Kenneth Baynes

Discourse ethics and the political conception of human rights

This article examines two recent alternatives to the traditional conception of human rights as natural rights: the account of human rights found in discourse ethics and the ‘political conception’ of human rights influenced by the work of Rawls. I argue that both accounts have distinct merits and that they are not as opposed to one another as is sometimes supposed. At the same time, the discourse ethics account must confront a deep ambiguity in its own approach: are rights derived in a strong sense from the conditions of ‘communicative freedom’ or are they developed from the participants’ own reflection upon their ongoing and continuously changing practices and institutions? The political conception recently proposed by Joshua Cohen can, I argue, contribute to the resolution of this ambiguity, though not without some modifications of its own.

Communicative ethics, the public sphere and communication media

The normative assumptions and likely practical consequences of Jurgen Habermas ‘s communicative ethics and related conception of the public sphere have been the topic of much critical discussion. After reviewing some of the general features of Habermass moral theory, I take up criticisms directed at his conception of the self or moral agency, his assumptions about the generalizability of human interests, and the supposed utopianism of his theory. In each case I argue that more charitable and attractive readings of his position are possible and desirable. I conclude with some general remarks about the potential role of mass communication media within his normative account of the public sphere.

Freedom and recognition in Hegel and Habermas

Contrary to some popular interpretations, I argue that Hegel and Habermas share many basic assumptions in their respective accounts of freedom. In particular, both respond to weaknesses in Kant’s idea of freedom as acting from (certain kinds of) reasons by explicating this idea with reference to specific social practices or ‘forms of recognition’ that in turn express suppositions and expectations that actors adopt with respect to one another. I illustrate this common strategy in each and suggest that it may offer an alternative to Rawls’s ‘political’ account of public reason.

the liberal/communitarian controversy and communicative ethics

common good&dquo; might differ from a &dquo;politics of rights,&dquo; or what should be the proper role of judicial review in a constitutional democratic regime.2 But it also asks us to reassess how claims about basic rights or distributive principles are best justified apart from, or prior to, their constitutional recognition. Do the political ideals and institutions we value require a general and coherent political morality for their defense (as Dworkin has argued), or is the interpretation and clarification of the shared meanings latent in our social practices via stories the most for which we can hope (as Walzer has recently claimed)?3The thesis developed in what follows is that so far the exchange between liberals and communitarians has revealed significant limitations and weaknesses on both sides: contemporary liberals have not sufficiently considered the social origin and justification of basic rights; whereas communitarians have not adequately addressed the nature and conditions of democratic citizenship. In both cases

Constructivism and Practical Reason in Rawls

Abstract This essay argues that Rawls’s recent constructivist approach waivers between a relativist defense and a more Kantian account which grounds his conception of justice in the idea of an agreement between free and equal moral persons. It is suggested that this ambiguity lies at the center of his attempt to provide a “political not metaphysical” account which is also not “political in the wrong way”.

Special section: Lorenzo Simpson's The Unfinished Project: The hermeneutics of `situated cosmopolitanism'

Lorenzo Simpson’s The Unfinished Project: Toward a Postmetaphysical Humanism1 offers a series of rich and probing insights across a range of issues. As a whole, the work also makes a significant contribution to questions concerning the possibility – and limits – of cross-cultural understanding. It is also a very timely contribution, especially in view of NPR commentator Daniel Shorr’s remark that ‘Americans only learn geography when the U.S. goes to war’ – suggesting, among other things, that our interests in cross-cultural understanding are at root often strategically motivated. Given the limited time available, I will focus on what I take to be the central chapter of the book, titled ‘Situated Cosmopolitanism’. In that chapter Lorenzo introduces the idea of ‘situated metalanguages’ as a contribution to the possibility of crosscultural understanding that, he argues, provides a more adequate characterization of what is required for achieving understanding than the characterizations that can be found in the work of either Gadamer or Habermas, despite Simpson’s obvious indebtedness to both of these philosophers. An initial, but important, question is already suggested by a contrast between the chapter title (‘Situated Cosmopolitanism’) and what I take to be that chapter’s central concern – ‘situated metalanguage’ or a response to the question of inter-cultural understanding. ‘Cosmopolitanism’, I take it, describes a commitment to the idea of a (human) community not limited by particularistic boundaries of nation, race, ethnicity, language or even geography. This commitment may take the form of a political program – as in various proposals for world government or cosmopolitan democracy – or it may be limited to an ethical or moral ideal – that is, the recognition that the more particular boundaries just mentioned bear little (if any) moral significance. Simpson does not opt for one or the other of these two forms of cosmopolitanism, but

'Gadamerian platitudes' and rational interpretations

The article considers some of the methodological commitments - specifically, what Brandom calls ‘Gadamerian platitudes’ - defended in Tales of the Mighty Dead. I argue that, given his commitment to Gadamer’s model of dialogue and Vorgriff der Vollkommenheit (‘anticipation of completeness’), Brandom should also accept Habermas’ position on the ineliminability of the second-person or performative perspective concerning our interpretive claims.

Modernity as autonomy

In Modernism as a Philosophical Problem Robert Pippin offers an interpretation of post‐Kantian continental philosophy that locates the project of autonomy or self‐determination at the center of the modernity/postmodernity debate and presents Hegel as ‘a kind of radical, post‐Kantian modernist’ whose philosophical ‘experiment’ is preferable to more recent attempts to overcome or deconstruct metaphysics. I raise some questions about the adequacy of Pippins interpretation of Hegels notion of a rational justification, at least as it bears on his argument in the Philosophy of Right, and I express some reservations about Pippins own attempt to view modernity in terms of the project of autonomy. I conclude with some reasons for preferring Habermass account of modernity which, without abandoning the project of autonomy, relinquishes the idea of a self‐grounding of reason and proposes a more modest role for philosophy within the current division of intellectual labor.