Keith L. Dougherty

Majority Rule versus Supermajority Rules: Their Effects on Narrow and Broad Taxes

Buchanan and Tullock argue that larger supermajority rules reduce tyranny of the majority but should have no effect on the passage of mutually advantageous policies. The authors test this argument by separately analyzing the effect of supermajority requirements on taxes that are targeted toward narrow groups (more redistributive) and taxes targeted toward a broader base (less redistributive), in a panel of fifty states from 1970 to 2008. Regression analysis reveals an inverse relationship between narrow taxes and the size of the majority rule requirement and no relationship between broad taxes and the size of the majority requirement—consistent with the claim of Buchanan and Tullock. The authors also find that Democratic controlled governments have significantly higher tax rates on narrow taxes than Republican controlled governments. The reverse is found for broad taxes, but the result is not as strong.

A Pivotal Voter from a Pivotal State: Roger Sherman at the Constitutional Convention

Robertson (2005) and Rakove (1996) argue that Roger Sherman was surprisingly influential at the Constitutional Convention. Using empirically estimated ideal points, we show that Sherman was a pivotal voter from a pivotal state. We also demonstrate that if the votes were tallied by individual delegates, rather than being grouped by the home state, then Sherman would have been less pivotal. This suggests that the voting procedures adopted at the Constitutional Convention may have affected Shermans ability to get his interests enacted. Such institutions might have been more responsible than his legislative ability for making Sherman effective.

The Properties of Simple Vs. Absolute Majority Rule: Cases Where Absences and Abstentions Are Important:

Little attention has been paid to the differences between absolute majority rule and simple majority rule, which differ in their treatment of absences and ‘votes to abstain’. This article fills that gap by undertaking a probabilistic analysis of the two voting rules assuming two alternatives and a quorum requirement for simple majority rule. The rules are compared in both a modified sincere setting and a strategic setting using five criteria: (1) the Pareto criterion, (2) the BT criterion (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962), (3) the Expected Social Gain criterion, (4) the Responsiveness criterion, and (5) a modified version of Rae’s criterion. In the sincere setting, we find that simple majority rule (with and without a quorum) outperforms absolute majority rule under most conditions for four out of the five criteria. In the strategic setting, we find that the voting rules perform much more similarly.

The Pareto Efficiency and Expected Costs of k-Majority Rules

Several authors have analyzed the optimal k-majority rule based on a variety of criteria. Buchanan and Tullock argued that, in constitutional settings, the criterion should be that all changes meet the Pareto criterion; otherwise the status quo should be preferred (we call this the BT criterion). They then asserted that unanimity rule would be the preferred voting rule in this setting. In parliamentary settings, they claimed that a near majority rule would be preferred because it minimizes the sum of decision costs and external costs. This article investigates both claims in an N-voter, two-alternative setting. We show the conditions under which unanimity rule is less likely to select BT preferred alternatives than other k-majority rules and prove that the difference in performance can be negligible when Nis large and certain weak conditions are met. Furthermore, if we define external costs as the expected number of losers from a BT-inferior vote, then external costs become negligible for a range of supermajority rules. This implies that unanimity rule and a range of supermajority rules should be equally preferred when decision costs are added. Finally, we show that the external cost function can actually increase for certain populations. Many of the broader conclusions should also hold for multiple alternatives.

The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design

Introduction.- Original Theories and Current Studies.- Clarifying Concepts.- Constitutional Decision Making.- Legislative Decision Making.- Electoral Decision Making.- Conclusion.

An Economic Interpretation of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 Revisited

�Empirical studies of delegate voting at the Constitutional Convention have relied on the same 16 roll call votes. This article re-examines various assumptions used in the collection of these data. We first create a baseline regression. We then consider the effect of dropping delegates not in attendance, re-inferring the votes from primary sources, examining various subsamples of the roll calls, and reconstructing constituency variables to include state districts. Our findings suggest that personal interests were indeed important for decision making at the Constitutional Convention, but constituent interests were less important than previously claimed. ver since Charles Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution was first published in 1913, scholars in history, economics, and political science have debated the motivation of the framers at the Constitutional Convention. Beard argued that “the members of the Philadelphia Convention which drafted the Constitution were, with few exceptions, immediately, directly, and personally interested in, and derived economic advantages from, the establishment of the new system.” 1 Specifically, he argued that the framers voted around two interests: those who primarily owned “realty” and those who primarily owned “personalty” or securities.

A Spatial Analysis of Delegate Voting at the Constitutional Convention

Previous studies of the U.S. Constitutional Convention have relied on votes recorded for the state blocs or a relatively small number of delegate votes. We construct a new data set covering delegate votes on over 600 substantive roll calls, and use the data in several ways. First, we estimate a single dimensional position for the delegates which reflects their overall voting patterns. Next, we explain these positions using a variety of delegate and constituent variables. Finally, we suggest a method for identifying state and floor medians, which can be used to predict equilibrium outcomes at the Convention.

Odd or Even: Assembly Size and Majority Rule*

This paper provides a probabilistic comparison of small assemblies with an even number of members versus an adjacent odd number of members. We show that assemblies with an odd number of members are more likely to pass proposals under absolute majority rule than assemblies with an adjacent even number of members. We also show they are more likely to attain quorum and to pass proposals under simple majority rule with a quorum. The first claim is supported by data on the U.S. appellate courts, 1940–84. Finally, we discover similar effects in the probability of making truthful judgements (Condorcet 1785) and the ability to satisfy common welfare criteria (Rae 1969). The results have important implications for institutional design.

Precursors of Mancur Olson

Mancur Olson wrote four books during his career. He wrote The Economics of Wartime Shortage, which studied food shortages in wartime Britain; the Rise and Decline of Nations, which dealt with “institutional sclerosis” caused by interest groups; and Power and Prosperity, which described the formation of government from roving bandits to democracy. But his most seminal work was The Logic of Collective Action (hereafter Logic). In it, Olson laid the foundation for free-riding behavior, created a taxonomy of groups, and extended the problems associated with collective action to a broad class of economic and non-economic phenomena. Olson wrote with simplicity and clarity. This work was so persuasive that several authors attributed the discovery of the free-rider problem to him (Alt 1999; Brand 1983; Baldwin 1989). Others were more critical of his work. They argued against his claimed relationship between group size and the successful provision of collective goods (Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1970; Chamberlin 1974; Esteban and Ray 2001); against the exploitation of large actors by small ones (Sandler 1992); and against the importance of selective incentives in the formation of groups (Marsh 1976; Moe 1980). Some scholars even went so far as to claim that Logic was merely a popularization of earlier ideas (Dowding 1997; Chamberlain 1966).

A New Dataset of Delegate Positions on All Substantive Roll Calls at the U.S. Constitutional Convention

Abstract Delegate level analysis of the U.S. Constitutional Convention has been limited because the Convention did not record delegate votes. In this article, we introduce the Constitutional Convention Research Group Dataset, which contains 5,121 inferred delegate votes on 620 substantive roll calls at the Convention. The Constitutional Convention Research Group Dataset represents a significant improvement over previous datasets such as those compiled by McDonald (1958) and Dougherty and Heckelman (2009), and datasets based on votes recorded for state blocs (Jillson 1981, 1988).