Justin Garson

Place prioritization for biodiversity content

The prioritization of places on the basis of biodiversity content is part of any systematic biodiversity conservation planning process. The place prioritization procedure implemented in the ResNet software package is described. This procedure is primarily based on the principles of rarity and complementarity. Application of the procedure is demonstrated with two analyses, one data set consisting of the distributions of termite genera in Namibia, and the other consisting of the distributions of bird species in the Islas Malvinas/Falkland Islands. The attributes that data sets should have for the effective and reliable application of such procedures are discussed. The procedure used here is compared to some others that are also currently in use.

Birds as surrogates for biodiversity: an analysis of a data set from southern Québec

Surrogacy analysis consists of determining a set of biotic or environmental parameters which can be rapidly assessed in the field and reliably used to prioritize places for biodiversity conservation. Whether adequate surrogate sets exist remains an open and relatively unexplored question though its solution is central to the aims of conservation biology. This paper analyses the surrogacy problem by prioritizing places using surrogate lists and comparing these results with those obtained by using more comprehensive species lists. More specifically, it explores (i) the possibility of using bird distributions, which are often easily available, as surrogates for species at risk (endangered and threatened species), which are presumed to be an important component of biodiversity; and (ii) the methodological question of how spatial scale influences surrogate success. The data set analysed, from southern Québec, is one of the most complete biotic data sets available at the regional scale. Contrary to some previous analyses, the results obtained suggest that the surrogacy problem is potentially solvable.

MultCSync: a software package for incorporating multiple criteria in conservation planning

MultCSync is a software package designed to aid incorporation of multiple criteria into conservation planning though it can be used in other similar contexts. During such planning, conservation area networks are selected primarily to represent biodiversity but must: (i) incorporate spatial design criteria such as size, dispersion, and connectivity of individual areas; and (ii) negotiate competing social claims on land use including recreation, resource extraction, and development. The social claims can also usually be modeled as (potentially incompatible) criteria to be simultaneously optimized along with the spatial design criteria. MultCSync enables the prioritization of alternative networks on the basis of such criteria after all biodiversity representation targets are satisfied. It begins by computing the set of non-dominated alternatives. If this set is sufficiently small, these alternatives can be presented to political decision makers. However, if this set is intractably large, further prioritization among the non-dominated alternatives is necessary. MultCSync accomplishes this prioritization using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) as well as a modification of the AHP in accordance with multi-attribute value theory (MAVT). MultCSync is freely downloadable via the world wide web and can be used in conjunction with different place prioritization software packages.

Functions Must Be Performed at Appropriate Rates in Appropriate Situations

We sketch a novel and improved version of Boorse’s biostatistical theory of functions. Roughly, our theory maintains that (i) functions are non-negligible contributions to survival or inclusive fitness (when a trait contributes to survival or inclusive fitness); (ii) situations appropriate for the performance of a function are typical situations in which a trait contributes to survival or inclusive fitness; (iii) appropriate rates of functioning are rates that make adequate contributions to survival or inclusive fitness (in situations appropriate for the performance of that function); and (iv) dysfunction is the inability to perform a function at an appropriate rate in appropriate situations. Based on our theory, we sketch solutions to three problems that have afflicted Boorse’s theory of function, namely, Kingma’s ([2010]) problem of the situation-specificity of functions, the problem of multi-functional traits, and the problem of how to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate rates of functioning. 1 Functions Are Situation-Specific 2 A General Account of Biostatistical Functions   2.1 Functions   2.2 Appropriate situations for the performance of a function   2.3 Appropriate rates of functioning   2.4 Dysfunction 3 Performing Functions at Appropriate Rates in Appropriate Situations 4 Conclusion 1 Functions Are Situation-Specific 2 A General Account of Biostatistical Functions   2.1 Functions   2.2 Appropriate situations for the performance of a function   2.3 Appropriate rates of functioning   2.4 Dysfunction   2.1 Functions   2.2 Appropriate situations for the performance of a function   2.3 Appropriate rates of functioning   2.4 Dysfunction 3 Performing Functions at Appropriate Rates in Appropriate Situations 4 Conclusion

The Functional Sense of Mechanism

This article presents a distinct sense of ‘mechanism’, which I call the functional sense of mechanism. According to this sense, mechanisms serve functions, and this fact places substantive restrictions on the kinds of system activities ‘for which’ there can be a mechanism. On this view, there are no mechanisms for pathology; pathologies result from disrupting mechanisms for functions. Second, on this sense, natural selection is probably not a mechanism for evolution because it does not serve a function. After distinguishing this sense from similar explications of ‘mechanism’, I argue that it is ubiquitous in biology and has valuable epistemic benefits.

Function, selection, and construction in the brain

A common misunderstanding of the selected effects theory of function is that natural selection operating over an evolutionary time scale is the only function-bestowing process in the natural world. This construal of the selected effects theory conflicts with the existence and ubiquity of neurobiological functions that are evolutionary novel, such as structures underlying reading ability. This conflict has suggested to some that, while the selected effects theory may be relevant to some areas of evolutionary biology, its relevance to neuroscience is marginal. This line of reasoning, however, neglects the fact that synapses, entire neurons, and potentially groups of neurons can undergo a type of selection analogous to natural selection operating over an evolutionary time scale. In the following, I argue that neural selection should be construed, by the selected effect theorist, as a distinct type of function-bestowing process in addition to natural selection. After explicating a generalized selected effects theory of function and distinguishing it from similar attempts to extend the selected effects theory, I do four things. First, I show how it allows one to identify neural selection as a distinct function-bestowing process, in contrast to other forms of neural structure formation such as neural construction. Second, I defend the view from one major criticism, and in so doing I clarify the content of the view. Third, I examine drug addiction to show the potential relevance of neural selection to neuroscientific and psychological research. Finally, I endorse a modest pluralism of function concepts within biology.

The Introduction of Information into Neurobiology

The first use of the term “information” to describe the content of nervous impulse occurs in Edgar Adrians The Basis of Sensation (1928). What concept of information does Adrian appeal to, and how can it be situated in relation to contemporary philosophical accounts of the notion of information in biology? The answer requires an explication of Adrians use and an evaluation of its situation in relation to contemporary accounts of semantic information. I suggest that Adrians concept of information can be to derive a concept of arbitrariness or semioticity in representation. This in turn provides one way of resolving some of the challenges that confront recent attempts in the philosophy of biology to restrict the notion of information to those causal connections that can in some sense be referred to as arbitrary or semiotic.

How development may direct evolution

A framework is presented in which the role ofdevelopmental rules in phenotypic evolution canbe studied for some simple situations. Usingtwo different implicit models of development,characterized by different developmental mapsfrom genotypes to phenotypes, it is shown bysimulation that developmental rules and driftcan result in directional phenotypic evolutionwithout selection. For both models thesimulations show that the critical parameterthat drives the final phenotypic distributionis the cardinality of the set of genotypes thatmap to each phenotype. Details of thedevelopmental map do not matter. If phenotypesare randomly assigned to genotypes, the lastresult can also be proved analytically.

A generalized selected effects theory of function.

I present and defend the generalized selected effects (GSE) theory of function. According to GSE, the function of a trait consists in the activity that contributed to its bearer’s differential reproduction, or differential retention, within a population. Unlike the traditional selected effects (SE) theory, it does not require that the functional trait helped its bearer reproduce; differential retention is enough. Although the core theory has been presented previously, I go significantly beyond those presentations by providing a new argument for GSE and defending it from a recent objection. I also sketch its implications for teleosemantics and philosophy of medicine.

Review of Karen Neander’s A Mark of the Mental: In Defense of Informational TeleosemanticsKaren Neander, A Mark of the Mental: In Defense of Informational Teleosemantics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2017), 344 pp.,

AMark of the Mental: In Defense of Informational Teleosemantics is Karen Neander’s long-awaited first book. It achieves three main goals. First, it establishes teleosemantics as a leading candidate for naturalizing intentionality. Second, it develops a highly original and innovative version of teleosemantics, informational teleosemantics (IT), which stands in contrast to consumer-based accounts. Third, it offers plausible solutions to the various content indeterminacy problems that have historically plagued the topic. Throughout the book, Neander exhibits the deft interweaving of philosophy of biology and philosophy of mind that has marked her career. Stated roughly, IT says that the content of a (sensory-perceptual) representation is whatever is supposed to cause it (149). More precisely, at its most basic, IT holds that a sensory-perceptual representation, R, is about C if there is a mechanism that has the function of producing R’s in response to C’s (151). So, for example, a specificmidbrain activation pattern in a toadmight be about long wriggling things, if there is a mechanism in the toad’s brain that has the function of producing that pattern in response to longwriggling things. In this, IT differs from consumer-oriented views, which hold that a representation’s content depends on the mechanisms that utilize (consume) it. For example, in Millikan’s consumer-based view, a toad’s midbrain activation pattern is about worms because that is what it must correspond to for the consumer