Justin Buchler

Competition, Representation and Redistricting The Case against Competitive Congressional Districts

A redistricting plan that maximizes the frequency of competitive elections does not maximize the representativeness of political outcomes. A plan more closely resembling a ‘bipartisan gerrymander’ (a non-competitive plan) out-performs a set of competitive districts. Drawing on the literature from democratic theory and the trade-offs between redistricting goals, I expand on previous models by taking legislators’ and constituents’ ideologies into consideration in order to compare the representativeness of a fair competitive and a fair non-competitive redistricting plan. I show that non-competitive districts lead to smaller ideological differences between the positions of district median voters and their representatives, voters being ideologically closer to their legislators in absolute terms, and a distribution of ideology in the legislature that is closer to the distribution of ideology in the electorate. Also, the competitive plan cannot simultaneously make legislators responsive to their district median voters while ensuring that there is a sufficient amount of variation in ideology among the state delegation. The non-competitive plan can meet all requirements. Consequently, I argue that competition is not as fundamental to representative government as we might think since competition does a surprisingly poor job of producing representative outcomes.

Teaching Quantitative Methodology to the Math Averse.

Many political science students struggle in quantitative methods courses because they have never been taught how to learn math. Learning math is different from learning in other fields, so the techniques students have used successfully in other classes are inappropriate in mathematically oriented classes. However, most students have never been told this, so they blame their difficulty with math on the impenetrability of the subject rather than tactical studying errors. This brief article discusses some of the reasons that common studying techniques do not work in quantitative methodology classes, and discusses some simple techniques to help students develop learning habits that are better suited to quantitative courses.

The Statistical Properties of Competitive Districts: What the Central Limit Theorem Can Teach Us about Election Reform

indicate that the most commonly per ceived problem with U.S. elections at the moment is that they are rarely competi tive. This absence of competition has prompted recent proposals in several states, most prominently in California and Ohio, to reform the redistricting pro cess to increase the frequency of compet itive elections. These propositions failed, but that is unlikely the end of such at tempts. The reason for these proposals is obvious. Political education in the U.S. indoctrinates us at a young age to believe that competition is good. In economics, market competition provides social ben efits, and, by analogy, political competi tion must provide similar benefits. This argument is frequently made explicitly, such as by Schumpeter (1942), and it has its roots as far back as the often-assigned Federalist Papers #10 and #51. Of

Redistricting Reform Will Not Solve California's Budget Crisis

THE CALIFORNIA Journal of Politics & Policy Volume 1, Issue 1 Redistricting Reform Will Not Solve California’s Budget Crisis Justin Buchler Case Western Reserve University Abstract Jarvis (2009) argues that ideological polarization in California’s state legislature creates unique problems for the state because of the interaction between polar- ization and the requirement that the budget pass with a two-thirds supermajority. Thus, Jarvis argues that California should adopt a system of redistricting that pro- duces more competitive elections in order to reduce polarization. However, that is the wrong solution. Increasing the number of competitive districts would have a minimal effect on polarization because polarization has other causes. Instead, the solution is to abandon the two-thirds budget requirement since polarization cannot be solved through redistricting, and increasing the number of competitive districts simply reduces representation. KEYWORDS: competition, redistricting, polarization, budget www.bepress.com/cjpp

Attention Deficit Democracy: The Paradox of Civic Engagement . By Ben Berger. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. 216p.

“Civic engagement” is the cornerstone of democracy, right? Everyone knows we need more civic engagement—everyone, that is, except Ben Berger, whose willingness to argue against convention, particularly when that convention is a key tenet of good governmentism, makes me reflexively sympathetic to his argument. Berger and I both attack foundational assumptions of conventional democratic thought, but we differ in our approaches. I base my arguments on economic theory and quantitative analysis, whereas he bases his arguments primarily on interpretations of canonical theorists, most importantly Hannah Arendt and Alexis de Tocqueville. Ultimately, I am convinced by Bergers argument that civic engagement is a messy concept that cannot be considered an “intrinsic good” for democracy, but like most formal theorists, I needed little convincing because the debate that he characterizes is remarkably similar to one that game theorists held some years ago, and resolved in the same direction. Ironically, then, he may face a more hostile audience from within his own subfield than outside of it.

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THE CALIFORNIA Journal of Politics & Policy Volume 3, Issue 3 The Aftermath of Redistricting Reform in California Justin Buchler Case Western Reserve University Abstract In 2009, Matthew Jarvis and I offered differing opinions in this journal about the potential effects of redistricting reform on California’s budgetary process. Jarvis suggested redistricting reform could help the process by either reducing legislative polarization, or giving Democrats the supermajority necessary to pass their budget without partisan gridlock. I argued the best approach would be to eliminate super- majority requirements for fiscal policy. Now that the new district lines have been released under the process created by Proposition 11, we revisit our arguments. I expect California’s legislature to remain polarized. While a two-thirds Democratic supermajority is possible, it is not probable, and legislative dysfunction will likely remain. Keywords: redistricting, redistricting reform, California politics, political polar- ization Copyright