Julie Byrne

Governance and the Corporate Life-Cycle

Purpose – The purpose of this research is to examine whether corporate governance changes along the corporate life-cycle. Design/methodology/approach – In a sample of 205 firms from 21 emerging market countries and using a life-cycle proxy from the dividends literature, we use a governance-prediction model which examines whether corporate governance differs along the corporate life-cycle. Findings – Mature firms tend to practice better overall corporate governance. Discipline and independence improve as firms mature. Firms tend to be most transparent and accountable when they are young. These findings suggest that the resource/strategy and monitoring/control governance functions are relevant but at different life-cycle stages. Research limitations/implications – In the absence of longitudinal governance data with sufficient coverage to track within-firm changes in corporate governance along the corporate life-cycle, we analyze differences in corporate governance between-firms at different life-cycle stages. Originality/value – We use an alternative, yet new measure from the dividends literature to account for the firm’s position along the corporate life-cycle. With this new measure, our findings are in line with the predictions of Filatotchev et al. (2006).

When does corporate governance matter? Evidence from across the corporate life-cycle

Purpose - – The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between corporate governance and firm value at different stages of the corporate life-cycle. Design/methodology/approach - – The authors use two measures, commonly employed in the literature, to differentiate between “immature” and “mature” firms, and estimate separate governance-value regressions for each set of firms. Findings - – The findings suggest that it is differences in the resource/strategic governance functions, which manifest in young firms which result in differences in value across firms, all else equal. The authors find no relationship between governance and firm value for older firms. Hence, differences in the monitoring aspect of governance between mature firms are not rewarded with a value premium. Research limitations/implications - – The findings imply that the strategic and resource roles of governance are “must haves” for firms since firms that score highly on these fronts are valued more highly. In contrast, differences in the monitoring aspect of governance are not rewarded, suggesting that effective monitoring is not a necessity, but rather a “nice to have”. The analysis is limited to a small sample of emerging market firms, and it would be of interest to extend this analysis to a larger and broader sample of firms. Originality/value - – The findings suggest that corporate governance is not valued at all stages of the corporate life-cycle.