Kelvin Jui Keng Tan

The Determinants of Debt Maturity in Australian Firms

We examine the determinants of debt maturity in the Australian capital market with the Top 400 firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange for the period 1989–2006. We find that Australian firms not only exhibit a positive leverage–maturity relationship but also use short-term debt to signal their high quality to the market. Our results are robust to different estimation methods that control for endogeneity and error-dependence. We also find that ignoring the interaction between leverage and maturity can lead to erroneous conclusions about the support for the matching principle, the agency costs hypothesis and the transaction costs hypothesis.

An Empirical Investigation of the Mergers Decision Process in Australia

In this paper we examine a database assembled from an Australian public register of 553 merger decisions taken between March 2004 and July 2008. Mergers may be accepted without public assessment, accepted in conjunction with publication of a Public Competition Assessment, or rejected. We estimate an ordered probit model, using these three possible outcomes, with the objective of gaining better insight into the regulator’s decision-making process. Our two major findings are: (i) the existence of entry barriers and the existence of undertakings are highly correlated with the regulator’s decision to closely scrutinise a merger proposal; and (ii) if we compare two decisions, one which does not mention entry barriers (or import competition) with a decision that does mention entry barriers (or import competition), then the latter is significantly more likely to be opposed than the former.

A Contemporary View of Corporate Finance Theory, Empirical Evidence and Practice

This article uses a survey of Australian corporate treasurers to shed light on the gap between the theory and practice of corporate finance in Australia. Seven areas are examined: capital structure, payout policy, cash holdings, initial public offerings, seasoned equity offering, mergers and acquisitions, and corporate governance. We also exploit the global financial crisis (GFC) to examine the effect of liquidity shocks on a firm’s capital structure choices. We then compare our Australian survey results with results from a comprehensive US survey conducted by Graham and Harvey. Our survey shows that the board of directors plays the most important role in determining capital structure decisions and that corporate treasurers play the most important role in cash holding decisions. This contrasts with the academic literature that has typically focused on the role of chief executive officer (CEO) in both capital structure and cash holding decisions. In addition, our respondents do not view the tax advantage of interest deductibility to be of first order of importance for debt issuance choices, which contrasts with most of the US empirical studies. Finally, we juxtapose the theory–practice perspective, with a review of the most recent 5 years (2011–2015) of corporate finance research published in the leading Asia Pacific Basin finance journals.

Short-Selling Pressure and Last-Resort Debt Financing: Evidence from 144A High-Yield Risk-Adjusted Debt

This study examines why non-financial publicly traded firms knowingly issue wealth destroying Rule 144A debt, which is associated with a negative announcement return and a higher yield. We provide a plausible ‘demand-side’ explanation (i.e. last-resort debt financing) for the motivation for issuing such debt. We also provide evidence as to what drives this negative reaction. Our findings suggest that the negative market impact is mainly driven by short-selling pressure from convertible bond arbitrageurs.

Why Do Overconfident REIT CEOs Issue More Debt? Mechanisms and Value Implications

This paper examines why overconfident CEOs issue more debt than equity within US Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and the value implications of this debt preference. Consistent with a demand-side story, the paper finds that overconfident CEOs choose to issue more debt than equity than their non-overconfident counterparts. The findings also rule out the supply-side story that overconfident CEOs are screened out of the equity market. CEO preference for debt is associated with a decline in shareholder wealth. Specifically, using an event study, the paper finds that overconfident CEOs suffer an approximately

Future Earnings Growth Volatility and the Value Premium

67 million loss associated with debt issues in market capitalization. Further analysis suggests that the loss stems from the higher default risk induced by overconfident REIT CEOs’ debt preference. The demand-side explanation remains robust even after considering several CEO demographics, estimation methods, and the following five possible alternative drivers of the main results: (1) insider information; (2) risk tolerance; (3) past performance; (4) dividends; and (5) board pressure.

On the Capital Structure of Real Estate Firms

The value premium is well established in empirical asset pricing, but to date there is little understanding as to its fundamental drivers. We use a stochastic earnings valuation model to establish a direct link between the volatility of future earnings growth and firm value. We illustrate that risky earnings growth affects growth and value firms differently. We provide empirical evidence that the volatility of future earnings growth is a significant determinant of the value premium. Using data on individual firms and characteristic-sorted test portfolios, we also find that earnings growth volatility is significant in explaining the cross-sectional variation of stock returns. Our findings imply that the value premium is the rational consequence of accounting for risky earnings growth in the firm valuation process.

CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Debt Maturity

The leverage and debt maturity choices of real estate companies are interdependent, and are not made separately as is often assumed in the literature. We use three-stage least squares (3SLS) regression analysis to explore this interdependence for a sample of listed U.S. real estate companies and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) traded between 1973 and 2006. We find substantial differences in the nature of the relationship between leverage and maturity for the two firm types. Leverage is a determinant of maturity for non-REITs, whereas maturity is a determinant of leverage for REITs. We also find that the drivers of capital structure choices in real estate companies and REITs clearly reflect the effects of the REIT regulation.