Kaitlin T. Raimi

Cognitive and Interpersonal Features of Intellectual Humility

Four studies examined intellectual humility—the degree to which people recognize that their beliefs might be wrong. Using a new Intellectual Humility (IH) Scale, Study 1 showed that intellectual humility was associated with variables related to openness, curiosity, tolerance of ambiguity, and low dogmatism. Study 2 revealed that participants high in intellectual humility were less certain that their beliefs about religion were correct and judged people less on the basis of their religious opinions. In Study 3, participants high in intellectual humility were less inclined to think that politicians who changed their attitudes were “flip-flopping,” and Study 4 showed that people high in intellectual humility were more attuned to the strength of persuasive arguments than those who were low. In addition to extending our understanding of intellectual humility, this research demonstrates that the IH Scale is a valid measure of the degree to which people recognize that their beliefs are fallible.

Distinguishing Intrapsychic From Interpersonal Motives in Psychological Theory and Research

Many psychological phenomena have been explained primarily in terms of intrapsychic motives to maintain particular cognitive or affective states—such as motives for consistency, self-esteem, and authenticity—whereas other phenomena have been explained in terms of interpersonal motives to obtain tangible resources, reactions, or outcomes from other people. In this article, we describe and contrast intrapsychic and interpersonal motives, and we review evidence showing that these two distinct sets of motives are sometimes conflated and confused in ways that undermine the viability of motivational theories. Explanations that invoke motives to maintain certain intrapsychic states offer a dramatically different view of the psychological foundations of human behavior than those that posit motives to obtain desired interpersonal outcomes. Several phenomena are examined as exemplars of instances in which interpersonal and intrapsychic motives have been inadequately distinguished, if not directly confounded, including cognitive dissonance, the self-esteem motive, biases in judgment and decision making, posttransgression accounts, authenticity, and self-conscious emotions. Our analysis of the literature suggests that theorists and researchers should consider the relative importance of intrapsychic versus interpersonal motives in the phenomena they study and that they should make a concerted effort to deconfound intrapsychic and interpersonal influences in their research.

The influence of learning about carbon dioxide removal (CDR) on support for mitigation policies

A wide range of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) strategies has been proposed to address climate change. As most CDR strategies are unfamiliar to the public, it is unknown how increased media and policy attention on CDR might affect public sentiment about climate change. On the one hand, CDR poses a potential moral hazard: if people perceive that CDR solves climate change, they may be less likely to support efforts to reduce carbon emissions. On the other hand, the need for CDR may increase the perceived severity of climate change and, thus, increase support for other types of mitigation. Using an online survey of US adults (Nxa0=xa0984), we tested these competing hypotheses by exposing participants to information about different forms of CDR. We find that learning about certain CDR strategies indirectly reduces support for mitigation policies by reducing the perceived threat of climate change. This was found to be true for participants who read about CDR in general (without mention of specific strategies), bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, or direct air capture. Furthermore, this risk compensation pattern was more pronounced among political conservatives than liberals—although in some cases, was partially offset by positive direct effects. Learning about reforestation, by contrast, had no indirect effects on mitigation support through perceived threat but was found to directly increase support among conservatives. The results suggest caution is warranted when promoting technological fixes to climate change, like CDR, as some forms may further dampen support for climate change action among the unengaged.

The Promise and Limitations of Using Analogies to Improve Decision-Relevant Understanding of Climate Change

To make informed choices about how to address climate change, members of the public must develop ways to consider established facts of climate science and the uncertainties about its future trajectories, in addition to the risks attendant to various responses, including non-response, to climate change. One method suggested for educating the public about these issues is the use of simple mental models, or analogies comparing climate change to familiar domains such as medical decision making, disaster preparedness, or courtroom trials. Two studies were conducted using online participants in the U.S.A. to test the use of analogies to highlight seven key decision-relevant elements of climate change, including uncertainties about when and where serious damage may occur, its unprecedented and progressive nature, and tradeoffs in limiting climate change. An internal meta-analysis was then conducted to estimate overall effect sizes across the two studies. Analogies were not found to inform knowledge about climate literacy facts. However, results suggested that people found the medical analogy helpful and that it led people—especially political conservatives—to better recognize several decision-relevant attributes of climate change. These effects were weak, perhaps reflecting a well-documented and overwhelming effect of political ideology on climate change communication and education efforts in the U.S.A. The potential of analogies and similar education tools to improve understanding and communication in a polarized political environment are discussed.

Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth Is: An Experimental Test of Pro-Environmental Spillover From Reducing Meat Consumption to Monetary Donations:

Psychological studies testing behavioral spillover—the notion that behavior change resulting from an intervention affects subsequent similar behaviors—has resulted in conflicting findings in the environmental domain. This study sought to further demarcate the spillover process by asking participants to engage in a difficult first pro-environmental behavior, reducing red meat consumption, for either health or environmental reasons. Evidence of spillover was tested via a subsequent monetary donation to an environmental organization. While there was no evidence of spillover for those in the green behavior condition, those in the health behavior condition were less likely to donate relative to controls. There was evidence that pro-environmental behavior led to an increase in environmental concern. In turn, environmental concern was associated with an increased likelihood of donating. Environmental concern may, thus, be one route to positive spillover in some subsets of the population.