Justin B. Biddle

Lessons from the Vioxx Debacle: What the Privatization of Science Can Teach Us About Social Epistemology

Since the early 1980s, private, for‐profit corporations have become increasingly involved in all aspects of scientific research, especially of biomedical research. In this essay, I argue that there are dangerous epistemic consequences of this trend, which should be more thoroughly examined by social epistemologists. In support of this claim, I discuss a recent episode of pharmaceutical research involving the painkiller Vioxx. I argue that the research on Vioxx was epistemically problematic and that the primary cause of these inadequacies was faulty institutional arrangements. More specifically, the research was organized in such a way as to allow short‐term commercial interests to compromise epistemic integrity. Thus, the Vioxx case study, in conjunction with numerous case studies developed elsewhere, provides strong reasons for believing that the privatization of the biomedical sciences is epistemically worrisome, and it suggests that the primary response to this situation should be a social, or organizational, one. What kind of organizational response would be most beneficial? I briefly discuss two prominent social epistemological proposals for how scientific research should be organized—namely those of Philip Kitcher and Helen Longino—and I suggest that they are incapable of dealing with the phenomenon of privatization. I then draw upon the Vioxx episode in order to outline an alternative suggestion for reorganizing certain aspects of pharmaceutical research.

Tragedy of the Anticommons? Intellectual Property and the Sharing of Scientific Information

Many philosophers argue that the emphasis on commercializing scientific research—and particularly on patenting the results of research—is both epistemically and socially detrimental, in part because it inhibits the flow of information. One of the most important of these criticisms is the “tragedy of the anticommons” thesis. Some have attempted to test this thesis empirically, and many have argued that these empirical tests effectively falsify the thesis. I argue that they neither falsify nor disconfirm the thesis because they do not actually test it. Additionally, I argue that there is other evidence that actually supports the thesis.

Institutionalizing Dissent: A Proposal for an Adversarial System of Pharmaceutical Research

There are serious problems with the way in which pharmaceutical research is currently practiced, many of which can be traced to the influence of commercial interests on research. One of the most significant is inadequate dissent, or organized skepticism. In order to ameliorate this problem, I develop a proposal that I call the “Adversarial Proceedings for the Evaluation of Pharmaceuticals,” to be instituted within a regulatory agency such as the Food and Drug Administration for the evaluation of controversial new drugs and controversial drugs already in the market. This proposal is an organizational one based upon the “science court” proposal by Arthur Kantrowitz in the 1960s and 1970s. The primary benefit of this system is its ability to institutionalize dissent, thereby ensuring that one set of interests does not dominate all others.

Advocates or Unencumbered Selves? On the Role of Mill’s Political Liberalism in Longino’s Contextual Empiricism

Helen Longino’s “contextual empiricism” is one of the most sophisticated recent attempts to defend a social theory of science. On this view, objectivity and epistemic acceptability require that research be produced within communities that approximate a Millian marketplace of ideas. I argue, however, that Longino’s embedding of her epistemology within the framework of Mill’s political liberalism implies a conception of individual epistemic agents that is incompatible with her view that scientific knowledge is necessarily social, and I begin to articulate an alternative conception that is better suited to a truly social theory of science.

Inductive Risk, Epistemic Risk, and Overdiagnosis of Disease

Recent philosophers of science have not only revived the classical argument from inductive risk but extended it. I argue that some of the purported extensions do not fit cleanly within the schema of the original argument, and I discuss the problem of overdiagnosis of disease due to expanded disease definitions in order to show that there are some risks in the research process that are important and that very clearly fall outside of the domain of inductive risk. Finally, I introduce the notion of epistemic risk in order to characterize such risks.

Bringing the Marketplace into Science: On the Neoliberal Defense of the Commercialization of Scientific Research

The aim of this paper is to identify and evaluate the theoretical justification for the commercialization of science – particularly the form of commercialization that is currently prominent in the U.S. In the first part of the paper, I examine the arguments put forward by one of the most prominent early proponents of commercialization, George Keyworth II, who served as Presidential Science Advisor to Ronald Reagan and Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy from 1981 to 1985. An examination of Keyworth’s arguments reveals the profound role that neoliberal political and economic thought played in his defense of the commercialization of science. On his view, Reagan’s science and technology policy would stimulate creative research and economic growth by expanding the domain of voluntary exchange in which scientists operate – i.e., by removing the government-imposed barriers between scientific research and the marketplace. The result, he argued, would be to facilitate the flow of information between sectors that were previously cut off from one another, thereby encouraging the sharing of expertise, expediting the transfer of scientific research into marketable products, and ultimately, promoting social progress. In the second part of this paper, I argue that there are strong reasons to question this conclusion. These reasons concern the biasing effects of conflicts of interest, the inhibition of the free flow of information that results from the proliferation of patenting and licensing, and the restrictions on scientific freedom that result from greater corporate control over scientific decision making.

Genetically engineered crops and responsible innovation

ABSTRACTThe current debate over genetically engineered (GE) crops is framed as an evaluation of GE crops as a class. This paper is an attempt to reframe the debate by focusing on the question of what responsible research and innovation (RRI) in agricultural biotechnology would look like. With regard to the ethics of agricultural technology, the most important question that we should be asking is not whether a technology is GE, but whether it is responsibly designed. I discuss a report by the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission in order to propose guidelines for RRI in agricultural technology, and I illustrate the possibility of RRI in agricultural biotechnology by discussing a public–private partnership, the Water Efficient Maize for Africa Project. I conclude by examining the implications of this argument for debates over the ethics of agricultural technologies more generally.

“Antiscience Zealotry”? Values, Epistemic Risk, and the GMO Debate

This article argues that the controversy over genetically modified crops is best understood not in terms of the supposed bias, dishonesty, irrationality, or ignorance on the part of proponents or critics, but rather in terms of differences in values. To do this, the article draws on and extends recent work of the role of values and interests in science, focusing particularly on inductive risk and epistemic risk, and it shows how the GMO debate can help to further our understanding of the various epistemic risks that are present in science and how these risks might be managed.

Intellectual Property Rights and Global Climate Change: Toward Resolving an Apparent Dilemma

Abstract This paper addresses an apparent dilemma that must be resolved in order to respond ethically to global climate change. The dilemma can be presented as follows. Responding ethically to global climate change requires technological innovation that is accessible to everyone, including inhabitants of the least developed countries. Technological innovation, according to many, requires strong intellectual property protection, but strong intellectual property protection makes it highly unlikely that patent-protected technologies will be accessible to developing countries at affordable prices. Given this, responding ethically to global climate change is highly unlikely. I argue that this apparent dilemma – which I call ‘the patent dilemma in global climate change’ – should be taken seriously. I discuss a number of possibilities for resolving it, and I argue that any acceptable strategy must satisfy the criteria of near-term feasibility and non-paternalism. Finally, I propose a multi-pronged, multi-tiered strategy that meets these conditions.