Keith Jeffery

The British Army and Internal Security 1919–1939

Systematic military policy-making towards internal security in Great Britain dates from the period immediately following the First World War. It was stimulated above all by widespread fears of possible revolution, sharpened by a belief in the collective incapacity of police forces to deal with civil disorder. Many, although by no means all, politicians and senior officials felt that the labour militancy of the 1920s was simply the harbinger of ‘red’ revolt, and preparations were made accordingly. Following the trade unions’ defeat in the general strike of 1926 fears of revolution subsided, although the War Office continued to revise the plans it had made in the early 1920s. Throughout the entire inter-war period, nevertheless, the general staff displayed an extreme reluctance to commit the army to internal security duties. Almost without exception, it seems, military men shared Lord Ironside’s opinion that ‘for a soldier there is no more distasteful duty than that of aiding the Civil Power’.

Security policy in Northern Ireland: Some reflections on the management of violent conflict

This article reviews the development of security policy in Northern Ireland since the outbreak of the current ‘troubles’ in 1969. Following an examination of the three principal categories of actor directly involved on the state side ‐ politicians, civil servants and security agency personnel ‐ the problems accompanying the fust phase of security policy, from 1969 to the mid‐1970s, are discussed. Particular attention is paid to intelligence aspects of the situation. The second part of the paper is devoted to security policy as it has developed since the governments policy review of 1975–76. The re‐emergence of the Royal Ulster Constabulary as the primary security agency is described, together with what is called the ‘Hermonization’ of the force in the 1980s. The development of the police under Sir John Hermon (Chief Constable 1980–89) has reflected three main trends in security policy: Ulsterization, professionalization, and the de‐politicization of the force. The article ends with a consideration of the...

“Hut ab,” “Promenade with Kamerade for Schokolade,” and the Flying Dutchman: British Soldiers in the Rhineland, 1918–1929

This essay explores the social history of the “British Army of the Rhine,” especially their interactions with the German population, over the eleven-year period of occupation in Cologne and part of the Rhineland. It covers the initial, sometimes fraught establishment of the occupation and interactions with the civil population, especially the perennial problem of British soldiers’ relations with German women. These were initially prohibited altogether, but the rule was quickly relaxed, and the British authorities even accepted and regulated the use of brothels, leading to criticisms back home. The essay also discusses the comparatively small number of serious violent crimes (including four murders) during the occupation, and concludes that the occupation was characterized on both sides by grudging acceptance and some degree of forbearance.

British military intelligence following World War I

The aim of this chapter is to examine the military dimension of British intelligence in the aftermath of World War I and to draw out a number of general observations concerning the practice of intelligence.1 After a survey of the structure and scope of military intelligence during the period in question, three case-studies are taken to illustrate different aspects of the topic. The first deals with senior war office involvement in and reaction to specific political intelligence-gathering: the intercept operation against the Russian Trade Delegation in 1920. The second looks at a local military intelligence operation — so far as the evidence allows — and assesses the influence (if any) exerted on British policy by intelligence collected in Constantinople. The third case-study investigates the military role in domestic intelligence work — both in Great Britain and Ireland. Finally, military intelligence during the 1920s is briefly examined in terms of the specific functions of collection, analysis, counter-intelligence and covert action.