Julien A. Deonna

Differentiating shame from guilt.

How does shame differ from guilt? Empirical psychology has recently offered distinct and seemingly incompatible answers to this question. This article brings together four prominent answers into a cohesive whole. These are that (a) shame differs from guilt in being a social emotion; (b) shame, in contrast to guilt, affects the whole self; (c) shame is linked with ideals, whereas guilt concerns prohibitions and (d) shame is oriented towards the self, guilt towards others. After presenting the relevant empirical evidence, we defend specific interpretations of each of these answers and argue that they are related to four different dimensions of the emotions. This not only allows us to overcome the conclusion that the above criteria are either unrelated or conflicting with one another, it also allows us to tell apart what is constitutive from what is typical of them.

In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion

Preface Introduction A. Why shame? B. Emotions and their Dimensions C. Shame and the sense of shame D. Emotions and morality E. The structure of the book Part One: Two Dogmas About Shame Chapter I. The Social Emotion Chapter II. The Ugly Emotion Part Two: The Nature Of Shame Chapter III. Shame, values and the self Chapter IV. Shame revealed Part Three: Revisiting the Dogmas Chapter V. Socialism with Modesty Chapter VI. Shames Fragile Beauty Part Four: Shame in the Public Domain Chapter VII. Shame, Crime, and Punishment Chapter VIII. Shame, Legislation, and Subordination

Two Faces of Group-Based Shame Moral Shame and Image Shame Differentially Predict Positive and Negative Orientations to Ingroup Wrongdoing

This article proposes distinctions between guilt and two forms of shame: Guilt arises from a violated norm and is characterized by a focus on specific behavior; shame can be characterized by a threatened social image (Image Shame) or a threatened moral essence (Moral Shame). Applying this analysis to group-based emotions, three correlational studies are reported, set in the context of atrocities committed by (British) ingroup members during the Iraq war (Ns = 147, 256, 399). Results showed that the two forms of shame could be distinguished. Moreover, once the other form of shame was controlled for, they were differentially related to orientations toward the outgroup: Image Shame was associated with negative orientations, whereas Moral Shame had associations with positive outgroup orientations. These associations were distinct from the associations of guilt and rejection. Study 3 used a longitudinal design and provided evidence suggestive of a causal direction from emotions to outgroup orientation.

The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion

Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists (in particular Barrett) seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in emotion noting that these do not qualify as intentional. We argue that these disappearing acts, deliberate or not, generate fruitless debate and add little to the advancement of our understanding of emotion as an adaptive mechanism to cope with events that are relevant to an organism’s life.

Emotions as Attitudes

In this paper, we develop a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions are evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion–value connection at the level of content and that we should instead locate it at the level of attitudes or modes. We begin by explaining the contrast between content and attitude, a contrast in the light of which we review the leading contemporary accounts of the emotions. We next offer reasons to think that these accounts face substantial problems since they locate the link emotions bear to values at the level of content. This provides the incentive to pursue an alternative approach according to which emotions qualify as evaluations because they are specific types of attitudes, an approach we substantiate by appealing to felt bodily stances. We conclude by considering two reasons why this approach may be resisted; they respectively pertain to the alleged impossibility of drawing the attitude–content contrast in the case of the emotions and to the suspicion that so doing raises qualia-related worries.

Taking affective explanations to heart

In this article, the authors examine and debate the categories of emotions, moods, temperaments, character traits and sentiments. They define them and offer an account of the relations that exist among the phenomena they cover. They argue that, whereas ascribing character traits and sentiments (dispositions) is to ascribe a specific coherence and stability to the emotions (episodes) the subject is likely to feel, ascribing temperaments (dispositions) is to ascribe a certain stability to the subject’s moods (episodes). The rationale for this distinction, the authors claim, lies in the fact that, whereas appeal to character traits or sentiments in explanation is tantamount to making sense of a given behaviour in terms of an individual’s specific evaluative perspective — as embodied in this individual’s emotional profile — appeal to temperaments makes sense of it independently of any such evaluative perspective. Dans cet article, les auteurs s’interrogent sur les catégories d’émotions, d’humeurs, de tempéraments, de traits de caractère et de sentiments. Ils proposent des définitions de ces catégories et offrent une analyse des relations existant entre les phénomènes qu’elles désignent. Ils défendent ainsi l’idée selon laquelle attribuer des traits de caractère et des sentiments (dispositions) revient à attribuer une certaine stabilité et cohérence dans les émotions (épisodes) ressenties par le sujet, alors qu’attribuer des tempéraments (dispositions) revient à attribuer une certaine stabilité dans ses humeurs (épisodes). Cette distinction est motivée par les rôles explicatifs distincts joués par ces catégories. D’un côté, faire référence à des traits de caractère ou à des sentiments dans l’explication psychologique, c’est faire sens d’un comportement donné en termes de l’orientation évaluative d’un individu, en tant qu’elle s’incarne dans son profil émotionnel. De l’autre, lorsque l’on fait appel à des tempéraments, l’explication est indépendante d’une quelconque perspective évaluative.

The Structure of Empathy

If Sam empathizes with Maria, then it is true of Sam that (1) Sam is aware of Marias emotion, and (2) Sam ‘feels in tune’ with Maria. On what I call thetransparency conception of how they interact when instantiated, I argue that these two conditions are collectively necessary and sufficient for empathy. I first clarify the ‘awareness’ and ‘feeling in tune’ conditions, and go on to examine different candidate models that explain the manner in which these two conditions might come to be concomitantly instantiated in a subject. I dismiss what I call theparallel and oscillation models for not satisfying the transparency condition, i.e. for failing to capture that, if Sam empathizes with Maria, then Sams own emotional experience towards the object of Marias emotion has to be mediated by Marias own emotional experience. I conclude in favour the fusion model as the only model capable of satisfying the transparency condition, and I argue that the suggested proposal illuminates the difference between it and other ways in which we understand the emotions of others. Finally, I expand and clarify the conception of empathy as transparency through responses to obvious objections that the view raises.

Getting Bodily Feelings Into Emotional Experience in the Right Way

We argue that the main objections against two central tenets of a Jamesian account of the emotions, that is, that (a) different types of emotions are associated with specific types of bodily feelings (specificity), and that (b) emotions are constituted by patterns of bodily feeling (constitution), do not succeed. In the first part, we argue that several reasons adduced against specificity, including one inspired by Schachter and Singer’s work, are unconvincing. In the second part, we argue that constitution, too, can withstand most of the objections raised against it, including the objection that bodily feelings cannot account for the outward-looking and evaluative nature of emotions. In both sections, we argue that the kinds of felt bodily changes posited by a Jamesian account of emotions are best understood in terms of felt states of action readiness.

From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements

Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of the relevant evaluative property. We then investigate the roles of motivational bases. Finally, we argue that justified emotions are sufficient for justified evaluative judgements.

Emotion, philosophical issues about.

We start this overview by discussing the place of emotions within the broader affective domain-how different are emotions from moods, sensations, and affective dispositions? Next, we examine the way emotions relate to their objects, emphasizing in the process their intimate relations to values. We move from this inquiry into the nature of emotion to an inquiry into their epistemology. Do they provide reasons for evaluative judgments and, more generally, do they contribute to our knowledge of values? We then address the question of the social dimension of emotions, explaining how the traditional nature versus nurture contrast applies to them. We finish by exploring the relations between emotions, motivation and action, concluding this overview with a more specific focus on how these relations bear on some central ethical issues.