sunk costs involving US lives do not affect the public’s support for intervention. The article engages an important concept in the academic and policy worlds, shows a high degree of methodological sophistication and rigour and provides new evidence in support of an interesting proposition.