Karine Brisset

Leniency Program: A New Tool in Competition Policy to Deter Cartel Activity in Procurement Auctions

This paper discusses the impact of a leniency program on incentives within cartels. The objective of this program is to encourage a cartel member to confess and implicate his co-conspirators with hard evidence about their collusive agreement. We develop a simple model of cartel behavior under a first-price sealed-bid procurement auction and we show how an effective leniency program can prevent the internal coordination of cartel members.

Comment l'acheteur professionnel peut-il fixer son prix de réserve dans une enchère inversée en ligne ?

In this paper, we analyze factors which determine the optimal reserve price in a procurement reverse auction. In practice, professional purchasers rarely set a reserve price or determine it on more or less subjective criteria. The paper aims to give them a clear analysis on this point based on the latest results of the economic literature.