Keise Izuma

Neural basis of the undermining effect of monetary reward on intrinsic motivation

Contrary to the widespread belief that people are positively motivated by reward incentives, some studies have shown that performance-based extrinsic reward can actually undermine a persons intrinsic motivation to engage in a task. This “undermining effect” has timely practical implications, given the burgeoning of performance-based incentive systems in contemporary society. It also presents a theoretical challenge for economic and reinforcement learning theories, which tend to assume that monetary incentives monotonically increase motivation. Despite the practical and theoretical importance of this provocative phenomenon, however, little is known about its neural basis. Herein we induced the behavioral undermining effect using a newly developed task, and we tracked its neural correlates using functional MRI. Our results show that performance-based monetary reward indeed undermines intrinsic motivation, as assessed by the number of voluntary engagements in the task. We found that activity in the anterior striatum and the prefrontal areas decreased along with this behavioral undermining effect. These findings suggest that the corticobasal ganglia valuation system underlies the undermining effect through the integration of extrinsic reward value and intrinsic task value.

Processing of the incentive for social approval in the ventral striatum during charitable donation

Human behaviors are motivated not only by materialistic rewards but also by abstract social rewards, such as the approval of others. When choosing an action in social situations, to evaluate each action, the brain must convert different types of reward (such as money or social approval) into a common scale. Here using fMRI, we investigated the neural correlates of such valuation computations while individuals freely decided whether to donate to real charities or to take the money for themselves in the presence or absence of observers. Behavioral evidence showed that the mere presence of observers increased donation rates, and neuroimaging results revealed that activation in the ventral striatum before the same choice (“donate” or “not donate”) was significantly modulated by the presence of observers. Particularly high striatal activations were observed when a high social reward was expected (donation in public) and when there was the potential for monetary gain without social cost (no donation in the absence of observers). These findings highlight the importance of this area in representing both social and monetary rewards as a “decision utility” and add to the understanding of how the brain makes a choice using a “common neural currency” in social situations.

Neural correlates of cognitive dissonance and choice-induced preference change

According to many modern economic theories, actions simply reflect an individuals preferences, whereas a psychological phenomenon called “cognitive dissonance” claims that actions can also create preference. Cognitive dissonance theory states that after making a difficult choice between two equally preferred items, the act of rejecting a favorite item induces an uncomfortable feeling (cognitive dissonance), which in turn motivates individuals to change their preferences to match their prior decision (i.e., reducing preference for rejected items). Recently, however, Chen and Risen [Chen K, Risen J (2010) J Pers Soc Psychol 99:573–594] pointed out a serious methodological problem, which casts a doubt on the very existence of this choice-induced preference change as studied over the past 50 y. Here, using a proper control condition and two measures of preferences (self-report and brain activity), we found that the mere act of making a choice can change self-report preference as well as its neural representation (i.e., striatum activity), thus providing strong evidence for choice-induced preference change. Furthermore, our data indicate that the anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex tracked the degree of cognitive dissonance on a trial-by-trial basis. Our findings provide important insights into the neural basis of how actions can alter an individuals preferences.

Insensitivity to social reputation in autism.

People act more prosocially when they know they are watched by others, an everyday observation borne out by studies from behavioral economics, social psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. This effect is thought to be mediated by the incentive to improve ones social reputation, a specific and possibly uniquely human motivation that depends on our ability to represent what other people think of us. Here we tested the hypothesis that social reputation effects are selectively impaired in autism, a developmental disorder characterized in part by impairments in reciprocal social interactions but whose underlying cognitive causes remain elusive. When asked to make real charitable donations in the presence or absence of an observer, matched healthy controls donated significantly more in the observers presence than absence, replicating prior work. By contrast, people with high-functioning autism were not influenced by the presence of an observer at all in this task. However, both groups performed significantly better on a continuous performance task in the presence of an observer, suggesting intact general social facilitation in autism. The results argue that people with autism lack the ability to take into consideration what others think of them and provide further support for specialized neural systems mediating the effects of social reputation.

“Stay Tuned”: Inter-Individual Neural Synchronization During Mutual Gaze and Joint Attention

Eye contact provides a communicative link between humans, prompting joint attention. As spontaneous brain activity might have an important role in the coordination of neuronal processing within the brain, their inter-subject synchronization might occur during eye contact. To test this, we conducted simultaneous functional MRI in pairs of adults. Eye contact was maintained at baseline while the subjects engaged in real-time gaze exchange in a joint attention task. Averted gaze activated the bilateral occipital pole extending to the right posterior superior temporal sulcus, the dorso-medial prefrontal cortex, and the bilateral inferior frontal gyrus. Following a partners gaze toward an object activated the left intraparietal sulcus. After all the task-related effects were modeled out, inter-individual correlation analysis of residual time-courses was performed. Paired subjects showed more prominent correlations than non-paired subjects in the right inferior frontal gyrus, suggesting that this region is involved in sharing intention during eye contact that provides the context for joint attention.

The neural basis of social influence and attitude change

Human attitudes and preferences are susceptible to social influence. Recent social neuroscience studies, using theories and experimental paradigms from social psychology, have begun to elucidate the neural mechanisms underlying how others influence our attitudes through processes such as social conformity, cognitive inconsistency and persuasion. The currently available evidence highlights the role of the posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC) in social conformity and cognitive inconsistency, which represents the discrepancy between ones own and another persons opinion, or, more broadly, between currently inconsistent and ideally consistent states. Research on persuasion has revealed that peoples susceptibility to persuasive messages is related to activation in a nearby but more anterior part of the medial frontal cortex. Future progress in this field will depend upon the ability of researchers to dissociate underlying motivations for attitude change in different paradigms, and to utilize neuroimaging methods to advance social psychological theories of social influence.

The social neuroscience of reputation

Human behavior is strongly influenced by the presence of others. Obtaining a good reputation or avoiding a bad one is a powerful incentive for a plethora of human actions. Theoretical considerations suggest that reputation may be a key mediator of aspects of altruistic behavior that are uniquely human. Despite its considerable influence on human social behavior and the growing interest in social neuroscience, investigations of the neural basis of reputation-based decision-making are still in their infancy. Here, I argue that reputation is an important aspect of human social cognition and present some of the candidate neural mechanisms.

The roles of the medial prefrontal cortex and striatum in reputation processing

Abstract How we are viewed by other individuals—our reputation—has a considerable influence on our everyday behaviors and is considered an important concept in explaining altruism, a uniquely human trait. Previously it has been proposed that processing ones own reputation requires a reputation representation in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and a value representation in the striatum. Here, we directly tested this idea using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Subjects disclosed their behavioral tendencies with reference to social norms in the presence or absence of other people, a manipulation that is known to greatly affect an individuals concern for their reputation. The mPFC showed strong activation during self-referential processing, and this activity was enhanced by the mere presence of observers. Moreover, the striatum was also strongly activated when subjects responded in front of observers. Thus, the present study demonstrated that the mPFC and striatum were automatically recruited when the task placed a high demand on processing how one is viewed by others. Taken together, our findings suggest that the mPFC and the striatum play a key role in regulating human social behaviors, and these results provide valuable insight into the neural basis of human altruism.

Choice-Induced Preference Change in the Free-Choice Paradigm: A Critical Methodological Review

Choices not only reflect our preference, but they also affect our behavior. The phenomenon of choice-induced preference change has been of interest to cognitive dissonance researchers in social psychology, and more recently, it has attracted the attention of researchers in economics and neuroscience. Preference modulation after the mere act of making a choice has been repeatedly demonstrated over the last 50 years by an experimental paradigm called the “free-choice paradigm.” However, Chen and Risen (2010) pointed out a serious methodological flaw in this paradigm, arguing that evidence for choice-induced preference change is still insufficient. Despite the flaw, studies using the traditional free-choice paradigm continue to be published without addressing the criticism. Here, aiming to draw more attention to this issue, we briefly explain the methodological problem, and then describe simple simulation studies that illustrate how the free-choice paradigm produces a systematic pattern of preference change consistent with cognitive dissonance, even without any change in true preference. Our stimulation also shows how a different level of noise in each phase of the free-choice paradigm independently contributes to the magnitude of artificial preference change. Furthermore, we review ways of addressing the critique and provide a meta-analysis to show the effect size of choice-induced preference change after addressing the critique. Finally, we review and discuss, based on the results of the stimulation studies, how the criticism affects our interpretation of past findings generated from the free-choice paradigm. We conclude that the use of the conventional free-choice paradigm should be avoided in future research and the validity of past findings from studies using this paradigm should be empirically re-established.

How Self-Determined Choice Facilitates Performance: A Key Role of the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex

Recent studies have documented that self-determined choice does indeed enhance performance. However, the precise neural mechanisms underlying this effect are not well understood. We examined the neural correlates of the facilitative effects of self-determined choice using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Participants played a game-like task involving a stopwatch with either a stopwatch they selected (self-determined-choice condition) or one they were assigned without choice (forced-choice condition). Our results showed that self-determined choice enhanced performance on the stopwatch task, despite the fact that the choices were clearly irrelevant to task difficulty. Neuroimaging results showed that failure feedback, compared with success feedback, elicited a drop in the vmPFC activation in the forced-choice condition, but not in the self-determined-choice condition, indicating that negative reward value associated with the failure feedback vanished in the self-determined-choice condition. Moreover, the vmPFC resilience to failure in the self-determined-choice condition was significantly correlated with the increased performance. Striatal responses to failure and success feedback were not modulated by the choice condition, indicating the dissociation between the vmPFC and striatal activation pattern. These findings suggest that the vmPFC plays a unique and critical role in the facilitative effects of self-determined choice on performance.