Kareen Rozen

Foundations of Intrinsic Habit Formation

We provide theoretical foundations for several common (nested) representations of intrinsic linear habit formation. Our axiomatization introduces an intertemporal theory of weaning a decision-maker from her habits using the device of compensation. We clarify differences across specifications of the model, provide measures of habit-forming tendencies, and suggest methods for axiomatizing time-nonseparable preferences.

History-dependent risk attitude

We propose a model of history-dependent risk attitude, allowing a decision maker’s risk attitude to be affected by his history of disappointments and elations. The decision maker recursively evaluates compound risks, classifying realizations as disappointing or elating using a threshold rule. We establish equivalence between the model and two cognitive biases: risk attitudes are reinforced by experiences (one is more risk averse after disappointment than after elation) and there is a primacy effect (early outcomes have the greatest impact on risk attitude). In dynamic asset pricing, the model yields volatile, path-dependent prices.

Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining

We consider a multilateral Nash demand game where short-sighted players come to the bargaining table with requests for both coalition partners and the potentially generated resource. We prove that group learning leads with probability one to complete cooperation and a strictly self-enforcing allocation (i.e., in the interior of the core). Highlighting group dynamics, we demonstrate that behaviors which appear destructive can themselves lead to beneficial and strictly self-enforcing cooperation.