Ken Manktelow

Probabilistic factors in deontic reasoning

Abstract Recent research on reasoning has resulted in a number of authors urging a convergence between ideas in the hitherto disparate fields of deduction and decision making. The deontic reasoning literature in particular refers increasingly to the decision-making constructs of subjective utility and subjective probability. Although the former construct has received some attention from experimenters, the latter has remained relatively unexplored. In this paper a set of experiments is reported in which a modified form of Wasons selection task using an enlarged array was used to investigate the role of a probabilistic factor in reasoning with conditional obligations. Results showed that this factor played a significant role in mediating this reasoning, when probabilistic information was added both to antecedent and to consequent items. Other results indicated that the effect occurred principally by suppressing selections of items with relatively low subjective relevance.

Necessity, Sufficiency, and Perspective Effects in Causal Conditional Reasoning

A growing body of research indicates that in causal conditional reasoning, the conclusion that P is necessary for Q is suppressed where alternative conditions for Q are available. Similarly, the conclusion that P is sufficient for Q is suppressed where disabling conditions for P or additional requirements for Q are available. This paper describes experiments in which these factors were used to produce “perspective effects” in causal contexts that appear identical to the perspective effects found in previous research with deontic tasks. It is therefore proposed that deontic perspective effects are themselves also attributable to the influence of pragmatic factors upon perceived necessity and sufficiency. A generalized theory based on a modification of the mental model theory of deontic reasoning is presented, which accounts for perspective effects across the two domains.

Subclinical delusional ideation and a self‐reference bias in everyday reasoning

Previous studies (e.g. Moller & Husby, 2000; Blackwood et al., 2004) have revealed that delusional thinking is accompanied by an exaggerated focus upon the self and upon stimuli that are perceived to be related to the self. The objective was to examine whether those high in subclinical delusional ideation exhibit a heightened tendency for self-reference. Using a mixed design, healthy individuals, classified into high- and low-scoring groups on the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (Peters, Day, & Garety, 1996), were compared on everyday reasoning tasks across three experiments. High-PDI scorers, in contrast to the low-PDI group, rated self-referent objections to everyday arguments as stronger than other-referent objections and formulated more self-referent assertion-based objections to everyday arguments. The findings support the notion that subclinical delusional ideation is linked to a self-reference bias, which is evident in the sort of everyday thinking that people engage in when forming or evaluating their beliefs and which may contribute to delusion formation.

A cross-cultural study of hindsight bias and conditional probabilistic reasoning

Hindsight bias is a mistaken belief that one could have predicted a given outcome once the outcome is known. Choi and Nisbett (2000) reported that Koreans showed stronger hindsight bias than Americans, and explained the results using the distinction between analytic cognition (Westerners) and holistic cognition (Easterners). The purpose of the present study was to see whether hindsight bias is stronger among Easterners than among Westerners using a probability judgement task, and to test an “explicit–implicit” hypothesis and a “rule-dialectics” hypothesis. We predicted that the implicit process is more active among Easterners to generate hindsight bias, and that Easterners are more dialectical thinkers, whereas Westerners are more rule-based thinkers. French, British, Japanese, and Korean participants were asked to make probabilistic judgements in a Good Samaritan scenario (Experiment 1) and in a scenario including conditional probabilistic judgement (Experiment 2). In both Experiments, we presume that the implicit revision of causal models is made just by being given unexpected outcome information, and that explicit revision is made by being asked to point out possible factors for an unexpected outcome. In the results Easterners showed greater hindsight bias generally and it was greater in the Good Samaritan scenario. We conclude that the reason why hindsight bias was lower among Westerners is primarily that they tried to follow a rule to suppress the bias.

Dialectical thinking: A cross-cultural study of Japanese, Chinese, and British students

Peng and Nisbett found that Chinese people are more apt to engage in dialectical thinking (DT) than Americans. We gave the Dialectical Self Scale questionnaire and 10 pairs of opposing opinions to high school and university students of Japanese, Chinese, and British nationality. We asked them to fill in the questionnaire, to rate how strongly they agreed with each opinion, and to rate how wise it is to think dialectically. The scores on the questionnaire were higher among Easterners than among Westerners and higher among university students than among high school students. But the results of opinion agreement indicated that the dialectical tendency was stronger among the Chinese and British than among the Japanese. Furthermore, however, Japanese participants judged DT as wiser than Chinese and British did, and Chinese university students believed it was wiser than Chinese high school students did. We propose that this effect is attributed to Marxist education in China.

Judgment of blame in teenagers with Asperger's syndrome

ABSTRACT The judgment of blame was studied in a group of 28 teenagers, 14 with Asperger syndrome (AS) and 14 typically developed. Teenagers in each group were matched by age, cognitive development and academic level. They were presented with 12 short vignettes in which they had to judge an action according to the intent of the actor (deliberate and accidental), the consequences of the action (presence and absence) and the seriousness of the situation (low, medium and high). Results showed a significant difference in the patterns of judgment of both groups. The AS group judged the action according to the physical consequence of the action more than the intent of the actor; the opposite was observed with the control group. In addition, the AS teenagers were less capable than the control group of grading injury to a person when apportioning blame especially when they were not familiar with the social situations. This result suggests that the judgement of the seriousness of the outcome of the social interaction is linked with its level of familiarity. Furthermore, result are congruent with the assumption that two different cognitive structures, deontic reasoning and perspective taking, are involved in the judgment of blame.

Can subthreshold summation be observed with the Ehrenstein illusion

Subthreshold summation between physical target lines and illusory contours induced by edges such as those produced in the Kanizsa illusion has been reported in previous studies. Here, we investigated the ability of line-induced illusory contours, using Ehrenstein figures, to produce similar subthreshold summation. In the first experiment, three stimulus conditions were presented. The target line was superimposed on the illusory contour of a four-arm Ehrenstein figure, or the target was presented between two dots (which replaced the arms of the Ehrenstein figure), or the target was presented on an otherwise blank screen (control). Detection of the target line was significantly worse when presented on the illusory contour (on the Ehrenstein figure) than when presented between two dots. This result was consistent for both curved and straight target lines, as well as for a 100 ms presentation duration and unlimited presentation duration. Performance was worst in the control condition. The results for the three stimulus conditions were replicated in a second experiment in which an eight-arm Ehrenstein figure was used to produce a stronger and less ambiguous illusory contour. In the third experiment, the target was either superimposed on the illusory contour, or was located across the central gap (illusory surface) of the Ehrenstein figure, collinear with two arms of the figure. As in the first two experiments, the target was either presented on the Ehrenstein figure, or between dots, or on a blank screen. Detection was better in the dot condition than in the Ehrenstein condition, regardless of whether the target was presented on the illusory contour or collinear with the arms of the Ehrenstein figure. These three experiments demonstrate the ability of reduced spatial uncertainty to facilitate the detection of a target line, but do not provide any evidence for subthreshold summation between a physical target line and the illusory contours produced by an Ehrenstein figure. The incongruence of these results with previous findings on Kanizsa figures is discussed.

Pathways to mental healthcare in south-eastern Nigeria

In sub-Saharan Africa, traditional and faith healers provide competing services alongside biomedical professionals. This may be associated with delays in reaching specialised mental health services, and hence with longer duration of untreated illness. As first line care constitutes a crucial stage in accessing of psychiatric care, investigating pathways to mental healthcare can highlight help-seeking choices. This study explored the pathways to care for mental illness preferred by a non-clinical sample of the population in south-eastern Nigeria. Multistage sampling was used to select participants (N = 706) who completed questionnaires on help-seeking. Results showed a significant preference for biomedical (90.8%) compared to spiritual (57.8%) and traditional (33.2%) pathways. Higher education predicted preference for the biomedical model, while low education was associated with traditional and spiritual pathways. Protestants preferred the spiritual pathway more than did Catholics. The use of biomedical care is potentially undermined by poor mental health infrastructure, a lack of fit between the culture of biomedical care and the deep-seated cultural/religious worldviews of the people, stigma surrounding mental illness, and the likelihood of a social desirability bias in responses. A complementary model of care is proposed.

Ideological vs. Instrumental Barriers to Accessing Formal Mental Health care in the Developing World: Focus on South-eastern Nigeria

The striking gaps in formal mental health care in the developing world are largely traceable to Instrumental and Ideological Barriers. Focusing on south-eastern Nigeria, the study aimed to establish the relative weight, significance and determinants of these barriers for prioritised policy interventions. Multistage sampling method was used to select participants (n = 706) to whom questionnaires were administered. Ideological Barriers (cultural and mental health literacy constraints) were more significantly perceived (84.8%) than Instrumental Barriers (systemic and financial impediments) (56.6%). The study demonstrated the primacy of improved knowledge in plugging the gap in conventional mental health care in a region ironically defined more by systemic and material poverty. This is instructive for prioritised policy interventions with an indication that even if facilities and socio-economic status improve, services will likely be underused without greater improvement in people’s conceptualisation of mental illness. It equally underscored the need for cultural competence in mental health service provision.

Physical Attractiveness and Altruism in Two Modified Dictator Games

ABSTRACT Several studies find that male individuals are more altruistic toward attractive women, suggesting altruism may serve as a courtship display. Many studies exploring this phenomenon have used vignettes and facial images. We tested the sexual selection hypothesis as an explanation for altruistic behavior, where players played the dictator game with “live” participants. Two studies were conducted (Study 1, n = 212; Study 2, n = 188) where we manipulated stakes and anonymity between participants to explore the relationship between the dictator’s allocations and their perceived attractiveness of the recipient. We found no relationship between attractiveness and altruism. Dictators were consistently fair when allocating stakes, irrespective of the recipients’ attractiveness.