Karen Neander

Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's Defense

In this paper I defend an etiological theory of biological functions (according to which the proper function of a trait is the effect for which it was selected by natural selection) against three objections which have been influential. I argue, contrary to Millikan, that it is wrong to base our defense of the theory on a rejection of conceptual analysis, for conceptual analysis does have an important role in philosophy of science. I also argue that biology requires a normative notion of a proper function, and that a normative notion is not ahistorical.

Pruning the Tree of Life

Some (eg. Elliott Sober) argue that natural selection does not explain the genotypic arid phenotypic properties of individuals. On this view, natural selection explains the adaptedness of individuals, not by explaining why the individuals that exist have the adaptations they do, but rather by explaining why the individuals that exist are the ones with those adaptations. This paper argues that this ‘Negative’ view of natural selection ignores the fact that natural selection is a cumulative selection process. So understood, it explains how the genetic sequences that individuals inherit and that are responsible for their complex (and co-adapted) adaptations first arose in the gene-pool.

What Does Natural Selection Explain? Correction to Sober

In this paper I argue against Sobers claim that natural selection does not explain the traits of individuals. Sober argues that natural selection only explains the distribution of traits in a population. My point is that the explanation of an individuals traits involves us in a description of the individuals ancestry, and in an explanation of the distribution of traits in that ancestral population. Thus Sober is wrong, natural selection is part of the explanation of the traits of individuals.

Are Homologies (Selected Effect or Causal Role) Function Free

This article argues that at least very many judgments of homology rest on prior attributions of selected‐effect (SE) function, and that many of the “parts” of biological systems that are rightly classified as homologous are constituted by (are so classified in virtue of) their consequence etiologies. We claim that SE functions are often used in the prior identification of the parts deemed to be homologous and are often used to differentiate more restricted homologous kinds within less restricted ones. In doing so, we discuss recent criticism of this view that has been offered (especially that offered by Paul Griffiths).

BIOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO MENTAL REPRESENTATION

Publisher Summary As per Brentano, one cannot have any mental attitude towards a thing unless it is present in ones mind. One cannot hope, doubt, taste, believe, or remember that thing unless the thing and its characteristics are present in mind. Teleosemantic theories are diverse range of answers on how do minds and brains represent things and what is these reference to these contents? But each teleosemantic theory maintains that the answer involves a normative and teleological notion of function, or in other words a notion of function that underwrites talk of malfunction and that is construed as a notion of what traits or items are for. There are a number of different teleological theories of mental content. Certainly there is a specific normative notion of function that underwrites certain normative notion of content. Content is said to be normative because some mental states that have content may represent correctly or may also misrepresent. Teleological theories of mental content, like others, attempt to provide naturalistic theories of mental content. According to Ontological Behaviorism, mental terms have a behavioral analysis. The first analysis is that mental states cannot be reduced to brain states because mental states are multiply realizable and second analysis is that mental states can be characterized in terms of their functional role.

Functional analysis and the species design

This paper argues that a minimal notion of function and a notion of normal-proper function are used in explaining how bodies and brains operate. Neither is Cummins’ (1975) notion, as originally defined, and yet his is often taken to be the clearly relevant notion for such an explanatory context. This paper also explains how adverting to normal-proper functions, even if these are selected functions, can play a significant scientific role in the operational explanations of complex systems that physiologists and neurophysiologists provide, despite a lack of relevant causal efficacy on the part of such functions.