Kenneth B. Dunn

Modeling the term structure of interest rates under non-separable utility and durability of goods

Abstract The term structure relations implied by a model in which preferences are non-separable functions of the service flows from two goods are investigated. The parameters characterizing preferences are estimated and restrictions on the co-movements of consumptions and Treasury bill returns are examined. Both the durability of goods and the non-separability of preferences are important factors in explaining the time paths of individual returns, but there is substantial evidence against the cross-sectional restrictions implied by our model. Differences between sample mean returns are too large relative to the sample covariances of the return differences and the marginal utility of consumption.

Voluntary conversion of convertible securities and the optimal call strategy

Abstract We provide an explanation of why convertibles are called long after the conversion value exceeds the call price. Delaying the call benefits the firm if enough investors are expected to delay their voluntary conversions. Consistent with this theory, we document that a substantial number of investors do not voluntarily convert when the common dividend exceeds the convertibles dividend plus its premium over conversion value. We find that firms would not have increased common stock returns by switching to the strategy of calling to force conversion as soon as possible. Surprisingly, we find that convertible preferreds frequently sell below conversion value.

Private information and incentives: Implications for mortgage contract terms and pricing

We examine the linkage in equilibrium among (1) contract design; (2) expected prepayment and default likelihoods; and (3) the pricing of mortgage contracts by focusing upon the effects of the borrowers private information at the time of contracting. We examine the implications of these perspectives upon the empirical analysis of prepayment behavior and use the framework to examine the predominance of long-term mortgage contracts in the United States. We consider examples that explore the trade-offs between fixed and adjustable rate instruments, assumable and due-on-sale loans, and contract interest rates and initial discounts (points).

A strategic analysis of sinking fund bonds

Abstract Unlike most securities, the pricing of sinking fund bonds is influenced by the distribution of ownership, which summarizes the extent to which the market is cornered. The effect of the distribution of ownership on the pricing of sinking fund bonds is examined by an explicit game in which the price obtained for bonds sold can depend upon the size of the investors position. This framework is used to contrast the valuation of sinking fund bonds with the valuation of amortizing bonds and straight debt. We show that it is generally incorrect to view sinking fund bonds as being equivalent to serial bonds.

Call Options, Points, and Dominance Restrictions on Debt Contracts

We analyze the impact of a contracts length, callability, amortization, and original discount by arbitrage methods. Among instruments that are callable without penalty, longer instruments command a higher interest rate because the borrower possesses the option of repaying relatively more slowly. However, the rate on longer self-amortizing loans cannot be substantially larger than for shorter ones because the payments decrease with contract length. Bounds on the trade-off between points and rate for callable debt are characterized using the trade-off for noncallable debt and the property that the value of the prepayment option increases with the loans interest rate. Copyright The American Finance Association 1999.

Rates of Return on GNMA Securities: The Cost of Mortgage Funds

This paper examines rates of return earned on GNMA securities over the period January 1971 through June 1978. We find that over this period the mean monthly return on GNMAs was greater than the mean return on long-term government bonds and slightly greater than the mean return on high-grade corporate bonds. However, in neither case was the difference statistically significant. Thus, based on this evidence, it is not possible to conclude that the cost of acquiring funds to finance single-family housing purchases through the GNMA program exceeded the cost of acquiring funds by the U.S. treasury or financially-strong corporations. Copyright American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association.