Julie Garon

Polio vaccination: past, present and future

Live attenuated oral polio vaccine (OPV) and inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) are the tools being used to achieve eradication of wild polio virus. Because OPV can rarely cause paralysis and generate revertant polio strains, IPV will have to replace OPV after eradication of wild polio virus is certified to sustain eradication of all polioviruses. However, uncertainties remain related to IPVs ability to induce intestinal immunity in populations where fecal-oral transmission is predominant. Although substantial effectiveness and safety data exist on the use and delivery of OPV and IPV, several new research initiatives are currently underway to fill specific knowledge gaps to inform future vaccination policies that would assure polio is eradicated and eradication is maintained.

Polio endgame: the global introduction of inactivated polio vaccine

In 2013, the World Health Assembly endorsed a plan that calls for the ultimate withdrawal of oral polio vaccines (OPV) from all immunization programs globally. The withdrawal would begin in a phased manner with removal of the type 2 component of OPV in 2016 through a global switch from trivalent OPV to bivalent OPV (containing only types 1 and 3). To mitigate risks associated with immunity gaps after OPV type 2 withdrawal, the WHO Strategic Advisory Group of Experts has recommended that all 126 OPV-only using countries introduce at least one dose of inactivated polio vaccine into routine immunization programs by end-2015, before the trivalent OPV-bivalent OPV switch. The introduction of inactivated polio vaccine would reduce risks of reintroduction of type 2 poliovirus by providing some level of seroprotection, facilitating interruption of transmission if outbreaks occur, and accelerating eradication by boosting immunity to types 1 and 3 polioviruses.

Polio endgame: the global switch from tOPV to bOPV

ABSTRACT Globally, polio cases have reached an all-time low, and type 2 poliovirus (one of three) is eradicated. Oral polio vaccine (OPV) has been the primary tool, however, in rare cases, OPV induces paralysis. In 2013, the World Health Assembly endorsed the phased withdrawal of OPV and introduction of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) into childhood routine immunization schedules. Type 2 OPV will be withdrawn through a globally synchronized “switch” from trivalent OPV (all three types) to bivalent OPV (types 1 and 3). The switch will happen in 155 OPV-using countries between April 17th and May 1st, 2016. Planned activities to reduce type 2 outbreak risks post-switch include the following: tOPV campaigns to increase type 2 immunity prior to the switch, monovalent OPV2 stockpiling to respond to outbreaks should they occur, containment of both wild and vaccine type 2 viruses, enhanced acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) and environmental surveillance, outbreak response protocols, and ensured access to IPV and bivalent OPV.

The Challenge of Global Poliomyelitis Eradication

In the United States during the 1950s, polio was on the forefront of every provider and caregivers mind. Today, most providers in the United States have never seen a case. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), which began in 1988 has reduced the number of cases by over 99%. The world is closer to achieving global eradication of polio than ever before but as long as poliovirus circulates anywhere in the world, every country is vulnerable. The global community can support the polio eradication effort through continued vaccination, surveillance, enforcing travel regulations and contributing financial support, partnerships and advocacy.

Monitoring and Validation of the Global Replacement of tOPV with bOPV, April–May 2016

Abstract The phased withdrawal of oral polio vaccine (OPV) associated with the Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan 2013-2018 began with the synchronized global replacement of trivalent OPV (tOPV) with bivalent OPV (bOPV) during April - May 2016, a transition referred to as the “switch.” The World Health Organization’s (WHO) Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) on Immunization recommended conducting this synchronized switch in all 155 OPV-using countries and territories (which collectively administered several hundred million doses of tOPV each year via several hundred thousand facilities) to reduce risks of re-emergence of vaccine-derived polioviruses. Safe execution of this switch required implementation of an associated independent monitoring strategy, the primary objective of which was verification that tOPV was no longer available for administration post-switch. This strategy had to be both practical and rigorous such that tOPV withdrawal could be reasonably employed and confirmed in all countries and territories within a discreet timeframe. Following these principles, WHO recommended that designated monitors in each of the 155 countries and territories visit all vaccine stores as well as a 10% sample of highest-risk health facilities within two weeks of the national switch date, removing any tOPV vials found. National governments were required to provide the WHO with formal validation of execution and monitoring of the switch. In practice, all countries reported cessation of tOPV by 12 May 2016 and 95% of countries and territories submitted detailed monitoring data to WHO. According to these data, 272 out of 276 (99%) national stores, 3,741 out of 3.968 (94%) regional stores, 16,144 out of 22,372 (72%) district level stores, and 143,050 out of 595,401 (24%) of health facilities were monitored. These data, along with field reports suggest that monitoring and validation of the switch was efficient and effective, and that the strategies used during the process could be adapted to future stages of OPV withdrawal.

Implementing the Synchronized Global Switch from Trivalent to Bivalent Oral Polio Vaccines—Lessons Learned From the Global Perspective

Abstract In 2015, the Global Commission for the Certification of Polio Eradication certified the eradication of type 2 wild poliovirus, 1 of 3 wild poliovirus serotypes causing paralytic polio since the beginning of recorded history. This milestone was one of the key criteria prompting the Global Polio Eradication Initiative to begin withdrawal of oral polio vaccines (OPV), beginning with the type 2 component (OPV2), through a globally synchronized initiative in April and May 2016 that called for all OPV using countries and territories to simultaneously switch from use of trivalent OPV (tOPV; containing types 1, 2, and 3 poliovirus) to bivalent OPV (bOPV; containing types 1 and 3 poliovirus), thus withdrawing OPV2. Before the switch, immunization programs globally had been using approximately 2 billion tOPV doses per year to immunize hundreds of millions of children. Thus, the globally synchronized withdrawal of tOPV was an unprecedented achievement in immunization and was part of a crucial strategy for containment of polioviruses. Successful implementation of the switch called for intense global coordination during 2015–2016 on an unprecedented scale among global public health technical agencies and donors, vaccine manufacturers, regulatory agencies, World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) regional offices, and national governments. Priority activities included cessation of tOPV production and shipment, national inventories of tOPV, detailed forecasting of tOPV needs, bOPV licensing, scaling up of bOPV production and procurement, developing national operational switch plans, securing funding, establishing oversight and implementation committees and teams, training logisticians and health workers, fostering advocacy and communications, establishing monitoring and validation structures, and implementing waste management strategies. The WHO received confirmation that, by mid May 2016, all 155 countries and territories that had used OPV in 2015 had successfully withdrawn OPV2 by ceasing use of tOPV in their national immunization programs. This article provides an overview of the global efforts and challenges in successfully implementing this unprecedented global initiative, including (1) coordination and tracking of key global planning milestones, (2) guidance facilitating development of country specific plans, (3) challenges for planning and implementing the switch at the global level, and (4) best practices and lessons learned in meeting aggressive switch timelines. Lessons from this monumental public health achievement by countries and partners will likely be drawn upon when bOPV is withdrawn after polio eradication but also could be relevant for other global health initiatives with similarly complex mandates and accelerated timelines.

Disposing of Excess Vaccines After the Withdrawal of Oral Polio Vaccine

Abstract Until recently, waste management for national immunization programs was limited to sharps waste, empty vaccine vials, or vaccines that had expired or were no longer usable. However, because wild-type 2 poliovirus has been eradicated, the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization deemed that all countries must simultaneously cease use of the type 2 oral polio vaccine and recommended that all countries and territories using oral polio vaccine (OPV) “switch” from trivalent OPV (tOPV; types 1, 2, and 3 polioviruses) to bivalent OPV (bOPV; types 1 and 3 polioviruses) during a 2-week period in April 2016. Use of tOPV after the switch would risk outbreaks of paralysis related to type 2–circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2). To minimize risk of vaccine-derived polio countries using OPV were asked to dispose of all usable, unexpired tOPV after the switch to bOPV. In this paper, we review the rationale for tOPV disposal and describe the global guidelines provided to countries for the safe and appropriate disposal of tOPV. These guidelines gave countries flexibility in implementing this important task within the confines of their national regulations, capacities, and resources. Steps for appropriate disposal of tOPV included removal of all tOPV vials from the cold chain, placement in appropriate bags or containers, and disposal using a recommended approach (ie, autoclaving, boiling, chemical inactivation, incineration, or encapsulation) followed by burial or transportation to a designated waste facility. This experience with disposal of tOPV highlights the adaptability of national immunization programs to new procedures, and identifies gaps in waste management policies and strategies with regard to disposal of unused vaccines. The experience also provides a framework for future policies and for developing programmatic guidance for the ultimate disposal of all OPV after the eradication of polio.

Administering Multiple Injectable Vaccines During a Single Visit-Summary of Findings From the Accelerated Introduction of Inactivated Polio Vaccine Globally.

Abstract Background. In 2013, the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) recommended that all 126 countries using only oral polio vaccine (OPV) introduce at least 1 dose of inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) into their routine immunization schedules by the end of 2015. In many countries, the addition of IPV would necessitate delivery of multiple injectable vaccines (hereafter, “multiple injections”) during a single visit, with infants receiving IPV alongside pentavalent vaccine (which covers diphtheria, tetanus, and whole-cell pertussis; hepatitis B; and Haemophilus influenzae type b) and pneumococcal vaccine. Unanticipated concerns emerged from countries over acceptability of multiple injections, sites of administration, and safety. We contextualized the issues surrounding multiple injections by documenting concerns associated with administration of ≥3 injections, existing evidence in the published literature, and findings of a systematic review on administration practices and techniques. Methods. Concerns associated with multiple-injection visits were documented from meetings and personal communications with immunization program managers. Published literature on the acceptability of multiple injections by providers and caregivers was summarized, and a systematic review of the literature on administration practices was completed on the following topics: spacing between injection sites (ie, vaccine spacing), site of injection, route of injection, and procedural preparedness. WHO and United Nations Children’s Fund data from 2013–2015 were used to assess multiple-injection visits included in national immunization schedules. Results. Healthcare provider and caregiver attitudes and practices indicated concerns about infant pain, potential adverse effects, and uncertainty about vaccine effectiveness with multiple-injection visits. Published literature reinforced the record of safety and acceptance of the recommended schedule of IPV by the SAGE, but the evidence was largely from developed countries. Parental acceptance of multiple injections was associated with a positive provider recommendation to the caregiver. Findings of the systematic review identified that the intramuscular route is preferred over the subcutaneous route for vaccine administration and that the vastus lateralis muscle is preferred over the deltoid muscle for intramuscular injections. Recommendations on vaccine spacing and procedural preparedness were based on practical necessities, but comparative evidence was not identified. During 2013–2015, 85 countries added IPV to their immunization schedules, 46 (55%) of which adopted a schedule resulting in 3 injectable vaccines being administered in a single visit. Conclusion. The multiple-injection experience identified gaps in guidance for future vaccine introductions. Global partner organizations quickly mobilized to assess, document, and communicate the existing global experience on multiple-injection visits. This evidence-based approach provided reassurance to opinion leaders, health workers, and professional societies, thus encouraging uptake of IPV as a second or third injection in an accelerated manner globally.

Understanding the host-pathogen interaction saves lives: lessons from vaccines and vaccinations.

Vaccines are one of the most successful and cost-effective public health tools employed to date, yet these benefits are only realized when the life-saving intervention reaches each and every targeted individual. Vaccine development is prioritized based on a number of factors such as health burden, feasibility, and determination of potential target populations. But only through an arduous process of pre-clinical development and progressive clinical trials does a vaccine become licensed and recommended for use. Once used in a wider and more diverse population safety issues, long-term impact and other unintended outcomes may become apparent, influencing policy modification. This commentary explores the role host-pathogen interaction plays in vaccine development and the operational and policy considerations that may impact vaccine success post-licensure.

Comparing Israeli and Palestinian polio vaccination policies and the challenges of silent entry of wild poliovirus in 2013–14: a ‘natural experiment’

Eradication of poliomyelitis has been a long time global challenge and is currently reaching the final end stages (Moturi et al. 2014). The potential for reappearance of both wild poliovirus (WPV) and other vaccine-related polioviruses has impacted policy development and influenced strategies implemented worldwide (World Health Organization 2013; Mundel and Orenstein 2013). This commentary views the use of a combined oral polio vaccine (OPV) and inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) schedule in comparison to IPV-alone polio immunization programs in limiting the spread of imported WPV. In 2013, type 1 wild poliovirus (WPV1) entered highly immunized Israel and Palestinian Territories from Egypt and circulated for more than a year (Anis et al. 2013; Manor et al. 2014). During the 1970s, Gaza and the West Bank experienced high levels of clinical poliomyelitis with many cases occurring among children who had received multiple doses of OPV. In the early 1980s, polio was eliminated in both areas using a combination of OPV and IPV (Goldblum et al. 1994). Israel used OPV nationwide, except for in two districts in which an IPV-only schedule was used. Following a 1988 outbreak of poliomyelitis in one of these areas (Hadera) in which 15 cases of polio occurred, Israel adopted a combined OPV/IPV schedule. No further cases were found and a routine sewage monitoring system for polioviruses was initiated in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza (Slater et al. 1990). In 2004, Israel adopted an IPV-only policy in keeping with practices adopted in European and North American countries. Having achieved polio-free status, these countries sought to prevent vaccine-associated poliomyelitis (VAPP), a more pressing national priority at that time than prevention of WPV transmission, which was no longer endemic. In 2013, routine monitoring tests showed WPV1 in sewage in southern and later central Israel. Increased surveillance, developed in consultation with international experts, indicated widespread WPV1 isolates in Southern and Central Israel continuing into early 2014. The positive sewage findings were primarily in Israel, initially among Bedouin communities, but later spreading to mixed communities in Central Israel. A mass campaign of OPV was conducted for children up to age 10 in early 2014. Increased sampling in the West Bank and Gaza showed This commentary is part of the special issue ‘‘Driving the Best Science to Meet Global Health Challenges’’ edited on the occasion of the 9th European Congress on Tropical Medicine and International Health 2015.