Kai Vogeley

Mind reading: neural mechanisms of theory of mind and self-perspective.

Human self-consciousness as the metarepresentation of ones own mental states and the so-called theory of mind (TOM) capacity, which requires the ability to model the mental states of others, are closely related higher cognitive functions. We address here the issue of whether taking the self-perspective (SELF) or modeling the mind of someone else (TOM) employ the same or differential neural mechanisms. A TOM paradigm was used and extended to include stimulus material that involved TOM and SELF capacities in a two-way factorial design. A behavioral study in 42 healthy volunteers showed that TOM and SELF induced differential states of mind: subjects assigned correctly first or third person pronouns when providing responses to the stimuli. Following the behavioral study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in eight healthy, right-handed males to study the common and differential neural mechanisms underlying TOM and SELF. The main factor TOM led to increased neural activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and left temporopolar cortex. The main factor SELF led to increased neural activity in the right temporoparietal junction and in the anterior cingulate cortex. A significant interaction of both factors TOM and SELF was observed in the right prefrontal cortex. These divergent neural activations in response to TOM and SELF suggest that these important differential mental capacities of human self-consciousness are implemented at least in part in distinct brain regions. Press

Neural correlates of the first-person-perspective.

Human self-consciousness depends on the metarepresentation of mental and bodily states as ones own mental and bodily states. First-person-perspective taking is not sufficient, but necessary for human self-consciousness. To assign a first-person-perspective is to center ones own multimodal experiential space upon ones own body, thus operating in an egocentric reference frame. The brain regions involved in assigning first-person-perspective comprise medial prefrontal, medial parietal and lateral temporoparietal cortex. These empirical findings complement recent neurobiologically oriented theories of self-consciousness which focus on the relation between the subject and his/her environment by supplying a neural basis for its key components.

Being with virtual others: Neural correlates of social interaction

To characterize the neural correlates of being personally involved in social interaction as opposed to being a passive observer of social interaction between others we performed an fMRI study in which participants were gazed at by virtual characters (ME) or observed them looking at someone else (OTHER). In dynamic animations virtual characters then showed socially relevant facial expressions as they would appear in greeting and approach situations (SOC) or arbitrary facial movements (ARB). Differential neural activity associated with ME>OTHER was located in anterior medial prefrontal cortex in contrast to the precuneus for OTHER>ME. Perception of socially relevant facial expressions (SOC>ARB) led to differentially increased neural activity in ventral medial prefrontal cortex. Perception of arbitrary facial movements (ARB>SOC) differentially activated the middle temporal gyrus. The results, thus, show that activation of medial prefrontal cortex underlies both the perception of social communication indicated by facial expressions and the feeling of personal involvement indicated by eye gaze. Our data also demonstrate that distinct regions of medial prefrontal cortex contribute differentially to social cognition: whereas the ventral medial prefrontal cortex is recruited during the analysis of social content as accessible in interactionally relevant mimic gestures, differential activation of a more dorsal part of medial prefrontal cortex subserves the detection of self-relevance and may thus establish an intersubjective context in which communicative signals are evaluated.

Resting-state functional network correlates of psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia

Schizophrenia has been associated with aberrant intrinsic functional organization of the brain but the relationship of such deficits to psychopathology is unclear. In this study, we investigated associations between resting-state networks and individual psychopathology in sixteen patients with paranoid schizophrenia and sixteen matched healthy control participants. We estimated whole-brain functional connectivity of multiple networks using a combination of spatial independent component analysis and multiple regression analysis. Five networks (default-mode, left and right fronto-parietal, left fronto-temporal and auditory networks) were selected for analysis based on their involvement in neuropsychological models of psychosis. Between-group comparisons and correlations to psychopathology ratings were performed on both spatial (connectivity distributions) and temporal features (power-spectral densities of temporal frequencies below 0.06 Hz). Schizophrenia patients showed aberrant functional connectivity in the default-mode network, which correlated with severity of hallucinations and delusions, and decreased hemispheric separation of fronto-parietal activity, which correlated with disorganization symptoms. Furthermore, the severity of positive symptoms correlated with functional connectivity of fronto-temporal and auditory networks. Finally, default-mode and auditory networks showed increased spectral power of low frequency oscillations, which correlated with positive symptom severity. These results are in line with findings from studies that investigated the neural correlates of positive symptoms and suggest that psychopathology is associated with aberrant intrinsic organization of functional brain networks in schizophrenia.

Parsing the neural correlates of moral cognition: ALE meta-analysis on morality, theory of mind, and empathy

Morally judicious behavior forms the fabric of human sociality. Here, we sought to investigate neural activity associated with different facets of moral thought. Previous research suggests that the cognitive and emotional sources of moral decisions might be closely related to theory of mind, an abstract-cognitive skill, and empathy, a rapid-emotional skill. That is, moral decisions are thought to crucially refer to other persons’ representation of intentions and behavioral outcomes as well as (vicariously experienced) emotional states. We thus hypothesized that moral decisions might be implemented in brain areas engaged in ‘theory of mind’ and empathy. This assumption was tested by conducting a large-scale activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies, which assessed 2,607 peak coordinates from 247 experiments in 1,790 participants. The brain areas that were consistently involved in moral decisions showed more convergence with the ALE analysis targeting theory of mind versus empathy. More specifically, the neurotopographical overlap between morality and empathy disfavors a role of affective sharing during moral decisions. Ultimately, our results provide evidence that the neural network underlying moral decisions is probably domain-global and might be dissociable into cognitive and affective sub-systems.

The ''sense of agency" and its underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms

The sense of agency is a central aspect of human self-consciousness and refers to the experience of oneself as the agent of ones own actions. Several different cognitive theories on the sense of agency have been proposed implying divergent empirical approaches and results, especially with respect to neural correlates. A multifactorial and multilevel model of the sense of agency may provide the most constructive framework for integrating divergent theories and findings, meeting the complex nature of this intriguing phenomenon.

The corpus callosum in schizophrenia-volume and connectivity changes affect specific regions

The corpus callosum (CC) is of great interest for pathophysiological models of schizophrenia. Volume and structural integrity of the CC have been examined by volumetric and diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) studies, but results were not consistent across methods or studies. A possible explanation may be varying methodologies and accuracy of measurements based on a single slice or small regions of interest. In addition, none of the studies examined volume and diffusion values in the same group of patients, and thus the relationship between these anatomical measures is not clear. We used an automatic algorithm to segment seven midline slices of the CC from DTI images. We compared volume and the DTI measures fractional anisotropy (FA) and mean diffusivity (MD) in the CC and its subdivisions in the schizophrenia patients and matched controls. Patients had decreased volume, decreased FA and increased MD of the whole CC. The important novel finding is, however, that not all regions were equally affected by anatomical changes. The results emphasize the importance of using different methods in evaluation of white matter (WM) in schizophrenia to avoid false negative findings. In addition, the measures were highly correlated with each other, implying a common pathological process influencing FA, MD and volume of the CC. Although we cannot rule out other mechanisms affecting volume, FA and MD, converging evidence from cytoarchitectonic and genetic studies suggests that WM changes observed in schizophrenia may involve disintegration of healthy, functional axons and strengthening of aberrant connections resulting in increased severity of clinical symptoms.

Introspective Minds: Using ALE meta-analyses to study commonalities in the neural correlates of emotional processing, social & unconstrained cognition

Previous research suggests overlap between brain regions that show task-induced deactivations and those activated during the performance of social-cognitive tasks. Here, we present results of quantitative meta-analyses of neuroimaging studies, which confirm a statistical convergence in the neural correlates of social and resting state cognition. Based on the idea that both social and unconstrained cognition might be characterized by introspective processes, which are also thought to be highly relevant for emotional experiences, a third meta-analysis was performed investigating studies on emotional processing. By using conjunction analyses across all three sets of studies, we can demonstrate significant overlap of task-related signal change in dorso-medial prefrontal and medial parietal cortex, brain regions that have, indeed, recently been linked to introspective abilities. Our findings, therefore, provide evidence for the existence of a core neural network, which shows task-related signal change during socio-emotional tasks and during resting states.

Noradrenergic modulation of emotion-induced forgetting and remembering.

We used a free-recall paradigm to establish a behavioral index of the retrograde and anterograde interference of emotion with episodic memory encoding. In two experiments involving 78 subjects, we show that negatively valenced items elicit retrograde amnesia, whereas positively valenced items elicit retrograde hypermnesia. These data indicate item valence is critical in determining retrograde amnesia and retrograde hypermnesia. In contrast, we show that item arousal induces an anterograde amnesic effect, consistent with the idea that a valence-evoked arousal mechanism compromises anterograde episodic encoding. Randomized double-blind administration of the β-adrenoceptor antagonist propranolol compared with the selective norepinephrine (NE) reuptake-inhibitor reboxetine, and placebo, demonstrated that the magnitude of this emotional amnesia and hypermnesia can be upregulated and downregulated as a function of emotional arousal and central NE signaling. We conclude that a differential processing of emotional arousal and valence influences how the brain remembers and forgets.

Self-representation: Searching for a neural signature of self-consciousness

Human self-consciousness operates at different levels of complexity and at least comprises five different levels of representational processes. These five levels are nonconceptual representation, conceptual representation, sentential representation, meta-representation, and iterative meta-representation. These different levels of representation can be operationalized by taking a first-person-perspective that is involved in representational processes on different levels of complexity. We refer to experiments that operationalize a first-person-perspective on the level of conceptual and meta-representational self-consciousness. Interestingly, these experiments show converging evidence for a recruitment of medial cortical and parietal regions during taking a first-person-perspective, even when operating on different degrees of complexity. These data lend support for the speculative hypothesis, that there exist a neural signature for human self-consciousness that is recruited independent from the degree of representational complexity to be performed.