Jürgen Weigand

Fighting hard core cartels

The paper provides a comprehensive survey of the economics behind the fight against hard core cartels. Differentiating between four subsequent stages – characterisation, welfare effects, enforcement and evaluation – the paper pays particular attention to cartel detection methods, the derivation of corporate fines, the quantification of private damages and possibilities to judge on the successfulness of cartel enforcement activities by competition authorities around the world.

AGENT-BASED SIMULATION OF CONSUMER DEMAND FOR SMART METERING TARIFFS

An agent-based model simulates consumer demand for smart metering tariffs. It utilizes the Bass Diffusion Model and Rogerss adopter categories to locate demand-side barriers and drivers. Integration of empirical census microdata enables a validated socio-economic background for each consumer. The key performance indicators diffusion-speed and diffusion-level measure the effectiveness of regulatory interventions to induce diffusion. Pricing, promotion and quantity-regulation policies are tested. Scenario results emphasize the impact of both epidemic and probit effects. Speed of adoption is mainly triggered via interactions and consumer awareness. Level of diffusion primarily depends on pricing, willingness-to-pay and cost-benefit-thresholds. Data mining on agents attributes highlight weaknesses in current regulatory requirements due to disadvantages in consumer acceptance and policy effectiveness. A cash-for-clunkers program could tackle major barriers for adoption and boost diffusion through synergies of pricing and promotion interventions.

A framework to enforce anti-predation rules

The paper develops a framework to enforce anti-predation rules that explicitly takes the intervention stage into account. In particular, it is proposed to improve predation enforcement by focusing on two channels: refining the current regime, and amending it. With respect to the refinement of the current predation enforcement regime, criteria for the imposition of optimal gain- or harm-based fines are derived in order to sharpen the deterrent effect of predation enforcement. However, given the very low probability of conviction for predators a policy proposal solely based on an increase in the fines for detected and convicted predators might be too weak to significantly amplify the deterrence effect in particular and to improve predation enforcement in general. As a consequence, the introduction of a pre-screening approach is proposed, which aims at identifying industries in which entry is difficult but desirable and a predation strategy might be a suitable instrument for an incumbent to fight such occasional entry attempts. In those industries, it is advisable to reduce the high standard of proof in predation enforcement, as its basic justification - the danger to create a negative deterrence effect - is significantly reduced.

Predation Enforcement Options: An Evaluation Using a Cournot Framework

The paper characterises the building blocks of a framework to enforce antipredation rules and subsequently evaluates selected enforcement options in a Cournot-type duopoly predation model. Differentiating between a no rule approach, an ex ante approach and two ex post approaches, it is shown that an ex post approach typically maximises overall welfare. However, an ex ante approach can be the preferred option in cases where the entrant has a large cost advantage over the incumbent.