K. Steven Vincent

Between Marxism and Anarchism: Benoit Malon and French Reformist Socialism.

Here is the first scholarly study of the life and thought of Benoit Malon (1841-1893), the most persuasive and visible spokesman for reformist socialism during the early years of the French Third Republic. Active in the generation of the French Left that came of age under the Second Empire, Malon was a prominent member of the First International in Paris and later joined the Paris Commune. As a result, he was forced into exile in Switzerland and Italy during the 1870s, where he became entangled in the struggles within the International. Malon attempted to steer a course between Marxist authoritarianism and anarchist utopianism, which he continued on his return to France in 1880. Vincent analyzes Malons role as activist, editor, and author, arguing that Malon drew on a strong tradition of left-wing French republicanism. In his mature works, Malon articulated a socialism that emphasized broad moral and socioeconomic reform and advocated parliamentary rule as the appropriate source of national sovereignty. In helping the republican socialist Left shed its revolutionary associations, he pointed the way for later reformist socialists from Jean Jaures to Francois Mitterrand.

Benjamin Constant, the French Revolution, and the Origins of French Romantic Liberalism

<P> Benjamin Constant (1767–1830) has a dual reputation, that of an influential romantic writer and an important liberal political thinker. This article argues that Constant’s distinctive cultural contribution comes into clear focus only if we appreciate how elements we associate with “liberalism” were intertwined with those we associate with sensibilité and “romanticism.” For the author of Adolphe, these elements came together during the Directory, which means that the first expression of French liberalism emerged during the Revolution and not, as previous scholars have argued, during the Consulate, Empire, or Restoration. In addition to outlining the institutional dimensions of Constant’s liberalism, this article examines how his stance on “enthusiasm” and reaction to “melancholy” mark his liberalism as “romantic.”</P>

Benjamin Constant, the French revolution, and the problem of modern character

This article examines Constants analysis of character during the French Revolution. During the late-1790s, Constant declared himself a “democrat”, but he worried that the Revolution was reinforcing character traits in France that would undermine stable liberal politics. He was especially concerned that the “revolutionary torrent” [his phrase] had unleashed violent passions that led to fanaticism, rebelliousness, and the search for vengeance. And, he was disturbed to see that, at the other extreme, the chaos of revolutionary violence had led others to resignation, isolation, and a focus on narrow self-interest. In his search for a path between vengeance and fatigue, he encouraged sentiments like self-respect, compassion, and enthusiasm.

Visions of stateless society

To be GOVERNED is to be kept in view, inspected, spied upon, directed, legislated, regulated, prosecuted, indoctrinated, preached at, controlled, estimated, valued, censured, commanded by those who do not have the right, the wisdom, nor the virtue to do so . . . To be GOVERNED is to be at each operation, at each transaction, at each movement, noted, registered, counted, taxed, stamped, measured, numbered, assessed, licensed, authorised, annotated, admonished, forbidden, reformed, corrected, punished. It is, under pretext of public utility, and in the name of the general interest, to be placed under contribution, trained, ransomed, exploited, monopolised, extorted, pressured, mystified, robbed; then, at the slightest resistance, at the first word of complaint, to be reprimanded, fined, run down, harassed, tracked, abused, clubbed, disarmed, bound, imprisoned, shot, machine-gunned, judged, condemned, deported, sacrificed, sold, betrayed: and, to top it all off, mocked, ridiculed, outraged, dishonoured. That is government: that is its justice: that is its morality! (Proudhon 1923b, p. 344)

The Republican Moment(s) in Modern France

The republican tradition has enjoyed an impressive history in modern thought. Since the Renaissance humanists, who re-established Greek an as political authorities, and who defended a political ideology that praise tion in politics and communal self-government (free from impe ecclesiastical jurisdiction), republican themes have been an important s political reflections. In early-modern France, republican themes were wider discussion that focused on sovereignty, constitutionalism, and dominant political debate revolved around varying conceptions of m those who viewed the future of France as best served by a strong cen unhampered by privileged bodies (the thèse royale) and those who saw France in a monarchy whose power was limited by autonomous no bodies (the thèse nobiliaire). To persons with an overriding interest in the chy, republicanism probably seemed, at least on the surface, of margi republican models appeared to be inadequate for large modern states, t were by monarchies with growing bureaucracies and strong armies. modern republics like Venice or the United Provinces scarcely looked types for an ambitious modern state. Nonetheless, republican themes be common in French culture during the 18th century. Republican themes w the pathologies of the absolutist state, and to diagnose the problems of when celebrations of republican ‘virtue’ were used to question the mœur more broadly, elite society. Interest in the viability of a large republic g revolution in the American colonies, but no prominent thinker argued was a reasonable model for a major European power with a centurie monarchy like France. Republicanism moved to centre stage during the Revolution, especi King’s failed attempt to flee the country in June 1791 – ‘the flight to Va of a French Republic, previously limited to extremists, quickly g Historians and political theorists recently have focused on the growi

Élie Halévy and French socialist liberalism

ABSTRACT Élie Halévy (1870–1937) is best known in the Anglo-American world for his volumes on British Utilitarianism and his multi-volume history of England during the nineteenth century. His reputation in his native France, however, is associated with his directing role of the Revue de métaphysique et de morale and for his lectures on the history of European socialism, given every other year at the École libre des sciences politiques between 1902 and 1937. This essay analyses the relationship of Halévy’s scholarship on socialism with his self-proclaimed liberalism. Contrary to much of the literature about Halévy, and at odds with the ideological thrust of the posthumously published version of his lectures on the history of European socialism, this essay claims that Halévy was a socialist liberal before the First World War. It makes this case by providing a careful reading of Halévy’s correspondence and of the manuscript versions of these lectures (held at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris), and by placing these in the wider historical context. It argues that Halévy developed a sophisticated comparative analysis of European socialism, and that he was sympathetic to many of its dimensions.

A Divided Republic: Nation, State and Citizenship in Contemporary France

of Russia’s positions, the “consolidation of Russian public opinion around... Russia’s resurgence as a great power, vigorous patriotism, and expansionist visions of Slavic solidarity” (87), a xenophobic anti-Western campaign, economic nationalism and domestic self-sufficiency extending beyond defense industries, and a repositioning of the ideological foundations of Russian foreign policy around the idea that the country needs to take action against the West’s encroachment. The implications of the crisis for Europe are analyzed in Chapter 4 by considering the actions (and inaction) of the European Union and NATO, the two structures that allow for an examination of Europe’s role in political and economic, as well as military and security terms. Through its European Neighborhood Policy, which encompassed several post-Soviet states, and its Eastern Policy, focused on Armenia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, Europe tried to work with its eastern neighbors on issues related to market reform, democratization, governance performance, environmental protection, the promotion of civil society, reforms of the military and the police, human rights, as well as energy security. The decision of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to reject rapprochement with the European Union sparked in November 2013 the street protests that marked the beginning of the crisis. The rebellion triggered by the presidential decision revealed Russia’s unwillingness to accept the integration of post-Soviet states into the European Union. NATO’s eastward expansion only compounded Russia’s apprehensions. Chapter 5 turns its attention to Ukraine by detailing several possible scenarios for the country’s future, some bleaker than others. Among these the authors discuss three scenarios: a frozen conflict similar to the one that unfolded in Transnistria for close to two decades, a Russian invasion of central and even western Ukrainian territories, or a Ukrainian victory over the pro-Russia separatists. According to Menon and Rumer, the first scenario is the most likely to unfold, but also the most dangerous for the further democratization of Ukraine and its capacity to implement the reform called for by the EU. While the conflict in Ukraine has turned into a pivotal event for Europe, the authors suggest it represents a symptom of Europe’s problems with Russia. To appease this giant neighbor, Europe must tailor its political, economic and security strategies to Russia’s demands and idiosyncrasies, not only to the hopes, interests and priorities of the EU member states. Written in a clear style that is generally free of unnecessary jargon, this volume will be of interest for a large audience of academics and undergraduate and graduate students interested in international relations, post-communist Ukraine and Russia, as well as the EU and NATO. The balance it manages to maintain between domestic political and international relations makes this book an interesting read for specialists working in political science, international relations, and area studies.

Faces of Moderation: The Art of Balance in an Age of Extremes

The volume adequately addresses the first, mainly descriptive goal it set for itself: to map each EU member state’s relationship with Russia. Together, the individual chapters further show that the EU has impacted individual member states’ foreign policy toward Russia, EU-member state and member state-Russia relations exist within “a circular dynamic,” and “progress at the EU level has, on occasion, undeniably been impacted negatively by the priority placed by member states on their own bilateral relations with Russia rather than the common European good” (261). What that “common European good” entails, and how it can be defined in the absence of input from the European citizenry remains under-explained, but could prove a worthwhile topic for future research. The brief answer to the last research question that has driven this research—whether bilateralism negatively impacts multilateralism—does not seriously engage with any of the individual chapters. Especially given Russia’s unlawful annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the lack of any coherent response from the EU, one should seriously ask whether multilateralism by inaction is an effective alternative to bilateralism. Thus the analysis presented in this volume has been put to a serious test since its publication in 2013. A longer and more detailed concluding chapter would have more convincingly explained this volume’s contribution to the literature, and possibly made that contribution withstand the test of more recent events such as Russia’s annexation of Crimea, but also the realignment of forces that will necessarily follow Brexit, whatever form that might take. The differences among individual country experiences would have gained in relevance and clarity, helping to differentiate more strongly the intervening and key explanatory factors, if the conclusion presented the data gleaned from individual chapters in a series of comparative tables. The qualitative analysis provided in individual chapters would have definitely been boosted if conclusions would have gone beyond summarizing in general terms the main arguments, and would have instead complemented the chapters with statistics, whenever available. The volume as a whole shows that bilateral and multilateral relations with Russia might continue to represent a serious challenge for the EU.

Royal Censorship of Books in Eighteenth-Century France

I highly recommend it. This book is great fun to read. Please note: you may need multi-dimensional reading and listening. I had a copy of the play opened on the side. I also stopped reading to watch the Joseph Mankiewicz movie of the play, the one with Marlon Brando as Antony, James Mason as Brutus, John Gielgud as Cassius, and Louis Calhern as Caesar. It is a good idea to have that version on hand, as well as the later film version by Stuart Burge, with luminaries Charlton Heston as Antony, Jason Robards as Brutus, Richard Johnson as Cassius, and John Gielgud, this time as Caesar. Both movies are referenced by Wills. The magnificent use of language by Shakespeare is breathtaking. The films give these great actors a chance to speak these words, to change meaning by changing tone, to use emphasis or even silence to find new, often profound possibilities in storyline and impression. It is hard to imagine a greater contrast in the interpretation of Antony than to compare Brando with Heston. In my view, they are both memorable, and fascinating. But Brando’s intensity makes Antony much more complex. Heston sees Antony as strong and solid, loyal and determined. Brando sees him as scheming and devious, tortured and driven. However he is played, the conclusion is the same. Antony, in league with Octavian, gains revenge for Caesar at Philippi.

Equality in the Age of Singularity

French historian and political theorist Pierre Rosanvallon has written a large number of influential books about the history of political ideas in France, as well as important studies of problems facing the modern welfare state. In his new book, The Society of Equals, he brings his expertise in both fields to bear on the history of equality in economically advanced democracies since the eighteenth century. Because he laments the growth of inequality in these countries over the past forty years, he concludes with a preliminary outline of “what is to be done” to move back towards a more equitable society. Rosanvallon begins by noting the sharp rise of economic inequality during the past few decades. There is little disagreement concerning this, and statistics abound that in the United States and France (the two countries upon which Rosanvallon mostly focuses) income and accumulated wealth are increasing at the top, while stagnating for the middle and lower classes. In the United States, this shift is related, at least in part, to changes in tax policy (the progressive lowering of the top federal tax bracket from 70% in the 1970s to 40% today), to the decline of government oversight of banks and corporations, and to the controversial bailout of financial institutions following the economic crisis of 2008. The wealthy—especially the top ranks of the corporate and financial sectors, joined by the top tier of figures in sports and entertainment —have benefited enormously. In short, we have entered a new “gilded age.” Part of Rosanvallon’s agenda is to put these changes in historical perspective. Central to his argument is that there have been profound shifts in the manner in which equality has been conceptualized and implemented over the past 200 plus years. This inevitably leads to Rosanvallon making broad generalizations concerning historical eras and historical change, some of which are debatable. But, in general, he brings to bear a remarkable command of a vast historical literature, and an impressive ability to see the shape of the forest while still recognizing the multiplicity of trees. Rosanvallon begins with an account of how the ideal of equality emerged during the era of the Atlantic Revolutions of the late eighteenth century, focusing especially on France and America. During this period, he argues, there emerged a potent criticism of aristocratic pretensions and “aristocratic racism” that insisted that all individuals are similar. Christian notions of spiritual equality joined with anthropological/biological theories of the centrality of the individual and with moral conceptions of natural equality to undergird a belief that the world was made up of individuals who share essential characteristics. Simultaneously, there emerged an idea of autonomy and active reciprocity that supported the idea that society was best served by individuals who were independent and interdependent. In Rosanvallon’s terms, “reciprocal utility” replaced “hierarchical authority” (28). Additionally, there emerged notions of citizenship that were closely related to ties of community, reinforced by