Kaitlin Woolley

The experience matters more than you think: People value intrinsic incentives more inside than outside an activity.

We document a shift in the value assigned to intrinsic incentives: people value these incentives more inside an activity than outside the activity (i.e., during vs. before or after pursuit). For example, people care more about the level of interest of their present work task than of past or future work tasks. We document this shift across a variety of activities (exercising, visiting a museum, and lab tasks) and using various measures, including rated importance of intrinsic incentives inside and outside pursuit, actual and planned persistence on activities that offer these incentives, and regret when choosers outside pursuit forgo intrinsic incentives that pursuers later seek. This shift in valuation occurs because intrinsic incentives improve the experience during action pursuit, and therefore, this shift is unique to intrinsic incentives. Extrinsic incentives, by contrast, are valued similarly inside and outside pursuit.

Immediate Rewards Predict Adherence to Long-Term Goals

People primarily pursue long-term goals, such as exercising, to receive delayed rewards (e.g., improved health). However, we find that the presence of immediate rewards is a stronger predictor of persistence in goal-related activities than the presence of delayed rewards. Specifically, immediate rewards (e.g., enjoyment) predicted current persistence at New Year’s resolutions whereas delayed rewards did not (Study 1). Furthermore, immediate rewards predicted persistence in a single session of studying and exercising whereas delayed rewards did not, even though people report primarily pursuing these activities for delayed rewards (Studies 2 and 3). This is true for both short (1 week) and long (3 month) time frames (Study 4), and regardless of whether anticipated or materialized rewards are assessed (Study 5). Overall, whereas delayed rewards may motivate goal setting and the intentions to pursue long-term goals, a meta-analysis of our studies finds that immediate rewards are more strongly associated with actual persistence in a long-term goal.

A Structural Model of Intrinsic Motivation: On the Psychology of Means-Ends Fusion

The term intrinsic motivation refers to an activity being seen as its own end. Accordingly, we conceptualize intrinsic motivation (IM) as (perceived) means-ends fusion and define an intrinsicality continuum reflecting the degree to which such fusion is experienced. Our means-ends fusion (MEF) theory assumes four major antecedents of activity-goal fusion: (a) repeated pairing of the activity and the goal, (b) uniqueness of the activity-goal connection, (c) perceived similarity between the activity and its goal, and (d) temporal immediacy of goal attainment following the activity. MEF theory further identifies two major consequences of the activity-goal fusion (i.e., manifestations of intrinsic motivation): (a) perceived instrumentality of the activity to goal attainment and consequent activity engagement, and (b) goal-related affective experience of the activity. Empirical evidence for MEF theory comes from diverse fields of psychological inquiry, including animal learning, brain research, and social cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record

It’s about time: Earlier rewards increase intrinsic motivation.

Can immediate (vs. delayed) rewards increase intrinsic motivation? Prior research compared the presence versus absence of rewards. By contrast, this research compared immediate versus delayed rewards, predicting that more immediate rewards increase intrinsic motivation by creating a perceptual fusion between the activity and its goal (i.e., the reward). In support of the hypothesis, framing a reward from watching a news program as more immediate (vs. delayed) increased intrinsic motivation to watch the program (Study 1), and receiving more immediate bonus (vs. delayed, Study 2; and vs. delayed and no bonus, Study 3) increased intrinsic motivation in an experimental task. The effect of reward timing was mediated by the strength of the association between an activity and a reward, and was specific to intrinsic (vs. extrinsic) motivation—immediacy influenced the positive experience of an activity, but not perceived outcome importance (Study 4). In addition, the effect of the timing of rewards was independent of the effect of the magnitude of the rewards (Study 5).

Closing your eyes to follow your heart:: Avoiding information to protect a strong intuitive preference.

Rationally, people should want to receive information that is costless and relevant for a decision. But people sometimes choose to remain ignorant. The current paper identifies intuitive-deliberative conflict as a driver of information avoidance. Moreover, we examine whether people avoid information not only to protect their feelings or experiences, but also to protect the decision itself. We predict that people avoid information that could encourage a more thoughtful, deliberative decision to make it easier to enact their intuitive preference. In Studies 1 and 2, people avoid learning the calories in a tempting dessert and compensation for a boring task to protect their preferences to eat the dessert and work on a more enjoyable task. The same people who want to avoid the information, however, use it when it is provided. In Studies 3–5, people decide whether to learn how much money they could earn by accepting an intuitively unappealing bet (that a sympathetic student performs poorly or that a hurricane hits a third-world country). Although intuitively unappealing, the bets are financially rational because they only have financial upside. If people avoid information in part to protect their intuitive preference, then avoidance should be greater when an intuitive preference is especially strong and when information could influence the decision. As predicted, avoidance is driven by the strength of the intuitive preference (Study 3) and, ironically, information avoidance is greater before a decision is made, when the information is decision relevant, than after, when the information is irrelevant for the decision (Studies 4 and 5).