Katherine Levine Einstein

Pushing the City Limits

Are city governments capable of responding to the preferences of their constituents? Is the menu of policy options determined by forces beyond their direct control? We answer these questions using a comprehensive cross-sectional database linking voter preferences to local policy outcomes in more than 2,000 midsize cities and a new panel covering cities in two states. Overall, our analysis paints an encouraging picture of democracy in the city: we document substantial variation in local fiscal policy outcomes and provide evidence that voter preferences help explain why cities adopt different policies. As they become more Democratic, cities increase their spending across a number of service areas. In addition, voter sentiment shapes the other side of the ledger, determining the level and precise mix of revenues on which cities rely. In short, we show that cities respond both to competitive pressures and the needs and wants of their constituents.

Pushing the City Limits Policy Responsiveness in Municipal Government

Are city governments capable of responding to the preferences of their constituents? Or is the menu of policy options determined by forces beyond their direct control? We answer these questions using the most comprehensive cross-sectional database linking voter preferences to local policy outcomes in more than 2,000 mid-size cities and a new panel covering cities in two states. Overall, our analysis paints an encouraging picture of democracy in the city: we document substantial variation in local fiscal policy outcomes and provide evidence that voter preferences help explain why cities adopt different policies. As they become more Democratic, cities increase their spending across a number of service areas. In addition, voter sentiment shapes the other side of the ledger, determining the level and precise mix of revenues on which cities rely. In short, we show that cities respond both to competitive pressures and the needs and wants of their constituents.

'It Isn't What We Don't Know that Gives Us Trouble, It's What We Know that Ain't So:' Misinformation and Democratic Politics

Political theorists and activists insist that the public must be knowledgeable for a democracy to succeed. However, many citizens are ignorant of relevant facts, hold correct information but do not make policy choices that accord with it, or – most importantly, we argue – hold misinformation that is associated with their policy preferences. We explore the dangers to the quality of democratic governance from those who are informed but disengaged and, especially, those who are engaged but use false “knowledge.” Our case is global warming.Poll data show the extent of Americans’ misinformation about or disengagement with climate change. The main responsibility for these problems lies with politicians, who have partisan incentives to help the disengaged become active but also partisan incentives to keep the misinformed politically involved. Activity in accord with false “knowledge” can not only slow needed responses to global warming but also lead to concrete harm to individuals, communities, and nations.

Mayors, Partisanship, and Redistribution Evidence Directly from U.S. Mayors

Policymakers and scholars are increasingly looking to cities to address challenges including income inequality. No existing research, however, directly and systematically measures local political elites’ preferences for redistribution. We interview and survey 72 American mayors—including many from the nation’s largest cities—and collect public statements and policy programs to measure when and why mayors prioritize redistribution. While many of the mayors’ responses are consistent with being constrained by economic imperatives, a sizable minority prioritize redistributive programs. Moving beyond the question of whether mayors support redistribution, we find that partisanship explains much of the variation in a mayor’s propensity for redistribution. Moreover, the impact of partisanship very rarely varies with institutional and economic contexts. These findings suggest that national political debates may be shaping local priorities in ways contrary to conventional views, and that they may matter even more than other recent findings conclude.

City Learning: Evidence of Policy Information Diffusion from a Survey of U.S. Mayors

Most studies of policy diffusion attempt to infer the processes through which policies spread by observing outputs (policy adoptions). We approach these issues from the other direction by directly analyzing a key policymaking input—information about others’ policies. Moreover, we do so by investigating policy diffusion in cities rather than states. Using a survey of U.S. mayors, more specifically, mayors’ own lists of cities they look to for ideas, we find evidence that distance, similarity, and capacity all influence the likelihood of a policy maker looking to a particular jurisdiction for policy information. We also consider whether these traits are complements or substitutes and provide some evidence for the latter. Specifically, we find that, at times, mayors eschew similarity and distance to look to highly respected “high capacity” cities but that there is no tradeoff between distance and similarity.

Do Mayors Run for Higher Office? New Evidence on Progressive Ambition

The mayor’s office potentially offers a launchpad for statewide and national political ambitions. We know relatively little, however, about how frequently mayors actually run for higher office, and which mayors choose to do so. This article combines longitudinal data on the career paths of the mayors of 200 big cities with new survey and interview data to investigate these questions. While we find that individual and city traits—especially gender—have some predictive power, the overwhelming story is that relatively few mayors—just under one-fifth—ever seek higher office. We suggest that ideological, institutional, and electoral factors all help to explain why so few mayors exhibit progressive ambition.