Justin Storbeck

With Sadness Comes Accuracy; With Happiness, False Memory: Mood and the False Memory Effect

The Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm lures people to produce false memories. Two experiments examined whether induced positive or negative moods would influence this false memory effect. The affect-as-information hypothesis predicts that, on the one hand, positive affective cues experienced as task-relevant feedback encourage relational processing during encoding, which should enhance false memory effects. On the other hand, negative affective cues are hypothesized to encourage item-specific processing at encoding, which should discourage such effects. The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with these predictions: Individuals in negative moods were significantly less likely to show false memory effects than those in positive moods or those whose mood was not manipulated. Experiment 2 introduced inclusion instructions to investigate whether moods had their effects at encoding or retrieval. The results replicated the false memory finding of Experiment 1 and provide evidence that moods influence the accessibility of lures at encoding, rather than influencing monitoring at retrieval of whether lures were actually presented.

On the interdependence of cognition and emotion

Affect and cognition have long been treated as independent entities, but in the current review we suggest that affect and cognition are in fact highly interdependent. We open the article by discussing three classic views for the independence of affect. These are (i) the affective independence hypothesis, that emotion is processed independently from cognition, (ii) the affective primacy hypothesis, that evaluative processing precedes semantic processing, and (iii) the affective automaticity hypothesis, that affectively potent stimuli commandeer attention and evaluation is automatic. We argue that affect is not independent from cognition, that affect is not primary to cognition, nor is affect automatically elicited. The second half of the paper discusses several instances of how affect influences cognition. We review experiments showing affective involvement in perception, semantic activation, and attitude activation. We conclude that one function of affect is to regulate cognitive processing.

The affective regulation of cognitive priming.

Semantic and affective priming are classic effects observed in cognitive and social psychology, respectively. The authors discovered that affect regulates such priming effects. In Experiment 1, positive and negative moods were induced before one of three priming tasks; evaluation, categorization, or lexical decision. As predicted, positive affect led to both affective priming (evaluation task) and semantic priming (category and lexical decision tasks). However, negative affect inhibited such effects. In Experiment 2, participants in their natural affective state completed the same priming tasks as in Experiment 1. As expected, affective priming (evaluation task) and category priming (categorization and lexical decision tasks) were observed in such resting affective states. Hence, the authors conclude that negative affect inhibits semantic and affective priming. These results support recent theoretical models, which suggest that positive affect promotes associations among strong and weak concepts, and that negative affect impairs such associations (Clore & Storbeck, 2006; Kuhl, 2000).

Watch Out! That Could Be Dangerous: Valence-Arousal Interactions in Evaluative Processing

Seven studies involving 146 undergraduates examined the effects of stimulus valence and arousal on direct and indirect measures of evaluative processing. Stimuli were emotional slides (Studies 1 to 6) or words (Study 7) that systematically varied in valence and arousal. Evaluative categorization was measured by reaction times to evaluate the stimuli (Studies 2, 3, and 7), latencies related to emotional feelings (Study 3), and incidental effects on motor performance (Studies 4 and 5). A consistent interaction was observed such that evaluation latencies were faster if a negative stimulus was high in arousal or if a positive stimulus was low in arousal. Studies 1, 6, and 7 establish that the findings are not due to stimulus identification processes. The findings therefore suggest that people make evaluative inferences on the basis of stimulus arousal.

Don't Look Down: Emotional Arousal Elevates Height Perception

In a series of experiments, it was found that emotional arousal can influence height perception. In Experiment 1, participants viewed either arousing or nonarousing images before estimating the height of a 2-story balcony and the size of a target on the ground below the balcony. People who viewed arousing images overestimated height and target size more than did those who viewed nonarousing images. However, in Experiment 2, estimates of horizontal distances were not influenced by emotional arousal. In Experiment 3, both valence and arousal cues were manipulated, and it was found that arousal, but not valence, moderated height perception. In Experiment 4, participants either up-regulated or down-regulated their emotional experience while viewing emotionally arousing images, and a control group simply viewed the arousing images. Those participants who up-regulated their emotional experience overestimated height more than did the control or down-regulated participants. In sum, emotional arousal influences estimates of height, and this influence can be moderated by emotion regulation strategies. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

Preferences and Inferences in Encoding Visual Objects: A Systematic Comparison of Semantic and Affective Priming

The authors systematically compared semantic and affective priming in five studies involving words and pictures. In Studies 1 (lexical decision task) and 2 (evaluation task), irrelevant short duration (200 ms) primes were briefly flashed before relevant targets. The authors orthogonally varied both the semantic and affective relations between primes and targets. In both studies, semantic priming but not affective priming was found. Study 3 revealed that the same stimuli can produce affective priming, but only when words come from a single semantic category. Studies 4 and 5 used pictures rather than words to examine automatic encoding tendencies. The results conceptually replicated those from Studies 1 and 2. In sum, the findings suggest that affective priming may be a relatively fragile phenomenon, particularly when the semantic properties of objects vary in a salient manner.

Semantic Processing Precedes Affect Retrieval: The Neurological Case for Cognitive Primacy in Visual Processing

According to the affective primacy hypothesis, visual stimuli can be evaluated prior to and independent of object identification and semantic analysis (Zajonc, 1980, 2000). Our review concludes that the affective primacy hypothesis is, from the available evidence, not likely correct. Although people can react to objects that they cannot consciously identify, such affective reactions are dependent upon prior semantic analysis within the visual cortex. The authors propose that the features of objects must first be integrated, and then the objects themselves must be categorized and identified, all prior to affective analysis. Additionally, the authors offer a preliminary neurological analysis of the mere exposure and affective priming effects that is consistent with the claim that semantic analysis is needed to elicit these effects. In sum, the authors conclude that the brain must know what something is in order to know whether it is good or bad.

Affect Influences False Memories at Encoding: Evidence from Recognition Data

Memory is susceptible to illusions in the form of false memories. Prior research found, however, that sad moods reduce false memories. The current experiment had two goals: (1) to determine whether affect influences retrieval processes, and (2) to determine whether affect influences the strength and the persistence of false memories. Happy or sad moods were induced either before or after learning word lists designed to produce false memories. Control groups did not experience a mood induction. We found that sad moods reduced false memories only when induced before learning. Signal detection analyses confirmed that sad moods induced prior to learning reduced activation of nonpresented critical lures suggesting that they came to mind less often. Affective states, however, did not influence retrieval effects. We conclude that negative affective states promote item-specific processing, which reduces false memories in a similar way as using an explicitly guided cognitive control strategy.

Selective Impairment of Spatial Cognition Caused by Autoantibodies to the N-Methyl-d-Aspartate Receptor

Patients with systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE) experience cognitive abnormalities in multiple domains including processing speed, executive function, and memory. Here we show that SLE patients carrying antibodies that bind DNA and the GluN2A and GluN2B subunits of the N-methyl-d-aspartate receptor (NMDAR), termed DNRAbs, displayed a selective impairment in spatial recall. Neural recordings in a mouse model of SLE, in which circulating DNRAbs penetrate the hippocampus, revealed that CA1 place cells exhibited a significant expansion in place field size. Structural analysis showed that hippocampal pyramidal cells had substantial reductions in their dendritic processes and spines. Strikingly, these abnormalities became evident at a time when DNRAbs were no longer detectable in the hippocampus. These results suggest that antibody-mediated neurocognitive impairments may be highly specific, and that spatial cognition may be particularly vulnerable to DNRAb-mediated structural and functional injury to hippocampal cells that evolves after the triggering insult is no longer present.

Negative affect promotes encoding of and memory for details at the expense of the gist: Affect, encoding, and false memories

I investigated whether negative affective states enhance encoding of and memory for item-specific information reducing false memories. Positive, negative, and neutral moods were induced, and participants then completed a Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) false-memory task. List items were presented in unique spatial locations or unique fonts to serve as measures for item-specific encoding. The negative mood conditions had more accurate memories for item-specific information, and they also had fewer false memories. The final experiment used a manipulation that drew attention to distinctive information, which aided learning for DRM words, but also promoted item-specific encoding. For the condition that promoted item-specific encoding, false memories were reduced for positive and neutral mood conditions to a rate similar to that of the negative mood condition. These experiments demonstrated that negative affective cues promote item-specific processing reducing false memories. People in positive and negative moods encode events differently creating different memories for the same event.