Julie K. Norem

Defensive pessimism: harnessing anxiety as motivation

In this article we discuss the strategies that people may use to cope with situations that are risky in that they present the possibility for failure and potential threats to self-esteem. Previous research has indicated that anxiety (Sarason, 1980) and explicitly set low expectations (Sherman, Skov, Hervitz, & Stock, 1981) may lead to performance deficits in these situations. Experiment 1 indicates, in contrast, that with a strategy called defensive pessimism (Norem & Cantor, 1986), individuals may sometimes use low expectations to cope with their anxiety so that it does not become debilitating. A second experiment further supports the contention that low expectations may help individuals negotiate risky situations by showing that interference with the defensive-pessimism strategy impairs performance. Subjects whose strategic construction of the situation was not interfered with do not show impaired performance. These data are interpreted as evidence that the effects of low expectations and high anxiety on performance may be mediated by the strategies individuals use when approaching risky situations.

Anticipatory and post hoc cushioning strategies: Optimism and defensive pessimism in “risky” situations

The concept of cognitive strategies is proposed as a model for the process by which individuals cushion themselves against threats to self-esteem in “risky” situations. Two strategies are discussed. The first is defensive pessimism, an anticipatory strategy that involves setting defensively low expectations prior to entering a situation, so as to defend against loss of self-esteem in the event of failure. The second is an optimistic strategy, where expectations are high at the outset, and post hoc restructuring of the situation is done when the outcome is known. Expectations about performance on an anagram task were collected from prescreened optimistics and defensive pessimists. After completion of the task, subjects were given false failure or success feedback. A posttest measuring self-reported satisfaction, feelings of control, and performance evaluations was administered. As predicted, subjects selected for defensive pessimist attitudes expected to perform significantly worse than did those selected for optimistic attitudes, even though there was no difference in actual performance. Moreover, optimists demonstrated attributional egotism in claiming significantly more control over their performance in the success condition than in the failure condition. Pessimists did not show this pattern. The data provide evidence of post hoc cushioning efforts among optimists, whereas defensive pessimists seem to be cushioned by their initial structuring of the situation. It is argued that these strategies can be understood as motivated attempts to solve the “problem” of a “risky” situation.

Strategy-dependent effects of reflecting on self and tasks: Some implications of optimism and defensive pessimism.

Two studies investigated the hypothesis that individuals using the cognitive strategy of defensive pessimism will perform better and feel better when allowed to play through possible outcomes and reflect on their progress. In contrast, individuals using an optimistic strategy will perform more poorly and feel worse when they are encouraged or required to reflect on themselves and their goals. A laboratory experiment and a study using experience-sampling methodology (ESM) revealed this pattern for self-reported mood, appraisal of tasks, and progress toward goals; objective performance; and a physiological measure, though the interaction was not always statistically significant

Reflection and Distraction Defensive Pessimism, Strategic Optimism, and Performance

This research concerns the interaction between performance strategies and imagery conditions. Defensive pessimists (DPs, who set low expectations, feel anxious, and rehearse possible outcomes) and strategic optimists (OPTs, who set high expectations, feel calm, and avoid reflecting) were randomly assigned to three conditions: a coping imagery condition (imagining correcting mistakes), a mastery imagery condition (imagining a flawless performance), or a relaxation condition (relaxation imagery). DPs performed better in the coping imagery condition, which was similar to their typical strategy, than in the relaxation condition, which was hypothesized to interfere with their performance. The opposite was true for OPTs. Both groups performed worst in the mastery imagery condition. Discussion highlights the importance of both reflective process and thought content and the costs and benefits of each strategy.

Defensive self-déception and social adaptation among optimists

Though optimism and self-enhancing deception are related, few researchers have tried to disentangle their relations to particular outcomes. Using a person-centered approach and longitudinal data, this paper reports comparisons between defensive and non-defensive optimists. Results suggest that defensive optimists may be less successful at forming intimate, supportive relationships with others over time, relative to non-defensive optimists. Further research should be directed toward understanding both the costs and the benefits of defensive psychological processes and optimism, especially as they may vary across different kinds of outcomes, and different intrapsychic, social, cultural, and developmental contexts.

Resisting the Hegemony of the Five-Factor Model: There is Plenty of Personality Outside the FFA

One of the glorious things about being a member of a scientific field that values empiricism is the rush of excitement as new data pour in: One can trumpet new findings to the world, confident in their scientific currency and power to legitimize. One of the less glorious things about being a member of a scientific field that places so much emphasis on the generation of new data is the relative lack of opportunity, amidst empirical fury, to synthesize, integrate, and reconsider. Block’s target article, written in his signature style and informed by his wide-ranging interests, experiences, and historical breadth, provides a collective opportunity to pause and reflect—an opportunity made more poignant by his recent death. Most of the insights, reflections, and critiques included in Block’s target article can be found in some form in his previous writing, and many individuals in the field have been strongly influenced by his work at various points. Yet, on reading this current instantiation, one is struck by the extent to which the theoretical hegemony of the Five-Factor Approach (FFA) in personality psychology seems scarcely touched by Block’s arguments, which are less frequently refuted than simply ignored. Certainly there are other critics of the FFA, and certainly there is work in personality on other topics and from other theoretical perspectives. Within the FFA tradition, however, there is little ongoing consideration of Block’s critiques; within personality psychology, there is (too) little public discussion of the implications of the prominence of the FFA for the field as a whole. Block’s discussion of specific concerns about the FFA, such as lack of consensual understanding of the five factors, additional characteristics not included in the model, and the probable existence of two factors “above” the five factors of the FFA, provides a potent argument against claims of comprehensiveness. I want to extend his discussion of what that model leaves out by considering some further categories and specific examples of personality phenomena that are not subsumed within the Big Five or the Five-Factor Model (FFM). In addition, I argue that there are significant costs to unchallenged FFA hegemony, both in terms of what we may fail to understand about personality and what personality psychologists cede (unnecessarily, unproductively and ahistorically) to other areas in psychology if we accept that hegemony.