Katharine O. Strunk

Do strong unions shape district policies? collective bargaining, teacher contract restrictiveness, and the political power of teachers' unions

A substantial amount of school district policy is set in the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) negotiated between teachers’ unions and districts. Although previous studies have assumed that CBA provisions bargained by unions are a primary mechanism connecting union strength to outcomes for teachers and students, research has not yet addressed the basic question of whether stronger unions in fact bargain different CBAs. Combining data from a content analysis of agreements and a statewide survey of school board members in California, this study examines whether stronger, more politically organized unions are associated with CBAs that place greater constraints on district policy options. The results show that contracts in districts with stronger unions, measured by both board members’ evaluations of union power and union support of board members in recent elections, allow school district administrators less flexibility than do contracts in districts with weaker, less active unions.

How Should School Districts Shape Teacher Salary Schedules? Linking School Performance to Pay Structure in Traditional Compensation Schemes.

This study examines the relative distribution of salary schedule returns to experience for beginning and veteran teachers. We argue that districts are likely to benefit from structuring salary schedules with greater experience returns early in the teaching career. To test this hypothesis, we match salary data to school-level student performance data on math and reading achievement tests across states. We find that frontloaded compensation schemes—those that allocate greater salary returns to experience to novice teachers—are associated with better performance in multiple grades and throughout the achievement distribution. Our results contribute to national debates concerning teacher compensation policies.

Portfolio district reform meets school turnaround : Early implementation findings from the Los Angeles Public School Choice Initiative

Purpose – Despite the popularity of school “turnaround” and “portfolio district” management as solutions to low performance, there has been limited research on these strategies. The purpose of this paper is to address this gap by exploring the strategic case of Los Angeles Unified School Districts Public School Choice Initiative (PSCI) which combined both of these reforms. It examines how core mechanisms of change played out in schools and communities during the first two years of implementation.Design/methodology/approach – The paper draws on a mixed methods study, combining data from surveys, case studies, leader interviews, observations, and document review. It is guided by a conceptual framework grounded in research on school turnaround and portfolio districts, along with the districts implicit theory of change.Findings – The paper finds early success in attracting diverse stakeholder participation, supporting plan development, and ensuring transparency. However, data also indicate difficulty establ...

Economic Incentives as a Strategy for Responding to Teacher Staffing Problems: A Typology of Policies and Practices

Background: Many district and school leaders experience difficulties staffing their classrooms with qualified teachers. Economic incentives may motivate teachers to enter and remain in the workforce and entice teachers to work in less desirable districts and schools. However, very little is known about incentives in use, how they are used to address teacher staffing challenges, or their relative effectiveness in meeting teacher staffing needs. Purpose: This article presents a typology that organizes and differentiates among economic incentive policies. The typology provides a framework for understanding the alignment between incentive policies and dimensions of the teacher staffing problem and interactions among incentive policies across levels of the educational system. Research Design: The typology is based on a broad review of scholarly literature, state and district documents and websites, and research and interest group reports and briefings. The typology was tested and refined using descriptive case studies in four districts in two states. Findings: The authors’ findings confirm the typology’s applicability, highlight patterns in the use of economic incentive policies, and point to the importance of considering the incentive “packages” to which teachers may be entitled in policy making and research. Conclusions: The study makes both conceptual and empirical contributions. Conceptually, the authors develop and test a tool policy makers, educational leaders, and researchers can use to examine economic incentive policies and align policies with teacher staffing problems. Empirically, the study identifies patterns that raise important questions about the ways in which economic incentive policies are implemented and evaluated.

Accountability Under Constraint The Relationship Between Collective Bargaining Agreements and California Schools’ and Districts’ Performance Under No Child Left Behind

The authors examine how the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) negotiated between teachers’ unions and districts is associated with schools’ and districts’ performance under accountability pressures in California. They find that CBA restrictiveness is associated with the increased likelihood that districts will be in Program Improvement (PI) and at higher levels of PI, and with lower school- and district-level proficiency and graduation rates. They also show that strong contract schools and districts that have higher proportions of minority, low-income, and low-achieving student are even less likely to meet performance targets and have even lower proficiency rates.

Policy Poison or Promise Exploring the Dual Nature of California School District Collective Bargaining Agreements

Purpose: This study examines policies set in the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) negotiated between teachers’ unions and school boards and explores what kinds of districts have contract provisions that restrict district administrators, enhance administrative flexibility, and/or improve teachers’ professional work lives and that have contracts that are more restrictive overall. Method: The author analyzes a sample of 465 California CBAs and uses linear probability models to highlight the relationships between a set of 95 representative provisions and characteristics of districts that may make them “hard to staff.” A measure of overall contract restrictiveness is generated and used to assess the relationships between these district characteristics and contract strength. Findings: Some CBA provisions restrict district administrators, whereas others may provide administrators with greater flexibilities. In addition, many provisions serve to enhance teachers’ working conditions. Many of the most restrictive clauses are more frequently found in the contracts of urban districts and districts with higher proportions of minority and poor students. However, many of these same districts have contracts that include important flexibilities and provisions that may enhance teachers’ working conditions. Large and urban districts have more restrictive contracts overall, although districts with high proportions of poor and minority students do not. Implications: As policymakers consider renegotiating provisions within CBAs and diminishing the strength of CBAs themselves, it will be important to consider the specific regulations within CBAs and whether they truly constrain administrators or serve some other purpose and whether specific high-need districts are more or less harmed by the contents of CBAs.

The State Role in Teacher Compensation

INTRODUCTION Policy makers have long been concerned with K– 2 teachers’ compensation. Not only might increased teacher compensation purchase more skilled teachers, it might also influence how long teachers stay at their schools and in the teaching profession. Similarly, changes in the structure of teacher salary schedules may change the appeal of teaching even if average salaries remain the same. Much of the extant research on K–2 teacher salaries shows, to no great surprise, that teachers respond to salary changes (for examples, see Baugh and Stone 982 and Murnane and Olsen 989, 990). Teachers’ salaries are just one component of teachers’ overall compensation, however. States and school districts also provide other incentives—both monetary and nonmonetary—aimed at attracting and retaining teachers. These incentives often target certain types of teachers in certain types of positions. In addition, teachers receive health and welfare and retirement benefits that add to their total compensation packages. This policy brief examines the state role in these three components of total K–2 teacher compensation— base salary, benefits, and other incentives—showing how states across the country are going beyond simple salary structures to compensate teachers. We also examine how teachers’ compensation targets teachers at different points in their career cycles. Some components aim at recruiting teachers, others target retention of early career teachers, and still others aim at the retention and efficient release of older and retirement-eligible Susanna Loeb

Democratic Engagement in District Reform: The Evolving Role of Parents in the Los Angeles Public School Choice Initiative

This article examines parent engagement in a Los Angeles portfolio district reform. Based on data from a 3-year study, we use the lens of democratic theory to examine the design and implementation of mechanisms seeking parent input in the selection of plans to operate low-performing and new schools. We find that despite significant efforts to move toward a more deliberative model over time, the process remained primarily interest-based in most cases, due in large part to structural constraints, limited access to information, and mistrust. The article concludes with implications for policy, practice, and research.

The Impact of Turnaround Reform on Student Outcomes: Evidence and Insights from the Los Angeles Unified School District.

We examine the Los Angeles Unified School Districts Public School Choice Initiative (PSCI), which sought to turnaround the districts lowest-performing schools. We ask whether school turnaround impacted student outcomes, and what explains variations in outcomes across reform cohorts. We use a Comparative Interrupted Time Series approach using administrative student-level data, following students in the first (1.0), second (2.0), and third (3.0) cohorts of PSCI schools. We find that students in 1.0 turnaround schools saw no significant improvements in outcomes, whereas students enrolled in 2.0 schools saw significant gains in English Language Arts in both years of the reform. Students in 3.0 schools experienced significant decreases in achievement. Qualitative and survey data suggest that increased support and assistance and the use of reconstitution and restart as the sole turnaround methods contributed to gains in 2.0, whereas policy changes in 3.0 caused difficulties and confusion in implementation, leading to poor student performance.

The Best Laid Plans An Examination of School Plan Quality and Implementation in a School Improvement Initiative

Purpose: A common strategy used in school improvement efforts is a mandated process of formal planning, yet little is known about the quality of plans or the relationship between plan quality and implementation. This mixed-methods article investigates plan quality, factors associated with plan quality, and the relationship between plan quality and implementation, drawing on the first 3 years of a Los Angeles Unified School District school improvement initiative that relied on formal school planning. Research Design: Our research team rated all 206 school plans submitted to the district in the first 3 years of the initiative and drew on surveys of applicant teams and principals implementing the plans. We use these data in descriptive analyses to explore relationships between plan quality and various inputs and outcomes. We also utilized school- and system-level qualitative data to contextualize and explain our findings. Findings: We find that, although average plan quality was relatively low throughout the reform, quality increased during the first phase of the initiative but decreased in the second phase. The two critical elements of the reform intended to drive plan quality, competition and technical support, were negatively or not associated with higher quality plans. However, we find positive relationships between plan quality and reported implementation outcomes in the first phase of the reform, but not in the second. Conclusions: We explore possible explanations for these patterns using qualitative case study and interview data. In the conclusion of the article, we discuss the implications for future school improvement initiatives and research.