Network


Latest external collaboration on country level. Dive into details by clicking on the dots.

Hotspot


Dive into the research topics where K.S. Carson is active.

Publication


Featured researches published by K.S. Carson.


Applied Economics | 2009

Why do people non-demand reveal in hypothetical double referenda for public goods?

A.C. Burton; K.S. Carson; S. M. Chilton; W. George Hutchinson

Hypothetical contingent valuation surveys used to elicit values for environmental and other public goods often employ variants of the referendum mechanism due to the cognitive simplicity and familiarity of respondents with this voting format. One variant, the double referendum mechanism, requires respondents to state twice how they would vote for a given policy proposal given their cost of the good. Data from these surveys often exhibit anomalies inconsistent with standard economic models of consumer preferences. There are a number of published explanations for these anomalies, mostly focusing on problems with the second vote. This article investigates which aspects of the hypothetical task affect the degree of nondemand revelation and takes an individual-based approach to identifying people most likely to non-demand reveal. A clear profile emerges from our model of a person who faces a negative surplus i.e. a net loss in the second vote and invokes non self-interested, non financial motivations during the decision process.


Western Economic Association 83rd Annual Conference. | 2012

Valuation under Fuzzy Preferences

K.S. Carson; S. M. Chilton; W. George Hutchinson

This paper reports the results of an experiment in which subjects with fuzzy induced values vote in a public goods referendum. The experiments demonstrate that if subjects’ preferences for a good are vague in the sense described by fuzzy numbers, their behavior in a referendum for a public good diverges significantly from what standard utility theory predicts when preferences are crisp. By exploiting the direct link between multiple bound uncertainty choice elicitation and fuzzy numbers we are subsequently able to incorporate this feature into the analysis of field willingness to pay data and demonstrate how information about the fuzziness of a respondent’s preferences obtained from payment card survey data can be incorporated into an interval data estimator of willingness to pay.


Chapters | 2009

Incentive compatible mechanisms for providing environmental public goods

K.S. Carson

This paper summarizes the results of two experiments designed to evaluate the applicability of incentive compatible mechanisms such as the pivot mechanism to determine the public’s preferences for environmental public goods. The first experiment employs a variant of the pivot mechanism to determine the appropriate level of a public good that is available in three discrete quantities. Although traditional public goods mechanisms determine the allocation of the good in continuously variable quantities, for many environmental public goods, such as the cleanup of a hazardous waste site, there may be only several discrete options that are feasible. The results indicate that using the pivot mechanism can result in truthful revelation of preferences for the public good, and hence selection of the optimal amount of the program to be implemented. The second experiment compares the ability of real and hypothetical versions of the pivot mechanism and provision point mechanism to generate accurate estimates of the public’s willingness to pay for open space. The results provide mixed evidence of real and hypothetical versions of each mechanism to generate unbiased willingness to pay estimates.


Environmental and Resource Economics | 2007

Resolving questions about bias in real and hypothetical referenda

A.C. Burton; K.S. Carson; S. M. Chilton; W. George Hutchinson


Journal of Environmental Economics and Management | 2003

An experimental investigation of explanations for inconsistencies in responses to second offers in double referenda

A.C. Burton; K.S. Carson; S. M. Chilton; W. George Hutchinson


Journal of Environmental Economics and Management | 2009

Necessary conditions for demand revelation in double referenda

K.S. Carson; S. M. Chilton; W. George Hutchinson


American Economic Association Annual Meeting [Session on Methodological Advances in Environmental Valuation. Anna Alberini University of Maryland Presiding] | 2001

Are hypothetical referenda incentive compatible

A.C. Burton; K.S. Carson; S.M. Chilton; George Hutchinson


EAERE Conference | 2008

Can Choice Experiment Surveys be Incentive Compatible? An Economic Experiment on Repeated Choice Formats with Financial Incentives in Place.

K.S. Carson; S. M. Chilton; George Hutchinson


EAERE Annual Conference | 2008

Decision Rules and Demand Revelation in Decisive Double Referenda

K.S. Carson; S. M. Chilton; George Hutchinson


Archive | 2006

Consequentiality and Demand Revelation in Double Referenda

K.S. Carson; S. M. Chilton; W. George Hutchinson

Collaboration


Dive into the K.S. Carson's collaboration.

Top Co-Authors

Avatar

George Hutchinson

Queen's University Belfast

View shared research outputs
Top Co-Authors

Avatar

S.M. Chilton

Queen's University Belfast

View shared research outputs
Top Co-Authors

Avatar
Top Co-Authors

Avatar

A.C. Burton

Government of New Zealand

View shared research outputs
Top Co-Authors

Avatar
Top Co-Authors

Avatar

W.G. Hutchinson

Queen's University Belfast

View shared research outputs
Researchain Logo
Decentralizing Knowledge