Karen Dawisha

Soviet cultural relations with Iraq, Syria and Egypt 1955–70

(1975). Soviet cultural relations with Iraq, Syria and Egypt 1955–70. Soviet Studies: Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 418-442.

Outcomes and Consequences

By the spring of 1978, Soviet influence in Egypt was at its lowest point since 1955; and many observers were concluding that the Soviet Union’s current position in Egypt marked the failure of its objectives and the bankruptcy of its policy towards both Egypt and other states of the Third World. It was in 1962 that one American analyst, writing on the similar failures of Western policies in the Middle East, stated that ‘if history teaches anything, it is that a power or group of powers apparently on the decline can do nothing right, while an apparently or really rising power can do nothing wrong’.1 Recent Soviet setbacks in the Middle East would seem to run counter to the conclusion that the Soviet Union ‘can do nothing wrong’. Likewise, the improvement of Egypt’s relations with the West and its recognition of the role which the United States could play in bringing about a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict underline the almost capricious nature of alignments in Middle Eastern politics and the resultant difficulties in determining the overall success or failure of Great Power policies.

Soviet Objectives Towards Egypt

The foreign policy objectives pursued by any state are the end result of interactions between values, images and capabilities. Whereas a state’s values will determine what is desirable, the capabilities, as perceived by decision-makers, will determine what is feasible. The general objectives of Soviet foreign policy are the outcome of such an interaction.

The Historical Foundations of the Policy

Prior to 1955, the establishment of full and cordial relations with Egypt and the other states of the developing East was not high on the list of Soviet objectives. Rather, priorities lay more with domestic economic growth and the establishment of a socialist order in the industrialised West. Nevertheless, both geographically and demographically Russia has always stood between East and West; and it was not unnatural, therefore, for the Bolsheviks to conclude that the October Revolution had ‘built a bridge between the Socialist West and the enslaved East’.1 In the years following the revolution, the Bolsheviks tried to strengthen this bridge by advocating that all communists and Eastern nationalists should join forces in a united front to bring about the collapse of imperialism and the victory of socialism. The decision to adopt united front tactics was taken at the Second Comintern Congress in 1920 against the bitter opposition of many Eastern communists who claimed, not without justification, that the national bourgeoisie in the East were unreliable allies and that they would turn against the Communists at the first opportunity.2

The Research Design

In the preceding chapters, the development of Soviet—Egyptian relations was outlined, with particular emphasis placed on the importance of Egypt in Soviet global calculations and the efforts made by the Soviet leadership to establish and maintain influence in that country. However, a chronological account of the type presented above raises almost as many questions as it answers. It does not in itself provide insights into the Soviet decision-making process which would allow a more complete explanation of not only the reasons for the successes and failures of Soviet policy toward Egypt, but also the more general features of Soviet foreign policy formulation as a whole.

Soviet Decision-making Structures and Processes

In the analysis of foreign policy, it has always been recognised that one of the most important influences on policy outcomes is the nature and structure of the decision-making process itself. When examining this process, it is necessary first of all to locate the centres of authority in the system. This is important not only because it reveals the institutional context of decisions but also because it leads to the consideration of wider issues such as the development of the decision-making process over time and the stability and regularity of that process during any given period. It is also important, secondly, to discover the impact of other factors outside the formal institutional setting which may affect both the structure of the decision-making process and the foreign policy decisions themselves. In particular the character of the political leadership and the role of interest groups and bureaucratic politics are variables which interact with the political institutions to produce a decision-making process which is often operationally quite different from formal or constitutional arrangements.

The Influences on Soviet Policy

In Brecher’s research design, presented in the preceding chapter, he isolates ten variables which serve as inputs into the decision-making process, including five external and five internal variables. The military capability, including geostrategic considerations, and the economic capability, including the demographic input, are dealt with in this chapter, as is ideology and the various influences from the external system. The inputs emanating from the Soviet Union’s political structure, and the role within it of competing elites and interests groups, are analysed in Chapter 7.

Soviet—Egyptian Relations under Brezhnev and Kosygin 1964–70

If one of Khrushchev’s greatest legacies to his successors was the expansion of relations with Egypt and the Third World, the Egyptian leadership was anxious following his ouster to ensure that these relations continued unaffected. Egyptian newspapers were quick to assert that ‘we must not consider our relations with the Soviet Union as relations with any particular personality … we have built these relations on a general and not on a personal basis’.1 In his weekly column in al-Ahram Mohamed Heikal went even further by claiming that Khrushchev’s fall was no great loss to Egypt, since he had been the only Soviet leader with whom Egypt had ever quarrelled and since he had never been able to eradicate completely the remnants of Stalinism.2

Soviet—Egyptian Relations under Sadat, 1970–78

If Nasser pursued a policy in his last years of ‘leaning to one side’ in favour of firmly cementing his ties with the Soviet Union, one of Sadat’s major objectives after becoming President was to redress what he considered to be a basic imbalance in Egypt’s foreign policy. As a result, Egypt’s relations with the West witnessed a marked improvement and her relations with the Soviet Union a corresponding deterioration. Egypt accepted America’s preeminent role in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute and also re-established both diplomatic and economic relations with the West.

The Instruments of Soviet Policy

Diplomacy, as perhaps the most traditional instrument of foreign policy, can be defined as the interaction between the official representatives of two or more states for the purpose of maintaining or modifying their relations. Diplomacy can be conducted by a variety of means. Prior to the First World War, diplomatic transactions were characterised by secret and bilateral negotiations between ambassadors. However, since that time there has been a growing tendency toward more open negotiations and more active involvement by prime ministers and heads of state. Furthermore, the trend toward regional, international and functional groupings has increased the frequency of multilateral negotiations and ‘parliamentary diplomacy’.1