Karine Nyborg

Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus: interpretation and aggregation of environmental values

In addition to his role as a consumer pursuing his own interests, an individual may also regard himself as an ethical observer or citizen, judging matters from societys point of view. However, an individuals personal preferences do not necessarily coincide with his social preferences. This paper presents a formal model in which individuals are assumed to have two distinct preference orderings: Personal well-being functions are applied in contexts where the individual regards himself as a consumer, while subjective social welfare functions are used when the citizen role is perceived as most relevant. The paper discusses the implications for environmental valuation if some respondents take on a citizen role when reporting their willingness to pay.

Does aquaculture add resilience to the global food system

Aquaculture is the fastest growing food sector and continues to expand alongside terrestrial crop and livestock production. Using portfolio theory as a conceptual framework, we explore how current interconnections between the aquaculture, crop, livestock, and fisheries sectors act as an impediment to, or an opportunity for, enhanced resilience in the global food system given increased resource scarcity and climate change. Aquaculture can potentially enhance resilience through improved resource use efficiencies and increased diversification of farmed species, locales of production, and feeding strategies. However, aquaculture’s reliance on terrestrial crops and wild fish for feeds, its dependence on freshwater and land for culture sites, and its broad array of environmental impacts diminishes its ability to add resilience. Feeds for livestock and farmed fish that are fed rely largely on the same crops, although the fraction destined for aquaculture is presently small (∼4%). As demand for high-value fed aquaculture products grows, competition for these crops will also rise, as will the demand for wild fish as feed inputs. Many of these crops and forage fish are also consumed directly by humans and provide essential nutrition for low-income households. Their rising use in aquafeeds has the potential to increase price levels and volatility, worsening food insecurity among the most vulnerable populations. Although the diversification of global food production systems that includes aquaculture offers promise for enhanced resilience, such promise will not be realized if government policies fail to provide adequate incentives for resource efficiency, equity, and environmental protection.

On social norms: the evolution of considerate smoking behavior

Abstract This paper studies the formation of social norms for considerate smoking behavior. Being considerate yields higher social approval from non-smokers, but also imposes an inconvenience cost. Non-smokers’ disapproval of inconsiderate smoking is assumed to be stronger the less used they are to passive smoking. Introduction of a smoking regulation may then move society from an initial no-consideration equilibrium to an equilibrium in which a large share of smokers are considerate, even in the unregulated zone. Empirical evidence confirms that social norms have changed in Norway after the smoking law amendments in 1988, and supports the plausibility of model assumptions.

Households’ recycling efforts

Abstract Households’ recycling effort is often argued to be of an insignificant size. It is also frequently argued that this contribution, if significant, is not a cost to households, since it is voluntary. Thus households’ use of time and energy are frequently disregarded in cost-benefit analyses of stricter recycling targets. In this survey, based on 1162 interviews, we find that sorting at source involves significant extra use of time and energy in the households. On average, each of those asked reported that they use close to half an hour a week for cleaning, sorting and transporting recyclable waste. On average, 185 h is used per tonne of waste. Four out of ten reported that they use warm or hot water to clean the materials. When investigating the motives for sorting waste, we find that many perceive sorting as mandatory, while some in fact find it a pleasant activity in itself. Moral motives for sorting at source are also widespread. A majority would prefer that a company took over the sorting if this were possible, and on average, the respondents are willing to pay US

Social norms as solutions

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The Cold Shiver of Not Giving Enough: On the Social Cost of Recycling Campaigns

Policies may influence large-scale behavioral tipping Climate change, biodiversity loss, antibiotic resistance, and other global challenges pose major collective action problems: A group benefits from a certain action, but no individual has sufficient incentive to act alone. Formal institutions, e.g., laws and treaties, have helped address issues like ozone depletion, lead pollution, and acid rain. However, formal institutions are not always able to enforce collectively desirable outcomes. In such cases, informal institutions, such as social norms, can be important. If conditions are right, policy can support social norm changes, helping address even global problems. To judge when this is realistic, and what role policy can play, we discuss three crucial questions: Is a tipping point likely to exist, such that vicious cycles of socially damaging behavior can potentially be turned into virtuous ones? Can policy create tipping points where none exist? Can policy push the system past the tipping point?

Some Norwegian Politicians' Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis

Governments sometimes try to increase individuals’ contributions to public goods through appeals to consumer responsibility, rather than by economic incentives, for example in recycling campaigns. Using standard consumer theory, one would hardly expect such campaigns to work at all; but if consumers are motivated by norms, appeals may work through changing consumers’ perception of the norm requirement. However, increasing voluntary contributions through appeals may come at a social cost. The reason is that appeals work through imposing a heavier (perceived) responsibility on consumers. This represents a welfare loss, which is not necessarily outweighed by “warm glow” benefits. (JEL D6, Q24)

Social Interaction in Responsibility Ascription: The Case of Household Recycling

Members of the Norwegian Parliament were interviewed about their use of cost-benefit analysis in the political treatment of a road investment plan. Most respondents found the cost-benefit ratio useful as a screening device to pick projects requiring closer political attention, but few seemed to actually use it to rank projects. Attitudes towards cost-benefit analysis varied along the left-right political axis, with politicians to the left being the most sceptical. These findings are consistent with a hypothesis that politicians rationally maximize subjective, but different, perceptions of social welfare.

Moral Hazard and Moral Motivation: Corporate Social Responsibility as Labor Market Screening

Duty-orientation implies a warm glow of giving as well as a cold shiver of not giving enough. If duty-oriented consumers learn their moral responsibility by observing others’ behavior, social interaction in contribution behavior arises. However, since moral responsibility is a burden, duty-oriented consumers may be less willing to accept responsibility if their information about others’ behavior is uncertain. Data from a survey on households’ glass recycling indicates that perceived responsibility is a major determinant for reported recycling, that responsibility ascription is influenced by beliefs about others’ behavior, and that people are, indeed, reluctant to accept responsibility based on uncertain information. (JEL D64, Q53)

Status-seeking and material affluence: evaluating the Hirsch hypothesis

Morally motivated individuals behave more cooperatively than predicted by standard theory. Hence,if a firm can attract workers who are strongly motivated by ethical concerns, moral hazard problems like shirking can be reduced. We show that employers may be able to use the firm’s corporate social responsibility profile as a screening device to attract more productive workers. Both pooling and separating equilibria are possible. Even when a substantial share of the workers have no moral motivation whatsoever, such screening may in fact drive every firm with a low social responsibility profile out of business.