Julie Wallbank

The Role of Rights and Utility in Instituting a Child’s Right to Know Her Genetic History

This article examines recent developments in family law which are concerned with the child’s right to know her genetic history. It specifically investigates three areas. First, the Child Support (Pensions and Social Security) Act 2000 (CSPSSA). Second, an unusual case concerning IVF at a licensed clinic where a decision failed to be made about parental responsibility ( Re D [2001]; Re R [2001]). Finally, the recent Department of Health (2002) consultation exercise on donor anonymity. Drawing upon Parker’s (1992) theoretical discussion about the significance of rights and utility to family law, the article will show that although there is evidence of a child’s right to know in private familial disputes, this right is not approached consistently across family law. In respect of the government’s recent consultation paper on donor anonymity, it will be argued that the child’s right to know is subordinated to a utility approach. The article will recommend that the government should take the radical step of reforming the law on donor anonymity to allow donor children the right to know their genetic progenitor.*

Castigating mothers: The judicial response to ‘wilful’ women in disputes over paternal contact in English law

Abstract In this article I utilize Foucault ‘s theory of discourse to examine five English cases concerning paternal contact in order to discover the criteria utilized by the courts in reaching decisions as to whether or not fathers should have contact with their children where the issue is disputed between the parents. 1 argue that whilst judges explicitly frame their decisions according to the best interests of the child as laid down in Section 1(1) Children Act 1989, the concept is so vague as to give rise to the consideration of a number of influential factors which will affect the outcome to the detriment of the child and her/his mother. These factors are identified as: (i) the implacable hostility of the mother; (ii) the desirability of father/child contact; (iii) the prominence of fathers’ rights claims. I also argue that in taking account of the above factors other important factors are ignored to the detriment of mothers and their children. Moreover, I demonstrate that mothers are subjected to ve...

Channelling the messiness of diverse family lives: resisting the calls to order and de-centring the hetero-normative family

The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (HFEA 2008) amended the parenthood provisions in order to achieve a level of consistency between same-sex and heterosexual parents who rely on reproductive technologies to achieve parenthood and to eradicate discrimination. 1 To that end, the legislation now allows for a lesbian couple to be registered as the childs parents if certain conditions are met. Academic debates on the significance of the amending legislation have begun.2

Minors' capacity to refuse treatment: a reply to Gilmore and Herring.

Re R and Re W allow a parent to consent to treatment a competent minor refuses, but the cases have not been tested post-Human Rights Act 1998. Gilmore and Herring offer a means by which they might be distinguished or sidelined. They interpret Gillick to say that in order to consent a minor need only have a full understanding of the particular treatment. They argue that the minors in Re R and Re W were refusing all treatment which requires a separate assessment of capacity-an assessment which was not made. We fear that this distinction would not be workable in clinical practice and argue that their interpretation of Gillick is flawed. From a clinicians point of view, competence cannot always be judged in relation to a specific treatment, but instead must relate to the decision. We show that a decision can incorporate more than one treatment, and more than one decision might be made about one treatment. A minors understanding of a specific treatment is not always sufficient to demonstrate competence to make a decision. The result is that whilst there might be situations when a parent and a minor both have the power to consent to a particular treatment, they will not share concurrent powers in relation to the same decision. Consequently, a challenge to Re R and Re W, if forthcoming, would need to take a different form. We emphasise the necessity to minimise the dichotomy between legal consent and how consent works in medical practice.

The Campaign for Change of the Child Support Act 1991: Reconstituting the 'Absent' Father

HE IMPLEMENTATION of the Child Support Act and the first t years of the operation of the Child Support Agency prompted vehe-JL ment criticisms from many quarters. Perhaps one of the most voracious sources of critique came from middle-class non-residential fathers who claimed that they were being treated unfairly by the new measures. Some of the fathers were joined by new partners who also voiced concerns about the way the Act placed a greater financial burden on the reconstituted family. Fathers maintained that they were being targeted by the Child Support Agency as the best means of recouping the greatest amount of money for the Treasury as they were already paying maintenance and were therefore readily identifiable for child-support purposes. Non-residential fathers as a group also objected to the way that they were represented in many contemporary discourses in a negative manner. Fathers were constructed as ’absent’ in both the White Paper Children Come First (HMSO, 1990) which preceded the legislation and in the Act itself. In much of the press coverage on the childsupport issue non-residential fathers were constructed as being feckless and in derogation of their paternal responsibilities. This derisory language provided a springboard for non-residential fathers’ campaigns for reform of the legislation. Non-residential fathers suggested that the Child Support Agency

“Throwing Baby out with the Bath water#x201D;: Some Reflections on the Evolution of Reproductive Technology}

This article discusses section 156 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 which prohibits the use of eggs from aborted female foetuses for the purposes of reproduction. I argue that the pre-legislative debates focus only on the biological relationship between the aborted foetus and any ensuing child and foreclose the possibility of useful discussion about the potential merits of such technology. Kristevas theory of abjection has been used in order to elucidate the strength of feeling about the use of eggs from the expelled foetus. I suggest that the ‘yuk’ factor stems from the potential for the blurring of the boundaries between life and death. In addition, I suggest that the stress placed on the biological link means that the foetus is ascribed special properties not given to live donors. Womans very crucial role in reproductive technologies is therefore erased. The article argues that there are very good reasons why the debate on the subject should remain open. At present women donors have to undergo highly intrusive procedures in order to give eggs and the process is not without its health risks. The use of eggs from aborted foetuses certainly raises important consent issues but these could be addressed by placing women at the centre of the decision making process, starting with the recognition that it is women and not foetuses who have the remit and responsibility for giving consent for the use of their genetic material. Moreover, there should be an acknowledgement that women are perfectly capable of making informed decisions about donation and of considering the potential implications of participating in egg donation.

The mysterious case of disappearing family law and the shrinking vulnerable subject: The shifting sands of family law’s jurisdiction

This article seeks to critically examine the implications that the new eligibility requirements for legal aid as implemented by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 are having on the ways in which private family law governs families. It makes use of a theoretical lens drawn from the work of Valverde (2009, 2014a, 2014b) on ‘jurisdiction’ to map the shift that has taken place within family law as a result of the political boundary that the act has drawn between ‘vulnerable’ litigants eligible for legal aid and the rest of families engaging with private family law, for whom self-sufficiency and responsibility is encouraged and expected. It argues that in reserving legal aid for a narrow group of vulnerable litigants, the formal scale of family law has shrunk, there being at the same time an increased reliance on more informal sources of law such as advice-based resources. This has led to a diversification of formal and informal scales of governance which operate according to different ‘logics’, which impact negatively on access to family justice for families from various backgrounds and circumstances. The article concludes with a call for family law researchers to be mindful of the need to look at both formal and more informal sources of family law in order to fully appreciate developments within the jurisdiction, particularly pernicious ones, and to be able to respond to them appropriately.

Returning the subject to the subject of women's poverty: An essay on the importance of subjectivity for the feminist research project

ConclusionIn this piece I have stated my case for the importance of the inclusion of subjectivity in the study of womens poverty. The relevance of the ideas discussed herein is not confined to this one research area, for the project of incorporation is crucial to any field of research which has a pertinence to the practical realities of womens lives. I have noted how through talking and prioritising principles we run the danger of evacuating the subject, for principles cannot take into account the diversity of womens experiences based upon class, race, ethnicity, religion and sexual affiliation. I have also outlined the benefits that accrue to both researcher and participant, with the researcher gaining better insight and understanding of the women she is concerned with and accountable to in her work, and the participant being given the opportunity to tell her own story of her life, rather than have it told solely by the outsider interpreting it. As such she is actively participating in her life rather than simply being led through it, resulting in a form of empowerment that might otherwise be denied her. Subscription has been made to interviewing as a means of incorporating subjectivity into the research project. But the interview as a technique has been problematised, for only through problematisation can we hope to improve our research and strive to ensure that we heed the lessons we and others have learned through our practical activities. I am indebted to those more experienced feminist researchers whose work has influenced this project. And finally, this piece serves as a reminder to others engaged in work about or with women, that women in all diversity are the subjects we should be concerned with in debates on the subject of poverty. Lest we forget ...