Kath Checkland

Impact of financial incentives on clinical autonomy and internal motivation in primary care: ethnographic study.

Objective To explore the impact of financial incentives for quality of care on practice organisation, clinical autonomy, and internal motivation of doctors and nurses working in primary care. Design Ethnographic case study. Setting Two English general practices. Participants 12 general practitioners, nine nurses, four healthcare assistants, and four administrative staff. Main outcome measure Observation of practices over a five month period after the introduction of financial incentives for quality of care introduced in the 2004 general practitioner contract. Results After the introduction of the quality and outcomes framework there was an increase in the use of templates to collect data on quality of care. New regimens of surveillance were adopted, with clinicians seen as “chasers” or the “chased,” depending on their individual responsibility for delivering quality targets. Attitudes towards the contract were largely positive, although discontent was higher in the practice with a more intensive surveillance regimen. Nurses expressed more concern than doctors about changes to their clinical practice but also appreciated being given responsibility for delivering on targets in particular disease areas. Most doctors did not question the quality targets that existed at the time or the implications of the targets for their own clinical autonomy. Conclusions Implementation of financial incentives for quality of care did not seem to have damaged the internal motivation of the general practitioners studied, although more concern was expressed by nurses.

Which features of primary care affect unscheduled secondary care use? A systematic review

Objectives To conduct a systematic review to identify studies that describe factors and interventions at primary care practice level that impact on levels of utilisation of unscheduled secondary care. Setting Observational studies at primary care practice level. Participants Studies included people of any age of either sex living in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries with any health condition. Primary and secondary outcome measures The primary outcome measure was unscheduled secondary care as measured by emergency department attendance and emergency hospital admissions. Results 48 papers were identified describing potential influencing features on emergency department visits (n=24 studies) and emergency admissions (n=22 studies). Patient factors associated with both outcomes were increased age, reduced socioeconomic status, lower educational attainment, chronic disease and multimorbidity. Features of primary care affecting unscheduled secondary care were more complex. Being able to see the same healthcare professional reduced unscheduled secondary care. Generally, better access was associated with reduced unscheduled care in the USA. Proximity to healthcare provision influenced patterns of use. Evidence relating to quality of care was limited and mixed. Conclusions The majority of research was from different healthcare systems and limited in the extent to which it can inform policy. However, there is evidence that continuity of care is associated with reduced emergency department attendance and emergency hospital admissions.

Relationship between quality of care and choice of clinical computing system: retrospective analysis of family practice performance under the UK's quality and outcomes framework

Objectives To investigate the relationship between performance on the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework pay-for-performance scheme and choice of clinical computer system. Design Retrospective longitudinal study. Setting Data for 2007–2008 to 2010–2011, extracted from the clinical computer systems of general practices in England. Participants All English practices participating in the pay-for-performance scheme: average 8257 each year, covering over 99% of the English population registered with a general practice. Main outcome measures Levels of achievement on 62 quality-of-care indicators, measured as: reported achievement (levels of care after excluding inappropriate patients); population achievement (levels of care for all patients with the relevant condition) and percentage of available quality points attained. Multilevel mixed effects multiple linear regression models were used to identify population, practice and clinical computing system predictors of achievement. Results Seven clinical computer systems were consistently active in the study period, collectively holding approximately 99% of the market share. Of all population and practice characteristics assessed, choice of clinical computing system was the strongest predictor of performance across all three outcome measures. Differences between systems were greatest for intermediate outcomes indicators (eg, control of cholesterol levels). Conclusions Under the UKs pay-for-performance scheme, differences in practice performance were associated with the choice of clinical computing system. This raises the question of whether particular system characteristics facilitate higher quality of care, better data recording or both. Inconsistencies across systems need to be understood and addressed, and researchers need to be cautious when generalising findings from samples of providers using a single computing system.

Rethinking collegiality: Restratification in English general medical practice 2004–2008

For Freidson [(1985). The reorganisation of the medical profession. Medical Care Review, 42(1), 11-35], collegiality, or ostensible equal status amongst members of the medical profession, serves a dual purpose. It socialises members into an attitude of loyalty to colleagues and presents an image to those outside the profession that all its members are competent and trustworthy. However, Freidson saw the use of formal standards developed by one (knowledge) elite within medicine and enforced by another (administrative) elite as threatening collegiality and professional unity. Drawing on two studies in English primary medical care this paper reports the emergence of new strata or elites, with groups of doctors involved in surveillance of others and action to improve compliance in deficient individuals and organizations. Early indications are that these developments have not led to the consequences which Freidson predicted. The increasing acceptance of the legitimacy of professional scrutiny and accountability that we identify suggests that new norms are emerging in English primary medical care, the possibility of which Freidsons analysis fails to take account.

Accountable to whom, for what? An exploration of the early development of Clinical Commissioning Groups in the English NHS.

Objective One of the key goals of the current reforms in the English National Health Service (NHS) under the Health and Social Care Act, 2012, is to increase the accountability of those responsible for commissioning care for patients (clinical commissioning groups (CCGs)), while at the same time allowing them a greater autonomy. This study was set out to explore CCGs developing accountability relationships. Design We carried out detailed case studies in eight CCGs, using interviews, observation and documentary analysis to explore their multiple accountabilities. Setting/participants We interviewed 91 people, including general practitioners, managers and governing body members in developing CCGs, and undertook 439 h of observation in a wide variety of meetings. Results CCGs are subject to a managerial, sanction-backed accountability to NHS England (the highest tier in the new organisational hierarchy), alongside a number of other external accountabilities to the public and to some of the other new organisations created by the reforms. In addition, unlike their predecessor commissioning organisations, they are subject to complex internal accountabilities to their members. Conclusions The accountability regime to which CCGs are subject to is considerably more complex than that which applied their predecessor organisations. It remains to be seen whether the twin aspirations of increased autonomy and increased accountability can be realised in practice. However, this early study raises some important issues and concerns, including the risk that the different bodies to whom CCGs are accountable will have differing (or conflicting) agendas, and the lack of clarity over the operation of sanction regimes.

The limits of market-based reforms in the NHS: the case of alternative providers in primary care

BackgroundHistorically, primary medical care in the UK has been delivered by general practitioners who are independent contractors, operating under a contract, which until 2004 was subject to little performance management. In keeping with the wider political impetus to introduce markets and competition into the NHS, reforms were introduced to allow new providers to bid for contracts to provide primary care services in England. These contracts known as ‘Alternative Provider Medical Services’, were encouraged by two centrally-driven rounds of procurement (2007/8 and 2008/9). This research investigated the commissioning and operation of such Alternative Providers of Primary Care (APPCs).MethodsTwo qualitative case studies were undertaken in purposively sampled English Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) and their associated APPCs over 14 months (2009-10). We observed 65 hours of meetings, conducted 23 interviews with PCT and practice staff, and gathered relevant associated documentation.Results and conclusionsWe found that the procurement and contracting process was costly and time-consuming. Extensive local consultation was undertaken, and there was considerable opposition in some areas. Many APPCs struggled to build up their patient list sizes, whilst over-performing on walk-in contracts. Contracting for APPCs was ‘transactional’, in marked contrast to the ‘relational’ contracting usually found in the NHS, with APPCs subject to tight performance management. These complicated and costly processes contrast to those experienced by traditionally owned GP partnerships. However, managers reported that the perception of competition had led existing practices to improve their services.The Coalition Government elected in 2010 is committed to ‘Any Qualified Provider’ of secondary care, and some commentators argue that this should also be applied to primary care. Our research suggests that, if this is to happen, a debate is needed about the operation of a market in primary care provision, including the trade-offs between transparent processes, fair procurement, performance assurance and cost.

Local histories and local sensemaking: a case of policy implementation in the English National Health Service

�Central policies that are only loosely specified might be expected to result in local variations in interpretation and implementation, and practice-based commissioning in the English National Health Service (NHS) is no exception. We show how local ‘sensemaking’ in relation to this policy has been influenced by local histories and by conceptual schemata derived from earlier reorganisations of the NHS. Changes to organisational formalities do not necessarily, therefore, result in reappraisals of sensemaking on the part of local actors. We also employ our data to address issues raised by commentators critical of the way the concept of sensemaking has been previously employed.

'We can't get anything done because ... ': making sense of 'barriers' to Practice-based Commissioning

Objectives: To investigate the issues raised by participants as ‘barriers’ to the development of Practice-based Commissioning (PBC) in ‘early adopter’ sites in England. Methods: Detailed case studies of five PBC consortia in three Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). Data collection included interviews with a wide range of respondents (46 in total), including general practitioners, PCT employees, Local Authority employees and patient representatives, observation of many different types of meetings (68 in total), and analysis of documents tabled at meetings and circulated at other times. Results: It has been claimed that progress in developing PBC has been slow. Our respondents articulated a number of factors that they felt were holding them back, which could have been identified as ‘barriers’ preventing change. The issues raised were consistent across our sites (lack of time, resources and personnel, and difficult relationships with the PCT), but observation suggested that these issues arose out of very different organizational ‘sensemaking’, and as a result the apparent ‘barriers’ had different meanings in different organizational contexts. Conclusion: Weicks concept of ‘organizational sensemaking’ provides a useful framework within which to explore the problems encountered when implementing policy. Observational methods are a powerful tool in understanding sensemaking. The variations in sensemaking that we observed suggest that the use of ‘barrier’ metaphors in descriptions of implementation problems risks homogenizing the portrayal of situations that differ greatly in reality. This implies that top-down or centrally driven solutions to such situations will often be inappropriate.

?Animateurs? and animation: what makes a good commissioning manager?

Objectives To examine the managerial behaviours adopted by commissioning managers in English primary care trusts (PCTs), and to explore the impact of these behaviours. Methods Qualitative case studies were undertaken in four PCTs, focusing on staff engaged in the commissioning of hospital services. Both formal and informal observation were undertaken (150 hours), and 41 in-depth interviews conducted with managers and general practitioners (GPs). Results Managers adopted many managerial behaviours familiar from the literature, including sharing information, and networking inside and outside the organization. Multiple organizational layers and unclear decisionmaking processes hindered this activity. In addition, some managers with responsibility for facilitating practice-based commissioning (PbC) adopted a managerial mode that we have called being an ‘animateur’. This approach involved the active management of disparate groups of people over whom the manager had no authority, and appeared to be a factor in determining success. It was facilitated by managerial autonomy and was more prevalent where managers were seen to have legitimacy. Some organizational practices appeared to inhibit its development. Conclusions From 2012/13 it is planned that GPs will be taking more responsibility for commissioning in the English NHS. This research suggests that managers of the new commissioning organizations will require a deep and contextualized understanding of the NHS and that it is important that organizational processes do not inhibit managerial behaviour. Legitimacy may be an issue in contexts were managers are automatically transferred from their existing appointments.

Evidence-based medicine and patient choice: The case of heart failure care

Objectives The implementation of evidence-based medicine and policies aimed at increasing user involvement in health care decisions are central planks of contemporary English health policy. Yet they are potentially in conflict. Our aim was to explore how clinicians working in the field of heart failure resolve this conflict. Methods Qualitative semi-structured interviews were carried out with health professionals who were currently caring for patients with heart failure, and observations were conducted at one dedicated heart failure clinic in northern England. Results While clinicians acknowledged that patients’ ideas and preferences should be an important part of treatment decisions, the widespread acceptance of an evidence-based clinical protocol for heart failure among the clinic doctors significantly influenced the content and style of the consultation. Conclusion Evidence-based medicine was used to buttress professional authority and seemed to provide an additional barrier to the adoption of patient-centred clinical practice.