Karyl A. Kinsey

Decision frame and opportunity as determinants of tax cheating: An international experimental study

Abstract The experimental studies described in this article were designed to examine the effects of decision frame and opportunity on tax evasion behavior in the context of a business management task that required subjects to file simulated tax returns. The data analyzed were derived from 674 subjects representing samples drawn for ten separate experiments conducted in six different countries.

Framing Justice: Taxpayer Evaluations of Personal Tax Burdens

This study examines how taxpayers evaluate the distributive justice of personal income tax burdens. Using the concept of framing from behavioral decision theory, we suggest that taxpayers employ either an outcome-processing or a norm-processing frame of tax fairness evaluation. Framing is affected by substantive tax policies and the tax situations of individuals. Taxpayers who qualify for tax deductions and other tax preferences employ an outcome-processing frame and focus on perceived abuses of government power when evaluating fairness. Those unable to claim tax breaks employ a normprocessing frame and focus on vertical social comparisons and their inability to qualify for valued tax breaks. The findings suggest that tax avoidance policies have the net effect of increasing public perceptions of unfairness in the tax system.

Tax Evasion Research: Measurement Strategies and Theoretical Models

In recent years, policy makers as well as social scientists have begun to recognize that income tax evasion is a behavioral problem that seriously threatens the capacity of government to raise public revenue. It is a problem that transcends cultural and political boundaries. For example, estimates have indicated that the equivalent of 7,5% of Britain’s gross national product escapes legitimate taxation, while 17% of the taxable income in Belgium remains undeclared (Lewis, 1982). In the United States, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS, 1983) has estimated that the tax gap (the difference between taxes owed and taxes filed) was

Which 'Haves' Come Out Ahead and Why? Cultural Capital and Legal Mobilization in Frontline Law Enforcement

81,5 billion for 1981; an amount that exceeded the federal deficit for that year. Beyond the prospect of substantial deficit reductions without spending cuts or tax increases, other benefits would be derived from minimizing tax evasion. As Spicer (1975) has noted, tax evasion tends both to undermine the resolve of honest taxpayers and, insofar as it occurs more frequently in some segments of the population than in others, to hinder realization of the distributional and equity goals of taxation.

Shame and Embarrassment as Deterrents to Noncompliance with the Law

Sociolegal theories of why haves might come out ahead in the legal system have emphasized legal mobilization and the use of legal representation. Small group research points to the influence of cultural capital on social expectations and interpersonal processes of social influence and deference as another potential explanation for status advantage. This study tests these explanations in the context of state income tax audits. The results indicate that taxpayers owning larger businesses are more likely to mobilize legally, but that legal mobilization does not affect audit outcomes. Instead, taxpayers with high occupational prestige and the owners of family businesses are more likely to come out ahead in tax audits, pointing to a cultural capital explanation of why the haves come out ahead. Prestige effects, however, are concentrated among taxpayers who represent themselves; when tax practitioners are involved in audits, status advantages disappear. Further analyses indicate that tax practitioners level the playing field by disrupting social influence and deference processes

Shame and Embarrassment as Deterrents to Noncompliance with the Law The Case of an Antilittering Campaign

The Keep America Beautiful campaign and the events surrounding it in the late 1960s and early 1970s generated concern about the problems created by littering not only among the public and government officials but also among behavioral scientists. The past two decades have produced a wealth of research on littering as well as other environmental behaviors (e. g., Casey & Lloyd, 1977; Clark, Burgess, & Hendee, 1972; Durdan, Reeder, & Hecht, 1985; Geller, Winett, & Everett, 1982; Geller, Witmer, & Orebaugh, 1976; Geller, Witmer, & Tuso, 1977; Gendrich, McNees, Schnelle, Beegle, & Clark, 1982; Krauss, Freedman, & Whitcup, 1978; Levitt & Leventhal, 1986; Powers, Osborne, & Anderson, 1973; Reich & Robertson, 1979; Robinson, 1976). While important insights and policy implications have been developed, the research so far has seemed to overlook the fact that littering is illegal. Thus, researchers have not drawn upon theories from the field of criminology concerning determinants of compliance and noncompliance with the law.