Karim S. Kassam

Emotion and Decision Making

A revolution in the science of emotion has emerged in recent decades, with the potential to create a paradigm shift in decision theories. The research reveals that emotions constitute potent, pervasive, predictable, sometimes harmful and sometimes beneficial drivers of decision making. Across different domains, important regularities appear in the mechanisms through which emotions influence judgments and choices. We organize and analyze what has been learned from the past 35 years of work on emotion and decision making. In so doing, we propose the emotion-imbued choice model, which accounts for inputs from traditional rational choice theory and from newer emotion research, synthesizing scientific models.

Decisions under distress: stress profiles influence anchoring and adjustment.

People frequently make decisions under stress. Understanding how stress affects decision making is complicated by the fact that not all stress responses are created equal. Challenge states, for example, occur when individuals appraise a stressful situation as demanding, but believe they have the personal resources to cope, and are characterized by efficient cardiovascular reactivity and approach motivation. Threat states, in contrast, occur when situational demands are perceived to outweigh resources and are characterized by less efficient cardiovascular reactivity and withdrawal motivation. We randomly assigned participants to social-feedback conditions (i.e., positive or negative feedback) designed to engender challenge or threat, or a no-stress condition. Participants then completed an anchoring-and-adjustment questionnaire. Those assigned to the challenge condition adjusted more from self-generated anchors than those assigned to the threat condition. Cardiovascular responses mediated the relationship between condition and adjustment. This study demonstrates the importance of considering profiles of cardiovascular reactivity when examining the influence of stress on decision making.

Identifying Emotions on the Basis of Neural Activation.

We attempt to determine the discriminability and organization of neural activation corresponding to the experience of specific emotions. Method actors were asked to self-induce nine emotional states (anger, disgust, envy, fear, happiness, lust, pride, sadness, and shame) while in an fMRI scanner. Using a Gaussian Naïve Bayes pooled variance classifier, we demonstrate the ability to identify specific emotions experienced by an individual at well over chance accuracy on the basis of: 1) neural activation of the same individual in other trials, 2) neural activation of other individuals who experienced similar trials, and 3) neural activation of the same individual to a qualitatively different type of emotion induction. Factor analysis identified valence, arousal, sociality, and lust as dimensions underlying the activation patterns. These results suggest a structure for neural representations of emotion and inform theories of emotional processing.

Early onset of neural synchronization in the contextual associations network

Objects are more easily recognized in their typical context. However, is contextual information activated early enough to facilitate the perception of individual objects, or is contextual facilitation caused by postperceptual mechanisms? To elucidate this issue, we first need to study the temporal dynamics and neural interactions associated with contextual processing. Studies have shown that the contextual network consists of the parahippocampal, retrosplenial, and medial prefrontal cortices. We used functional MRI, magnetoencephalography, and phase synchrony analyses to compare the neural response to stimuli with strong or weak contextual associations. The context network was activated in functional MRI and preferentially synchronized in magnetoencephalography (MEG) for stimuli with strong contextual associations. Phase synchrony increased early (150–250 ms) only when it involved the parahippocampal cortex, whereas retrosplenial–medial prefrontal cortices synchrony was enhanced later (300–400 ms). These results describe the neural dynamics of context processing and suggest that context is activated early during object perception.

The Effects of Measuring Emotion: Physiological Reactions to Emotional Situations Depend on whether Someone Is Asking

Measurement effects exist throughout the sciences–the act of measuring often changes the properties of the observed. We suggest emotion research is no exception. The awareness and conscious assessment required by self-report of emotion may significantly alter emotional processes. In this study, participants engaged in a difficult math task designed to induce anger or shame while their cardiovascular responses were measured. Half of the participants were asked to report on their emotional states and appraise their feelings throughout the experiment, whereas the other half completed a control questionnaire. Among those in the anger condition, participants assigned to report on their emotions exhibited qualitatively different physiological responses from those who did not report. For participants in the shame condition, there were no significant differences in physiology based on the self-report manipulation. The study demonstrates that the simple act of reporting on an emotional state may have a substantial impact on the body’s reaction to an emotional situation.

Debiasing Decisions Improved Decision Making With a Single Training Intervention

From failures of intelligence analysis to misguided beliefs about vaccinations, biased judgment and decision making contributes to problems in policy, business, medicine, law, education, and private life. Early attempts to reduce decision biases with training met with little success, leading scientists and policy makers to focus on debiasing by using incentives and changes in the presentation and elicitation of decisions. We report the results of two longitudinal experiments that found medium to large effects of one-shot debiasing training interventions. Participants received a single training intervention, played a computer game or watched an instructional video, which addressed biases critical to intelligence analysis (in Experiment 1: bias blind spot, confirmation bias, and fundamental attribution error; in Experiment 2: anchoring, representativeness, and social projection). Both kinds of interventions produced medium to large debiasing effects immediately (games ≥ −31.94% and videos ≥ −18.60%) that persisted at least 2 months later (games ≥ −23.57% and videos ≥ −19.20%). Games that provided personalized feedback and practice produced larger effects than did videos. Debiasing effects were domain general: bias reduction occurred across problems in different contexts, and problem formats that were taught and not taught in the interventions. The results suggest that a single training intervention can improve decision making. We suggest its use alongside improved incentives, information presentation, and nudges to reduce costly errors associated with biased judgments and decisions.

Affect valence inference from facial action unit spectrograms

The face provides an important channel for communicating affect valence, the positive or negative emotional charge of an experience. This paper addresses the challenging pattern recognition problem of assigning affect valence labels (positive, negative or neutral) to facial action sequences obtained from unsegmented videos coded using the Facial Action Coding System (FACS). The data were obtained from viewers watching eight short movies with each second of video labeled with self-reported valence and hand coded using FACS. We identify the most frequently occurring Facial Actions and propose the usefulness of a Facial Action Unit Spectrogram. We compare both generative and discriminative classifiers on accuracy and computational complexity: Support Vector Machines, Hidden Markov Models, Conditional Random Fields and Latent-Dynamic Conditional Random Fields. We conduct three tests of generalization with each model. The results provide a first benchmark for classification of self-report valences from spontaneous expressions from a large group of people (n=42). Success is demonstrated for increasing levels of generalization and discriminative classifiers are shown to significantly outperform generative classifiers over this large data set. We discuss the challenges encountered in dealing with a naturalistic dataset with sparse observations and its implications on the results.

Duration sensitivity depends on stimulus familiarity.

When people are asked to assess or compare the value of experienced or hypothetical events, one of the most intriguing observations is their apparent insensitivity to event duration. The authors propose that duration insensitivity occurs when stimuli are evaluated in isolation because they typically lack comparison information. People should be able to evaluate the duration of stimuli in isolation, however, when stimuli are familiar and evoke comparison information. The results of 3 experiments support the hypothesis. Participants were insensitive to the duration of hypothetical (Experiment 1) and real (Experiment 2) unfamiliar experiences but sensitive to the duration of familiar experiences. In Experiment 3, participants were insensitive to the duration of an unfamiliar noise when it was unlabeled but sensitive to its duration when it was given a familiar label (i.e., a telephone ring). Rather than being a unique phenomenon, duration neglect (and perhaps other forms of scope insensitivity) appears to be a particular case of insensitivity to unfamiliar attributes.

Misconceptions of Memory The Scooter Libby Effect

People often claim they cannot remember, and other people often doubt those claims. For example, during his 2007 trial, Vice-Presidential Chief of Staff I. Lewis ‘‘Scooter’’ Libby claimed that he could not remember mentioning the identity of a Central Intelligence Agency employee to other government officials or reporters. Jurors found it difficult to believe that Libby could have forgotten having had such important conversations and found him guilty of obstruction of justice, making false statements, and perjury. Libby’s conversations were indeed important, but they were less important at the time he had them than they became months later when the Justice Department launched its investigation. Although important information increases the motivation to remember (MTR), research on human memory suggests that MTR is considerably more effective when it arises before rather than after information is encoded (Loftus & Wickens, 1970; Naveh-Benjamin, Craik, Gavrilescu, & Anderson, 2000). MTR at encoding leads people to attend to and organize information in ways that promote accessible storage in long-term memory, whereas MTR at retrieval merely leads people to work hard to retrieve information, and even the most earnest search of long-term memory is ineffective when information was never stored there in the first place. Do people take the timing of MTR into account when judging other people’s memories? Research suggests that people’s intuitions about memorial processes are often flawed, leaving them susceptible to a host of errors, ranging from the illusion of knowing to hindsight bias (Bjork & Dunlosky, 2008; Dunlosky, Serra, & Baker, 2007; Metcalfe, 2000). If people do not consider the fact that MTR is more effective at encoding than at retrieval, then they may mistakenly expect other people to remember information that became important as though it had always been important. We tested this possibility.

Winners Love Winning and Losers Love Money

Salience and satisfaction are important factors in determining the comparisons that people make. We hypothesized that people make salient comparisons first, and then make satisfying comparisons only if salient comparisons leave them unsatisfied. This hypothesis suggests an asymmetry between winning and losing. For winners, comparison with a salient alternative (i.e., losing) brings satisfaction. Therefore, winners should be sensitive only to the relative value of their outcomes. For losers, comparison with a salient alternative (i.e., winning) brings little satisfaction. Therefore, losers should be drawn to compare outcomes with additional standards, which should make them sensitive to both relative and absolute values of their outcomes. In Experiment 1, participants won one of two cash prizes on a scratch-off ticket. Winners were sensitive to the relative value of their prizes, whereas losers were sensitive to both the relative and the absolute values of their prizes. In Experiment 2, losers were sensitive to the absolute value of their prize only when they had sufficient cognitive resources to engage in effortful comparison.