Julie Dickson

METHODOLOGY IN JURISPRUDENCE

As with many issues in contemporary jurisprudence, a host of recent debates concerning the proper methodology for legal theorists to adopt have been set into motion by H.L.A. Harts The Concept of Law . H.L.A. H ART , T HE C ONCEPT OF L AW (1st ed., 1961; 2nd ed. with Postscript, Penelope A. Bulloch and Joseph Raz, eds., 1994). All page references to this work are given according to the pagination in the 2nd edition. In the opening pages of the original edition of the book, Hart presents legal scholars in a self-reflective light, claming that they have a distinctive tendency to be drawn into theoretical debates concerning the subject matter of their discipline: “No vast literature is dedicated to answering the questions ‘What is chemistry?’ or ‘What is medicine?,’ as it is to the question ‘What is law?’ H ART , supra note 1, at 1.

Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law

1. Introduction: The Puzzles of European Union Law PART I: THE LEGAL SYSTEM 2. Towards a Theory of European Union Legal Systems 3. Not a System but an Order: An Inter-Institutional View of European Union Law 4. Harmonic Law: The Case Against Pluralism 5. Judicial Dialogue in the European Union PART II: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS 6. Deciphering the Political and Legal DNA of European Integration: An Exploratory Essay 7. Citizenship and Obligation 8. Constitutionalism in the European Union: Pipedream or Possibility? 9. Constitutionalism and the Moral Point of Constitutional Pluralism: Institutional Civil Disobedience and Conscientious Objection 10. European Demoicracy and its Crisis 11. Statecraft and the Foundations of European Union Law PART III: CONSTITUTIONAL VIRTUES 12. Precedent and the Court of Justice: A Jurisprudence of Doubt? 13. Monism and Fundamental Rights 14. European Integration and the Rule of Law in Foreign Policy 15. Solidarity in the European Union: Problems and Prospects 16. The Problem of Justice in the European Union: Values, Pluralism, and Critical Legal Justice

Who’s Afraid of Transnational Legal Theory?: Dangers and Desiderata

The rise in both number and importance of various forms of intra-, inter-, supra- and trans-national legal phenomena presents distinctive challenges for legal philosophers seeking to explain and evaluate such phenomena. This article focuses on one facet of those challenges, namely their relevance for the methodology, or the philosophy, of transnational legal theory. Must we devise new legal philosophical methodologies in order successfully to explain and evaluate transnational legal phenomena? Or do we merely need to apply, and perhaps somewhat adapt, existing methodological approaches successfully deployed in general legal philosophy, to the particular case of transnational law? This article takes the approach of identifying and exploring some dangers to be overcome or avoided, and some desiderata that we should strive to attain, if our theories of law are to be sufficiently attuned to, and appropriately illuminating regarding, the domain of transnational law.

Ours is a Broad Church: Indirectly Evaluative Legal Philosophy as a Facet of Jurisprudential Inquiry

Questions concerning the aims and aspirations, criteria of success and even proper delineation of the subject matter of theories of law have given rise to some of the most intractable and contentious debates in contemporary legal philosophy. In this article, I outline my vision of the remit and character of legal philosophy, with particular emphasis on the methodological approach with which I am most concerned in my own work, and which I refer to here as ‘indirectly evaluative legal philosophy’ (IELP). I do so partly in response to some vehement criticisms of, and, in my view, significant mischaracterisations of, IELP and cognate approaches to theorising about law, which feature in some recent jurisprudential debates. My position supports a pluralistic methodological outlook which emphasises disciplinary and sub-disciplinary complementarity as an alternative to the febrile adversarialism sometimes afflicting our discipline. For, in my view, ours is a broad church, and all theoretical accounts able to illuminate and help us understand any aspect of laws variegated and complex character are (to invoke a Scottish saying) welcome in the main body o’ the kirk.