Julio Escolano
International Monetary Fund
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Publication
Featured researches published by Julio Escolano.
Fiscal Performance, Institutional Design and Decentralization in European Union Countries | 2012
Luc Eyraud; Anita Tuladhar; Julio Escolano; Marialuz Moreno Badia; Juliane Sarnes
This paper analyzes the impact of decentralization on overall fiscal performance in the European Union, taking into account fiscal institutional arrangements. We find that spending decentralization has been associated with sizably better fiscal performance, especially when transfer dependency of subnational governments is low. However, subnational fiscal rules do not seem to be associated with better performance.
Competitiveness in the Southern Euro Area : France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain | 2008
Bogdan Lissovolik; Julio Escolano; Stefania Fabrizio; Werner Schule; Herman Bennett; Stephen Tokarick; Yuan Xiao; Marialuz Moreno Badia; Eva Gutierrez; Iryna V. Ivaschenko
This collection of studies analyzes developments in nonprice external competitiveness of France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. While France, Italy, and Portugal have experienced substantial export market share losses, Greece and Spain performed relatively well. Export market share losses appear associated with rigidities in resource allocation (sectoral, geographical, technological) relative to peers and lower productivity gains in high value-added sectors. Disaggregated analysis of goods and services export markets provides insights on aspects such as quality, market concentration, growth of destination markets, and geographical and sectoral diversification. Also, increased import penetration, offshoring and FDI could improve productivity and export performance.
Fiscal Studies | 2011
Anna Shabunina; Julio Escolano; Jaejoon Woo
The interest rate-growth differential (IRGD) shows a marked correlation with GDP per capita. It has been on average around 1 percentage point for large advanced economies during 1999-2008; but below -7 percentage points among non-advanced economies - exerting a powerful stabilizing influence on government debt ratios. We show that large negative IRGDs are largely due to real interest rates well below market equilibrium - possibly stemming from financial repression and captive and distorted markets, whereas the income catch-up process plays a relatively modest role. We find econometric support for this conjecture. Therefore, the IRGD in non-advanced economies is likely to rise with financial integration and market development, well before their GDP per capita converges to advanced-economy levels.
Fiscal Transparency, Fiscal Performance and Credit Ratings | 2012
Julio Escolano; Elif C. Arbatli
This paper investigates the effect of fiscal transparency on market assessments of sovereign risk, as measured by credit ratings. It measures this effect through a direct channel (uncertainty reduction) and an indirect channel (better fiscal policies and outcomes), and it differentiates between advanced and developing economies. Fiscal transparency is measured by an index based on the IMF’s Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs). We find that fiscal transparency has a positive and significant effect on ratings, but it works through different channels in advanced and developing economies. In advanced economies the indirect effect of transparency through better fiscal outcomes is more significant whereas for developing economies the direct uncertainty-reducing effect is more relevant. Our results suggest that a one standard deviation improvement in fiscal transparency index is associated with a significant increase in credit ratings: by 0.7 and 1 notches in advanced and developing economies respectively.
How Much is A Lot? Historical Evidence on the Size of Fiscal Adjustments | 2014
Julio Escolano; Laura Jaramillo; Carlos Mulas-Granados; G. Terrier
The sizeable fiscal consolidation required to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratios in several countries in the aftermath of the global crisis raises a crucial question on its feasibility. To answer this question, we rely on historical evidence from a sample of 91 adjustment episodes of countries during 1945–2012 that needed and wanted to adjust in order to stabilize debt to GDP. We find that, in at least half the cases, countries improved their cyclically adjusted primary balances by close to 5 percent of GDP. We also observe that, while countries typically make substantial efforts to stabilize debt, once this objective is achieved, they tend to ease their primary balances and do not necessarily get back to their initial lower debt-to-GDP ratio. We find that consolidations tended to be larger when the initial deficit was high and adjustment efforts were sustained over time. Fiscal adjustments also tended to be larger when accompanied by an easing of monetary conditions and, to a lesser extent, by an improvement in credit conditions.
Optimal Debt Policy Under Asymmetric Risk | 2016
Julio Escolano; Vitor Gaspar
In the paper we show that, most of the time, smooth reduction in the debt ratio is optimal for tax-smoothing purposes when fiscal risks are asymmetric, with large debt-augmenting shocks more likely than commensurate debt reducing shocks. Asymmetric risks are a feature of 200 years of data for the U.S. and the U.K.: rare but recurrent large surges of the debt-to-GDP ratio, followed by very gradual but persistent declines over long periods. More informal evidence from many other countries suggests that asymmetry is a general feature of fiscal shocks. The gradual smooth reduction in the public debt to GDP ratio is not a response to past developments. Instead it is optimal given recurrent fiscal risks and the empirical characteristics of fiscal shocks. The behavior of the debt-to-GDP ratio in the U.K. and the U.S. seems roughly compatible with the prescriptions of the tax-smoothing model.
Archive | 2014
Julio Escolano; Christina Elisabeth Kolerus; Constant Lonkeng Ngouana
This paper finds that tightening global financial conditions can worsen emerging economies’ public debt dynamics through an increasing interest rate-growth differential, particularly if coupled with high global risk aversion. Latin America and emerging Europe are the regions most likely to be adversely affected. In addition, historical evidence — analyzed by means of a Poisson count model — suggests that the frequency of sovereign debt crises increases in emerging economies at the early stage of U.S. monetary tightening cycles, at times in which the term spread also rises. The timing may be related to abrupt switches of expectations about the future course of policy in the early stages of tightening cycles.
The Puzzle of Persistently Negative Interest Rate-Growth Differentials : Financial Repression or Income Catch-Up? | 2011
Anna Shabunina; Julio Escolano; Jaejoon Woo
The interest rate-growth differential (IRGD) shows a marked correlation with GDP per capita. It has been on average around one percentage point for large advanced economies during 1999–2008; but below -7 percentage points among non-advanced economies—exerting a powerful stabilizing influence on government debt ratios. We show that large negative IRGDs are largely due to real interest rates well below market equilibrium—possibly stemming from financial repression and captive and distorted markets, whereas the income catch-up process plays a relatively modest role. We find econometric support for this conjecture. Therefore, the IRGD in non-advanced economies is likely to rise with financial integration and market development, well before their GDP per capita converges to advanced-economy levels. JEL Classification Numbers: E31, E4, E6, G1, H6, O47
Competitiveness in the Southern Euro Area : France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain | 2008
Bogdan Lissovolik; Julio Escolano; Stefania Fabrizio; Werner Schule; Herman Bennett; Stephen Tokarick; Yuan Xiao; Marialuz Moreno Badia; Eva Gutierrez; Iryna V. Ivaschenko
Global Monetary Tightening : Emerging Markets Debt Dynamics and Fiscal Crises | 2014
Julio Escolano; Christina Elisabeth Kolerus; Constant Lonkeng Ngouana