Kate Fleet

Anatolia under the Mongols

The period of Mongol rule in Anatolia, that is, roughly the century between the battle of Kosedag in 1243 and the collapse of the Ilkhanid regime in the 1340s, if mentioned at all, is generally treated only as a brief preamble to the rise of the Ottomans. Even then, as in the nationalist histories of Russia and China, Mongol rule is seen as an unwelcome interlude that wrecked the country and left no formative traces. Rather, traditional Ottoman Turkish history arises seamlessly out of the history of the Seljuks of Rum, the principal, though latterly only notional, rulers of central Anatolia between their victory over the Byzantines at Malazgirt (Manzikert) in 1071 and their obscure demise in the early fourteenth century. By this time, one of the beyliks that was later the kernel of the Ottoman state was already in existence, among numerous others. According to Kafesoglu, for example, this beylik ‘on the western frontier of the Seljuk state ( sic ), with regard to itsmoral fibre and organization, acquired many values from Seljuk Turkishness’ and ‘kept Anatolia as a Turkish motherland’. At the other end of the spectrum, comparisons have been drawn between the formation and development of the Mongol and Ottoman empires, with no reference at all to the Mongols in Anatolia. Others have been ready to examine in more detail late thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Anatolian society, in which the Ilkhanate was the dominant power. Numismatists in particular have recently taken another look at the traditional view, and have emphasised the continuity of Ottomanfrom Ilkhanid practices. Yet here too, interest in the Mongols arises solely in connection with the circumstances in which the Ottoman state emerged. It is difficult, with hindsight, to look at the Mongol period without regard to later Turkish history.

A Dangerous Axis: The ‘Bulgarian Müftü’, the Turkish Opposition and the Ankara Government, 1928–36

Between 1928 and 1936 Hüseyin Hüsnü Molla Ahmed (1882–1940) held the position of Başmüftü (the head Mufti, religious leader of the Muslim community) in Sofia. Hostile to the new Kemalist regime in Turkey and backed by the Bulgarian authorities, he became a centre for opposition to the Ankara government. This combination of religious office, political backing and power base for anti-Kemalist opposition was perceived by the Turkish government as potentially threatening to the stability of the new regime, and it sought to counter this challenge through a variety of means. What made the Başmüftülük so important for Turkey in the late 1920s and early 1930s was the personality of its incumbent. ‘Ignorant and fanatical’ according to Yaşar Nabi (Nayır), Hüseyin Hüsnü was ‘the proven enemy of Turkishness and of our revolution’. For the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP), the ruling and sole party in Turkey, he was a ‘reactionary’ with ‘the soul of a dangerous religious fanatic’. He was seen as being a hard-line supporter of Damad Ferid Paşa (the sadrazam after 1918) and the Hürriyet ve _ Itilaf Fırkası (the party in opposition to the _ Ittihad ve Terakki Fırkası (Committee of Union and Progress) which ended with the collapse of the empire). With a strong loathing for Mustafa Kemal, who had, for Hüseyin Hüsnü, destroyed religion in Turkey and allied with the atheist Bolsheviks, he vehemently opposed all the new reforms: the adoption of the hat, the replacing of the Arabic script with the Latin, and the introduction of a civil code in place of the Shari‘a. Although Başmüftü of the Bulgarian Turks, Hüseyin Hüsnü’s energies were much more devoted to the struggle against the Kemalist regime than they were to either the interests of the Turkish minority or of the Muslims in Bulgaria in general. In this he clashed with one segment of the Bulgarian Turkish community, which was split between the more traditional, conservative element, and that section which supported the new government in Turkey and was keen to follow the new reforms. Such deep hostility to Turkey made Hüseyin Hüsnü an attractive ally to the Bulgarian authorities. He was certainly regarded that way by Yaşar Nabi (Nayır), who commented that he was ‘kept in office by the Bulgarian government, which he served following Bulgarian orders and loyal to Bulgarian interests’. Some Bulgarian Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 44, No. 5, 775–789, September 2008

Review: Gold for the Sultan: Western Bankers and Ottoman Finance, 1856–1881 Christopher Clay

A two-year study was conducted in South Carolina wheat (Triticum aestivum L. (Poales: Poaceae)) fields to describe spatial and temporal dynamics of stink bugs (Hemiptera: Pentatomidae), which were sampled weekly with sweep nets. In 2010, the main phytophagous stink bugs caught in a grid sampling plan across two fields were the brown stink bug, Euschistus servus (Say), the rice stink bug, Oebalus pugnax (F.), the southern green stink bug, Nezara viridula (L.), and the red shouldered stink bug, Thyanta custator (F.), for both adults and nymphs. In 2011, the main phytophagous stink bugs were E. servus, O. pugnax, N. viridula, and T. custator across two fields. Adult stink bug counts adjacent to fallow fields were 2.1-fold greater for all species combined compared with counts adjacent to woods. Spatial Analysis by Distance IndicEs (SADIE) indicated significant aggregation for 35% of analyses for adults and nymph stink bugs at each sampling date. As a measure of spatial and temporal stability, positive SADIE association indices among sampling dates recorded 11, 36, 43, and 16% of analyses for adult E. servus and 7, 50, 50, and 14% for adult O. pugnax in fields A, B, C, and D, respectively. Adult and nymph stink bugs were spatially associated within wheat fields based on SADIE association indices. Seasonal counts of stink bugs were spatially associated with spike counts at least once for each species across the four fields. Future work may investigate practices to reduce stink bug buildup on wheat in the spring and movement to susceptible crops such as corn, Zea mays L.

The rise of the Ottomans

The rise The origins of the Ottomans are obscure. According to legend, largely invented later as part of the process of legitimising Ottoman rule and providing the Ottomans with a suitably august past, it was the Saljuq ruler ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn who bestowed rule on the Ottomans. The Saljuqs had however ceased to be the dominant power in Anatolia after their defeat by the Ilkhans, the Mongol rulers of Iran, at the battle of Kose Daǧ in 641/1243. Towards the end of the century the Ilkhans too no longer controlled the region effectively, while the other major regional power, the Byzantine empire, was a mere shadow of its former self, unable to maintain any strong hold over its territories to the east. It was out of this power vacuum that the Ottomans, like the other small Turkish states, emerged towards the end of the seventh/thirteenth century. By 700/1300 Anatolia was peppered with Turkish states ( beglik s). In the west, spread out along the Aegean coast running north to south, lay the beglik s of Qarasi, along the Dardanelles, Ṣarukhan, based round Maghnisa, Aydin, with its centre at Tire, and Menteshe, based round Balaṭ. Both Aydin and Menteshe had important trade relations with the Italian city-states, and from early in the eighth/fourteenth century concluded treaties with Venice, the earliest extant with Menteshe dating from 731/1331 and that with Aydin from the same year. To the south, round Anṭalya, lay Tekke, and inland, Ḥamid, round Isparta.

Ottoman warfare, 1300–1453

The formative period, c .1300–1370s The early Ottoman military organisation was a peculiar a malgam of Turkoman nomadic, Seljuk-Ilkhanid and Byzantine elements, but it was the nomadic tradition which predominated among the various constituent parts in the early period of the formation of the state. As in other Eurasian nomadic societies, it may well have been very difficult to distinguish between society and military among the Turkomans living in the Bithynian marches. All followers of the Ottomans capable of fighting could and did participate in raiding or in defence if need arose. The predatory raids were called akin in Turkish, and those taking part in them were akinci (later, as the Islamic character of the state strengthened, the term gazi , that is, warrior of the faith, came to be preferred). Yet, apart from the undifferentiated bands of warriors, we see from the outset a relatively small but well-organised and well-trained force which gathered around the ruler and rendered services to him in war and peace. This type of ‘military retinue’ was not an Ottoman invention. It was a universal institution which had existed in the east and the west since time immemorial. In the empires of the Inner Asian Turks and Uighurs the retinue of the kagan (ruler) was called buyruk , while the Karahanids and the Mongols knew it under the names koldas and nokor , respectively.

Ottoman Grain Exports from Western Anatolia at the End of the Fourteenth Century

This article considers Ottoman policy concerning grain exports from western Anatolia at the end of the fourteenth century and argues that the Ottomans may have introduced a system of control whereby the quantity of grain which could be exported from Anatolia at any one time was restricted.

Ottoman armies and warfare, 1453–1603

The period from the second accession of Mehmed II in 1451 to the accession of Ahmed III in 1603 was one in which the Ottoman Empire was to reach the limits of its territorial expansion. The empire truly became a world power, one of the major players in the politics of Europe and a dominant naval power in the Mediterranean. The reigns of Mehmed II, Bayezid II and Selim I and the first half of the reign of Suleyman I represent a period of rapid conquest with an expanding state pursuing generally lucrative wars. This chapter discusses the empire period in two parts. First, from 1451 to the mid-sixteenth century, in which the empire was on the rise, becoming a world power, conquering and dealing with the effects of success. Second period is the mid-sixteenth century to 1603, in which the empire had rather to deal with the consequences of its earlier successes.

The Ottomans, 1451–1603

The period from the second accession of Mehmed II in 1451 to the accession of Ahmed III in 1603 was one in which the Ottoman Empire was to reach the limits of its territorial expansion, stretching from Iran in the east to Hungary in the west, from the Crimea in the north to the borders of Morocco in the south. The empire truly became a world power, one of the major players in the politics of Europe (see Brummett, Chapter 3, this volume) and a dominant naval power in the Mediterranean (see Fleet, Chapter 5, this volume). With the conquest of Egypt and Syria, the Ottomans took control of the Red Sea and entered the Indian Ocean, where they clashed with the Portuguese for control of the lucrative trade routes from the east (see Ozbaran, Chapter 6, this volume). From the early sixteenth century onwards, the Ottomans were constantly challenged by the Safavid state of Iran, which effectively undermined the Ottomans’ ability to control their territory and secure the loyalty of their population in eastern Anatolia, and with whom warfare was particularly exacting as, after the calamity of Caldiran in 1514, they avoided direct military confrontation, preferring retreat and scorched-earth tactics. Ottoman victories against the Safavids were thus often pyrrhic ones (see Boyar, Chapter 4, this volume). The reigns of Mehmed II, Bayezid II and Selim I and the first half of the reign of Suleyman I represent a period of rapid conquest with an expanding state pursuing generally lucrative wars. By the middle of the sixteenth century, however, warfare had become more demanding and less rewarding, and the state became increasingly faced with the need to secure borders rather than extend them. The period was thus one in which the empire, as Geza David (Chapter 9, this volume) notes, “reached the apogee of its military potential” but also one in which its effective military strength, although still formidable, began to decline.

Money and politics: the fate of British business in the new Turkish Republic

This article examines the relations between the Ankara government and British financial circles in the period between the collapse of the Ottoman empire at the end of the First World War and the establishment of the new Turkish Republic in 1923. Highlighting the difficulties experienced by British business interests due to the political stance of the British government, it also calls into question the ability of such business circles to operate effectively within the new Turkey and demonstrates the new line adopted by the nationalists to British capital and to foreign financial control in the new Republic.

The Byzantine Empire from the eleventh to the fifteenth century

The defeat of the Byzantine armyby the Seljuk Turks at the battle of Malazgirt (Manzikert) in 1071 ushered in a period of military decline, which, despite its fluctuations, culminated with the capture of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in 1453. This event brought to an end an empire, which, despite the ethnic, linguistic and religious varieties existing within its borders, in essence had maintained its Graeco-Roman and Christian culture and tradition. Originally the eastern half ( pars orientalis ) of the Roman Empire, Byzantium had throughout its existence to defend its territories against forces that rose in the east, west and north. As a result of the migrations of the Germanic tribes, the western half was lost to the empire by the end of the fifth century, despite the subsequent attempts by Justinian I (527–65) to re-conquer these territories. Yet, as long as the empire held on to Asia Minor, its wealthiest province after Egypt in terms of men and resources, it had the possibility of reasserting itself, first against the Persians and later against the Arabs, despite the loss of North Africa, Egypt, Syria and Palestine.