Kenneth Benoit

Extracting policy positions from political texts using words as data

We present a new way of extracting policy positions from political texts that treats texts not as discourses to be understood and interpreted but rather, as data in the form of words. We compare this approach to previous methods of text analysis and use it to replicate published estimates of the policy positions of political parties in Britain and Ireland, on both economic and social policy dimensions. We “export” the method to a non-English-language environment, analyzing the policy positions of German parties, including the PDS as it entered the former West German party system. Finally, we extend its application beyond the analysis of party manifestos, to the estimation of political positions from legislative speeches. Our “language-blind” word scoring technique successfully replicates published policy estimates without the substantial costs of time and labor that these require. Furthermore, unlike in any previous method for extracting policy positions from political texts, we provide uncertainty measures for our estimates, allowing analysts to make informed judgments of the extent to which differences between two estimated policy positions can be viewed as significant or merely as products of measurement error.We thank Raj Chari, Gary King, Michael McDonald, Gail McElroy, and three anonymous reviewers for comments on drafts of this paper.

Models of electoral system change

Electoral systems are commonly treated as exogenous determinants of political party systems, yet our theoretical understanding remains limited as to how these institutions themselves are determined. Part of the problem lies with the subject matter itself: electoral system change is frequently idiosyncratic, often occurring during episodes of exceptional political change. Yet another aspect of the problem is that explanations of electoral system change frequently occur piecemeal in application to specific cases, without systematic or comparative development. Addressing both problems, I first survey the existing literature to develop a comprehensive typology of explanations of electoral system change and persistence. I then set forth a theory predicting the conditions under which electoral systems should change, linking motivations for institutional change to instrumentally rational political parties seeking to maximize their legislative seat shares. The theory predicts that electoral laws will change when a coalition of parties exists such that each party in the coalition expects to gain more seats under an alternative electoral institution, and that also has sufficient power to effect this alternative through fiat given the rules for changing electoral laws. To contrast this model to other explanations of electoral system change, I point to its observable implications and outline how it could be confirmed or disconfirmed in empirical research. The comparison also highlights limitations in other approaches to explaining electoral system change, and underscores the importance of institutions in inducing equilibriums in both electoral systems and party systems.

Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General)

Current consensus in the field of democratic peace research holds that democratic states go to war in general no less than nondemocratic states. The author challenges this consensus by reevaluating the main empirical studies on which it rests, using information that previous studies ignored and statistical techniques unused or even unknown at the time. The results indicate that from 1960 to 1980, democratic nations were less involved in military conflict than other regime types. Estimates of this relationship are robust to different operational definitions of both war and democracy, to the addition of control variables for other possible correlates of war, and to the application of different statistical techniques. This indicates that lack of previous significant findings have less to do with the data than with the methods used to analyze them.

Party Groups and Policy Positions in the European Parliament

As the legislative body of the European Union (EU), the European Parliament (EP) comprises 732 elected representatives from over 150 national political parties from 25 member states. At the EP level, these members are affiliated with seven major party groups representing distinct policy positions. Here we provide precise estimates of these policy positions based on expert surveys, in addition to characterizing the dimensionality of policy competition in the EP. Our results suggest not only that party groups have identifiable and differentiated positions on multiple issues of policy, but also that these positions group broadly into two orthogonal dimensions: one consisting of classic left-right social and economic issues, and the other related to the powers and scope of EU institutions.

The Evolution of Party Systems between Elections

Most existing theoretical work on party competition pays little attention to the evolution of party systems between elections as a result of defections between parties. In this article, we treat individual legislators as utility-maximizing agents tempted to defect to other parties if this would increase their expected payoffs. We model the evolution of party systems between elections in these terms and discuss this analytically, exploring unanswered questions using computational methods. Under office-seeking motivational assumptions, our results strikingly highlight the role of the largest party, especially when it is “dominant” in the technical sense, as a pole of attraction in interelectoral evolution.

District magnitude, electoral formula, and the number of parties

Duvergers propositions concerning the psychologicaland mechanical consequences of electoral rules have previously beenexamined mainly through the lens of district magnitude,comparing the properties of single-member district pluralityelections with those of multimember proportional representationelections. The empirical consequences of multi-member plurality(MMP) rules, on the other hand, have received scant attention.Theory suggests that the effect of district magnitude on the numberand concentration of parties will differ with regard to whether theallocation rules are plurality-based or proportional. I test thistheory by drawing on a uniquely large-sample dataset where districtmagnitude and electoral formula vary but the basic universe ofpolitical parties is held constant, applying regression analysis todata from several thousand Hungarian local bodies elected in 1994consisting of municipal councils, county councils, and mayors. Theresults indicate that omitting the variable of electoral formula hasthe potential to cause significant bias in estimates of Duvergerianconsequences of district magnitude. In addition, the analysis ofmulti-member plurality elections from the local election datasetreveals counter-intuitively that candidate and party entry mayincrease with district magnitude under MMP, suggesting importantdirections for future investigation of MMP rules.

Party Policy and Group Affiliation in the European Parliament

Systematic empirical research has yet to explain how national parties join political groups in the European Parliament. This article first demonstrates, using original empirical measures from expert surveys of party positions, that EP party groups consist of national parties sharing similar policy positions. Secondly, using Bayesian/MCMC methods, the paper estimates the policy determinants of group affiliation using a (conditional) multinomial logit model to explain that ‘party group’ choice is largely driven by policy congruence. Finally, predictions from the model identify national parties not in their ‘ideally congruent’ EP groups. The findings suggest that the organization of and switching between EP groups is driven mainly by a concern to minimize policy incongruence between national and transnational levels.

Presidents, Parties, and Policy Competition

Presidential systems present a unique possibility for spatial competition between elected political agents, since presidents may represent different policy positions than the parties to which they belong. Previous research, however, has lacked a firm empirical basis on which to measure these differences. We remedy this situation, providing independent estimates of positions and saliencies for presidents and parties on multiple policy dimensions in 18 Latin American countries, from original expert survey data. Our results offer strong evidence that positioning on nearly all political issues neatly reduces to a single dimension of left-right contestation. Furthermore, contrasting differences between the positioning of presidents and their own parties, we show that presidents tend to position themselves independently of their parties more in bicameral and proportional representation systems, when they differ in the importance they assign to a given policy dimension, and when elections with legislatures are nonconcurrent.

The endogeneity problem in electoral studies: a critical re-examination of Duverger's mechanical effect

Studies of electoral law consequences typically treat electoral laws as exogenous factors affecting political party systems, even while acknowledging that political parties often tailor electoral institutions to suit their own distributional needs. This study represents a departure from that approach, directly examining one aspect of the endogeneity of electoral systems: the endogeneity of Duvergers ‘mechanical’ effect. Theory clearly posits that the Duvergerian ‘psychological’ effect of electoral rules occurs in anticipation of their reductive mechanical effect, yet in empirical models this endogenous character is typically ignored. In this paper I formalize the two types of Duvergerian effects of electoral laws in a structural model and implement this model using two-stage-least-squares regression to re-estimate the mechanical effect model of Amorim Neto and Cox [Electoral institutions, cleavage structures, and the number of parties. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 41 (1997) 149-174] and Cox [Making Votes Count: Strategic Communication in the Worlds Electoral Systems. Cambridge University Press (1997)]. I also generalize the model and compare it to two other approaches taken by Ordeshook and Shvetsova [Ethnic heterogeneity, district magnitude, and the number of parties. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 38 (1994) 100-123] and Taagepera and Shugart [Predicting the number of parties: a quantitative model of Duvergers mechanical effect. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 87 (1993) 455-464]. The results indicate that because electoral structure affects the number of parties in the legislature both directly through the mechanical effect as well as indirectly through the psychological effect, simple OLS estimates that do not take into account this endogenous model will overestimate the mechanical effect by 45–100%.

Institutional Choice in New Democracies Bargaining Over Hungary's 1989 Electoral Law

Institutions shape political outcomes, yet institutions themselves are endogenously shaped outcomes of political choices. Such choices are especially significant during transitions to democracy, when initial institutional designs fundamentally structure the path of democratic development. Most theories of institutional emergence, however, focus on stable contexts rather than on the conditions of acute uncertainty identified in the standard transitions literature. Our article attempts to bridge the two subfields by outlining and applying a model of institutional choice as the outcome of a struggle between fledgling opposition parties and the authoritarian regime wherein each side struggles to gain the greatest distributive payoff. We examine the creation of the Hungarian electoral system of 1989, linking the positions of the participants to the institutional alternatives which they expected to maximize their expected seat shares in the election to take place under those rules. The evidence shows that the individual parties generally preferred alternatives that maximized their expected seats, subject to the constraint of not derailing the negotiations as a whole. When a party had the possibility to reduce its uncertainty, it also tended to shift to a position reflecting its updated evaluation of an institutional alternatives effect on its expected seats. Far from being paralyzed by uncertainty and lack of information, actors in the choice of Hungarys 1989 electoral law were, with minor exceptions, able to effectively link institutional outcomes to electoral self-interest and to pursue these distributive gains through bargaining.