Kathy L. Brock

A Comprehensive Canadian Approach to the Third Sector: Creative Tensions and Unexpected Outcomes

In June 2000, the Canadian government together with representatives from the voluntary sector announced the Voluntary Sector Initiative (VSI), an ambitious joint endeavor intended to investigate and strengthen their relationship. With the experience of the United Kingdom as a backdrop, representatives from the two sectors were confident that they could develop a new framework for the inclusion of voluntary sector organizations in government policy and revamp the regulatory framework to enable voluntary organizations to function more effectively. Ultimately, the goal was to serve Canadians better at a time when these organizations were increasingly assuming functions that had been performed by government departments and agencies. This paper argues that in order to understand the success and the limitations of the VSI in securing a more effective policy role for the sector, the forces that drove the initiative onto the government agenda must be understood. By reflecting back on why the policy window opened for the VSI, the tensions in the relationship and the subsequent policy choices, the outcome of the VSI and the future direction of the state–third sector relationship can be better understood. Effecting a comprehensive policy shift is a difficult task; however, to effect the policy shift in the particular way envisaged by the policy participants at the outset of such an endeavor, is even more difficult. Too often the result is not what is expected or even desired by at least one side. Chapter 2 A Comprehensive Canadian Approach to the Third Sector: Creative Tensions and Unexpected Outcomes

The Economic Consequences of Quebec Sovereignty@@@Parting as Friends: The Economic Consequences for Quebec

This paper reviews the issues that would arise if Quebec were to separate from Canada. It also presents quantitative estimates of the likely orders of magnitude of their economic impact both on Quebec and the Rest of Canada. Its overall conclusion is that Quebec would be much harder hit than the rest of Canada if Quebec separates. Real output in Quebec could easily be depressed in the short run by as much as 10 percent and in the long run by 5 percent. In the short run, the output loss would be triggered by a crisis of confidence resulting from separation. In the long run, output loss would be caused by the required transfer of resources to the foreign sector (necessitated by the elimination of the existing fiscal gain in transactions with the federal government), by the emigration of anglophones, and by higher public debt charges resulting from the increased debt burden. The transfer would be made more difficult by the need to ad just in the soft and dairy sectors and by the probable loss of Churchill Fallss power, but it could be facilitated by increased taxes. For the rest of Canada, the economic costs, which can be quantified, would be substantially lower than for Quebec. And for Canada there also would be some offsetting economic gains. The net short-run costs would only be about one to two percent of GDP and would result mainly from the short-run loss of confidence caused by the separation of Quebec. The long-run quantifiable costs would be small – probably less than the quantifiable benefits.