Keith B. Payne

The case against nuclear abolition and for nuclear deterrence

This article assesses proposals for nuclear disarmament that have recently been presented by prominent individuals, nongovernmental organizations, and foreign governments. It offers a critique of proposals to eliminate nuclear weapons, concluding that such efforts are more likely to lead to adverse consequences than would a course of retaining nuclear weapons as part of a diverse and flexible portfolio of U.S. military capabilities.

Post‐cold war requirements for U.S. nuclear deterrence policy

This article addresses post‐Cold War requirements for U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, including requirements for both major‐power deterrence and regional deterrence. The report first examines the background and context for U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, as it developed during the U.S.‐Soviet competition from 1945 through 1991. It then examines the new context for deterrence and stresses the multiple audiences and circumstances to which the United States may seek to apply deterrent policies over the coming decades. The next section explores the current U.S. approach to deterrence, based on an assessment of official statements and policy decisions since the end of the Cold War. This leads to a consideration of emerging requirements for U.S. deterrence policy, with particular emphasis on those political, military‐strategic, and nuclear elements of deterrence that current policy may not adequately address.

Deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction: Lessons from history

The identification of “how to deter” the use of WMD, in practice, is a question of how to deter an opposing leadership from extreme provocations under specific circumstances. The size and type of the U.S. threat, and how, when and to whom it should be communicated will be shaped by the context and the character of the opponent. The initial question of interest is whether an opponent can be subjected to deterrence pressure. In addition, a significant set of contextual factors will determine the likely effectiveness of deterrence policies. The notion, widespread during the Cold War, that deterrence is simply a function of force characteristics, will be a risky basis for deterrence thinking in the future.

Alternative grand strategy options for the United States

The cold war grand strategy of the United States—containment—became outmoded with the demise of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. This article is a description and review of three U.S. post‐cold war grand strategy options, as articulated by different prominent members of the U.S. defense and foreign policy community. The three options—noninterventionism, unipolarism, and multilateralism—capture virtually all of the various proposals for a new grand strategy as currently discussed in official and unofficial circles in Washington. Each option is presented in terms of a common framework that examines its conceptualization of the international system, characterization of security interests, evaluation of strategic assets, and specification of a strategic approach.

Deterrence and U.S. strategic force requirements after the cold war

The demise of the Soviet Union and the planned reduction of strategic offensive forces have led many to conclude that maintaining an effective policy of deterrence will be less burdensome in the future. That may be correct financially—in the sense that the U.S. strategic offensive nuclear force structure necessary to support deterrence probably will not need to be as robust in the future as it is now. Creation of an effective policy of deterrence in the post‐cold war period, however, will be more challenging intellectually, and the roles that deterrence will have to play will be more demanding as the U. S. military retrenchment from abroad and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continue apace. The traditional U. S. ‐Soviet model of deterrence established during the cold war will be inadequate as the United States confronts a potentially diverse set of unfamiliar opponents. Standard assumptions about the goals, values, and character of the likely opponent will no longer be appropriate, and an...

Future of Deterrence: The Art of Defining How Much Is Enough

Many commentators who publicly calculate “how much is enough” in terms of the U.S. strategic capabilities necessary to support national goals continue to adhere to the Cold War formula that was known as “assured destruction.” That formula, however, is inadequate at best and likely misleading in the post–Cold War era. It bases such calculations on a simplistic numbers game based on weapons and targets and generally is unrelated to the goals that U.S. strategic forces are expected to support. A goal-driven approach to calculating how much is enough offers the opportunity to have such calculations driven by the needs of strategy as opposed to having strategy driven by numbers.

Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence

Minimum Deterrence proposals claim that a relatively small number of nuclear weapons, measured in single digits to hundreds, is an adequate nuclear force for all pertinent U.S. deterrence missions, including extending U.S. nuclear deterrence coverage to U.S. allies. The vulnerability of an adversary’s population and economy to nuclear weapons and the assumed high value of these targets to opposing leaders is the basis for the confident claims of Minimum Deterrence proponents that U.S. deterrence requirements can be met with a small number of nuclear weapons. Contemporary proponents of Minimum Deterrence often argue that reducing to low nuclear force levels would:

The Nuclear Posture Review and Deterrence for a New Age

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the success of the international coalition against Saddam Hussein in 1991, it seemed to many that a “new world order” was around the corner. An assembly of retired senior military officers and civilian officials asserted very publicly at the time that an emerging international collective security system could replace nuclear deterrence as the foundation of U.S. security. Since then, the rise of hostile rogue states supporting terrorism and armed with weapons of mass destruction has eliminated most talk of an emerging, secure world order, and highlighted our continuing need for the capability to deter attacks. The failure to deter a single attack involving contemporary chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons could lead to casualties many times greater than those we suffered on 9/11. With the need for deterrence once again obvious, the fundamental question now is how do we deter these new threats? Some suggest that our traditional Cold War understanding of deterrence worked well during the Cold War, and remains valid today. The essentials are unchanged, so “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” The basic mechanism of deterrence has indeed remained the same for millennia: deterrence is about threatening an opponent with costs that would outweigh any benefit it might anticipate from provocation, and thereby lead the opponent to choose a more benign path. But, to put it simply, compared to the Cold War era, the list of provocations and opponents we now hope to deter has expanded, the contexts within which we hope to deter are far more variable, as are the stakes involved and the priority we may attach to deterrence. It should not come as a surprise that much of our Cold War-derived thinking about deterrence now needs to be reconsidered.

How Much Is Enough?: A Goal-Driven Approach to Defining Key Principles for Measuring the Adequacy of U.S. Strategic Forces

Analyses of U.S. strategic force requirements frequently are based on assertions about the requirements for deterrence. A politically attractive position is that a relatively small number of nuclear weapons reliably meets U.S. strategic nuclear requirements. This position, however, is flawed for two reasons: first, the number/types of nuclear weapons required for deterrence cannot be identified with precision because requirements shift dramatically across time and circumstances. Second, strategic forces also are intended to assure allies and limit damage, and these goals entail separate requirements that must be included in any serious calculation of U.S. strategic force requirements.

Are they interested in stability? The Soviet view of intervention

Abstract The Soviet view of intervention is reflected both in Soviet literature and actual foreign policy. An adequate assessment of the Soviet view of intervention and its role in international relations must examine both Soviet declaratory and action policies. Soviet discussion of intervention, when viewed with a clear understanding of Soviet ideological jargon, reflects a belief that Soviet acts of intervention are justified and even proper according to international law. Interestingly, Soviet discussion of intervention also indicates that there exists a perceived linkage between the freedom of Soviet interventionist behavior and the specific state of the strategic balance. An examination of recent Soviet actions in Angola, the Horn of Africa, and Afghanistan indicates that the Soviet leadership may actually formulate foreign policy in the direction indicated by Soviet declaratory policy.