Justin Waring

The link between the management of employees and patient mortality in acute hospitals

The relationship between human resource management practices and organizational performance (including quality of care in health-care organizations) is an important topic in the organizational sciences but little research has been conducted examining this relationship in hospital settings. Human resource (HR) directors from sixty-one acute hospitals in England (Hospital Trusts) completed questionnaires or interviews exploring HR practices and procedures. The interviews probed for information about the extensiveness and sophistication of appraisal for employees, the extent and sophistication of training for employees and the percentage of staff working in teams. Data on patient mortality were also gathered. The findings revealed strong associations between HR practices and patient mortality generally. The extent and sophistication of appraisal in the hospitals was particularly strongly related, but there were links too with the sophistication of training for staff, and also with the percentages of staff working in teams.

Institutional Work to Maintain Professional Power: Recreating the Model of Medical Professionalism

The creation of new roles commonly threatens the power and status of elite professionals through the substitution of their labour. In this paper we examine the institutional work carried out by elite professionals to maintain their professional dominance when threatened. Drawing on 11 case sites from the English National Health Service (NHS) where new nursing or medical roles have been introduced, threatening the power and status of specialist doctors, we observed the following. First, the professional elite respond through institutional work to supplant threat of substitution with the opportunity for them to delegate routine tasks to other actors and maintain existing resource and control arrangements over the delivery of services in a way that enhances elite professionals’ status. Second, other professionals outside the professional elite, but relatively powerful within their own professional group, are co-opted by the professional elite to engage in institutional work to maintain existing arrangements. Our work extends Lawrence and Suddaby’s typology of institutional work in three ways. First, we reveal how different types of institutional work interact, and how different types of institutional work cross categories of creating or maintaining institutions. Second, we show how an actor’s social position or status, both intra-professionally as well as inter-professionally, in the institutional field frame the institutional work they engage in. Third, the institutional work of ‘theorizing’ by professional elites appears particularly significant, specifically the focus of the institutional work to invoke the concept of ‘risk’ associated with any change in service delivery, which maintains the model of medical professionalism.

Implementation and adoption of nationwide electronic health records in secondary care in England: qualitative analysis of interim results from a prospective national evaluation

Objectives To describe and evaluate the implementation and adoption of detailed electronic health records in secondary care in England and thereby provide early feedback for the ongoing local and national rollout of the NHS Care Records Service. Design A mixed methods, longitudinal, multisite, socio-technical case study. Setting Five NHS acute hospital and mental health trusts that have been the focus of early implementation efforts and at which interim data collection and analysis are complete. Data sources and analysis Dataset for the evaluation consists of semi-structured interviews, documents and field notes, observations, and quantitative data. Qualitative data were analysed thematically with a socio-technical coding matrix, combined with additional themes that emerged from the data. Main results Hospital electronic health record applications are being developed and implemented far more slowly than was originally envisioned; the top-down, standardised approach has needed to evolve to admit more variation and greater local choice, which hospital trusts want in order to support local activity. Despite considerable delays and frustrations, support for electronic health records remains strong, including from NHS clinicians. Political and financial factors are now perceived to threaten nationwide implementation of electronic health records. Interviewees identified a range of consequences of long term, centrally negotiated contracts to deliver the NHS Care Records Service in secondary care, particularly as NHS trusts themselves are not party to these contracts. These include convoluted communication channels between different stakeholders, unrealistic deployment timelines, delays, and applications that could not quickly respond to changing national and local NHS priorities. Our data suggest support for a “middle-out” approach to implementing hospital electronic health records, combining government direction with increased local autonomy, and for restricting detailed electronic health record sharing to local health communities. Conclusions Experiences from the early implementation sites, which have received considerable attention, financial investment and support, indicate that delivering improved healthcare through nationwide electronic health records will be a long, complex, and iterative process requiring flexibility and local adaptability both with respect to the systems and the implementation strategy. The more tailored, responsive approach that is emerging is becoming better aligned with NHS organisations’ perceived needs and is, if pursued, likely to deliver clinically useful electronic health record systems.

Rules and guidelines in clinical practice: a qualitative study in operating theatres of doctors’ and nurses’ views

Background: The current orthodoxy within patient safety research and policy is characterised by a faith in rules based systems which limit the capacity for individual discretion, and hence fallibility. However, guidelines have been seen as stifling innovation and eroding trust. Our objectives were to explore the attitudes towards guidelines of doctors and nurses working together in surgical teams and to examine the extent to which trusting relationships are maintained in a context governed by explicit rules. Methods: Fourteen consultant grade surgeons of mixed specialty, 12 consultant anaesthetists, and 15 nurses were selected to reflect a range of roles. Participant observation was combined with semi-structured interviews. Results: Doctors’ views about the contribution of guidelines to safety and to clinical practice differed from those of nurses. Doctors rejected written rules, instead adhering to the unwritten rules of what constitutes acceptable behaviour for members of the medical profession. In contrast, nurses viewed guideline adherence as synonymous with professionalism and criticised doctors for failing to comply with guidelines. Conclusions: While the creation of a “safety culture” requires a shared set of beliefs, attitudes and norms in relation to what is seen as safe clinical practice, differences of opinion on these issues exist which cannot be easily reconciled since they reflect deeply ingrained beliefs about what constitutes professional conduct. While advocates of standardisation (such as nurses) view doctors as rule breakers, doctors may not necessarily regard guidelines as legitimate or identify with the rules written for them by members of other social groups. Future safety research and policy should attempt to understand the unwritten rules which govern clinical behaviour and examine the ways in which such rules are produced, maintained, and accepted as legitimate.

Policy and practice in the use of root cause analysis to investigate clinical adverse events : mind the gap

This paper examines the challenges of investigating clinical incidents through the use of Root Cause Analysis. We conducted an 18-month ethnographic study in two large acute NHS hospitals in the U.K. and documented the process of incident investigation, reporting, and translation of the results into practice. We found that the approach has both strengths and problems. The latter stem, in part, from contradictions between potentially incompatible organizational agendas and social logics that drive the use of this approach. While Root Cause Analysis was originally conceived as an organisational learning technique, it is also used as a governance tool and a way to re-establish organisational legitimacy in the aftermath of incidents. The presence of such diverse and partially contradictory aims creates tensions with the result that efforts are at times diverted from the aim of producing sustainable change and improvement. We suggest that a failure to understand these inner contradictions, together with unreflective policy interventions, may produce counterintuitive negative effects which hamper, instead of further, the cause of patient safety.

A culture of safety or coping? ritualistic behaviours in the operating theatre.

Objectives The creation of a ‘safety culture’ is a health services priority, yet there is little contemporary research examining the tacit, customary practices that relate to clinical risk. This paper investigates how the ritualistic behaviours of surgeons and anaesthetists serve to normalize risks within the operating theatre, thereby inhibiting organizational learning and enabling such risks to recur. Methods A two-year ethnographic study in the operating department of a large teaching hospital in the north of England, including observations of the organizational and clinical setting and interviews with 80 members of staff. Results Three ritualistic types of behaviour are identified and described. Each illustrates the taken-for-granted assumptions associated with clinical risk in the operating theatre and is characterized by a patterned response to risk, the first being to tolerate and endure risk, the second being to accommodate risk through slight modifications to clinical practice and the third being to innovate or implement unorthodox practices to control for risk. Conclusion These ritualistic behaviours normalize risk within the operating theatre leading to the possibility that some threats will escape appropriate attention and may lead to patient harm. These culturally scripted behaviours also encourage a short-term reactive response to risk that emphasizes the importance of individual coping rather than the more systemic forms of learning associated with participation in incident reporting. This research extends and elaborates upon the current policy orthodoxy to better understand the cultural context of patient safety.

The challenges of undertaking root cause analysis in health care: a qualitative study

Objectives Root cause analysis (RCA) is a framework for structured investigations of safety incidents. Our aim was to identify the barriers to successful learning in health care and to make recommendations for service development. Methods A qualitative study that ‘tracked’ the investigation procedures and practices of ten patient safety incidents in two National Health Service (NHS) hospitals. Non-participant observations of the complete investigation process in various managerial and administrative settings, together with semi-structured qualitative interviews with those involved in the process, and following the completion of the final report. Results There are several challenges to undertaking root cause analysis in health care. These are associated with forming and leading the investigation team; gathering and analysing supporting evidence; and formulating and implementing service improvements. Undertaking root cause analysis remains a complex non-linear task which entails balancing a multiplicity of concerns and expectations. Supporting enhanced incident investigation requires keeping in focus the instrumental aim of triggering sustainable service improvement and not for the investigation to become an end in itself. Conclusions Health services leaders need to provide open endorsement of root cause analysis and of the staff carrying it out; enhance staff participation within learning activities and new analytic tools; and develop capabilities in change management.

The problem with root cause analysis

Attempts to learn from high-risk industries such as aviation and nuclear power have been a prominent feature of the patient safety movement since the late 1990s. One noteworthy practice adopted from such industries, endorsed by healthcare systems worldwide for the investigation of serious incidents,1–3 is root cause analysis (RCA). Broadly understood as a method of structured risk identification and management in the aftermath of adverse events,1 RCA is not a single technique. Rather, it describes a range of approaches and tools drawn from fields including human factors and safety science4 ,5 that are used to establish how and why an incident occurred in an attempt to identify how it, and similar problems, might be prevented from happening again.6 In this article, we propose that RCA does have potential value in healthcare, but it has been widely applied without sufficient attention paid to what makes it work in its contexts of origin, and without adequate customisation for the specifics of healthcare.7 ,8 As a result, its potential has remained under-realised7 and the phenomenon of organisational forgetting9 remains widespread (box 1). Here, we identify eight challenges facing the usage of RCA in healthcare and offer some proposals on how to improve learning from incidents. Box 1 ### Lessons not learnt This example provides a summary of a real case that occurred in a hospital and the failure to learn from the incident in spite of a root cause analysis. In a large acute hospital, a patient underwent a routine cataract surgery—an operation with a minimal risk profile—led by an experienced ophthalmologist. The wrong lens was inserted during the operation. The error was promptly recognised postoperatively; the patient was returned to the operating room and the procedure was safely redone. A subsequent root cause analysis …

Narratives of professional regulation and patient safety: The case of medical devices in anaesthetics

Government prescription for the management of clinical risk and patient safety relies upon the development of a shared perspective between stakeholders engaged in the delivery of healthcare about what constitutes clinical risk and what mechanisms are suitable to manage such risk to ensure patient safety. However, there are tensions arising from notions of clinical risk and its management, specifically between healthcare professionals and those managers given responsibility for implementation of policy. Central to these tensions are issues of legitimacy, power and identity in claims about how risk should be managed. Aligned with an emerging body of literature that takes a narrative approach to change in healthcare systems (e.g. Currie and Brown 2003), including patient safety (e.g. McDonald et al. 2005, 2006), our paper examines how healthcare professionals make sense of the regulation of single use medical devices (SUDs) in anaesthesia. Our study indicates that there is considerable resistance to detailed surveillance of SUDs. It appears that doctors author a narrative that privileges clinical judgement over managerial control in the use of SUDs, and this has come to be adopted by other healthcare professionals and managers. This may undermine future policy aspirations for the tighter regulation of clinical autonomy.

Balancing risk, that is my life: the politics of risk in a hospital operating theatre department

Abstract The management of risk has become a policy priority in health systems around the world. Current orthodoxy within patient safety policy circles stresses the need to identify and manage risk to reduce harm to patients. However, this rests on an assumption that there is common agreement that risk can be managed, together with a shared set of beliefs about what constitutes risk and the methods for managing risk. The framing of particular issues as risks and the methods chosen to manage these can be interpreted as a challenge to medical autonomy. In this sense, risk management can be seen as a political tool intended to change behaviours and existing forms of organization. In this paper we present findings from a 2-year research study conducted within a hospital operating theatre department. Our findings based on observation and interviews suggest that sophisticated risk discourses can be used by those who seek to challenge the current patient safety orthodoxy. In particular, doctors were able to deploy discourses which emphasize the scientific nature of risk measurement as well as capitalizing on the ambiguous nature of probabilistic risk calculations. The implications for clinical risk management policy are discussed.