Kenneth D. Bush

The Intra-Group Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka

PART I: INTRODUCTION Introduction: Beyond Billiard Ball Analysis Learning to Read Between the Lines An Overview of Sri Lanka in Politics PART II: CRITICAL JUNCTURES Critical Juncture I: 1948 Independence and the Disenfranchisement of the Plantation Tamils Critical Juncture II: 1956 Election and the Premiership of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike Critical Juncture III: 1971 JVP Insurrection and 1987 JVP Resurgence Critical Juncture IV: 1983 Riots Critical Juncture V: 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement Critical Juncture VI: 2002 Ceasefire Agreement PART III: CONCLUSION Conclusions and Implications

How can research contribute to peacebuilding

How do we know whether or not research contributes to peacebuilding? And, what kind of positive or negative impacts may research have? These two questions are conspicuous by their absence despite the large number of peacebuilding-specific research institutes, academic programmes, publishers and funders. Some of the reasons for the current state of affairs are examined: the ambiguous, elastic and politicised nature of ‘peacebuilding’ as a concept and as a practice; the inappropriateness of current approaches to the evaluation of research impact; and the disconnection between the world of evaluators and the world of peace researchers. The current article addresses these questions through an exploration of the intersection of research, evaluation methodology and politics. The article concludes with preliminary framework for teasing out the specific kinds of peacebuilding impacts catalysed through research.

The Ethical Tipping Points of Evaluators in Conflict Zones

What is different about the conduct of evaluations in conflict zones compared to nonconflict zones—and how do these differences affect (if at all) the ethical calculations and behavior of evaluators? When are ethical issues too risky, or too uncertain, for evaluators to accept—or to continue—an evaluation? These are the core questions guiding this article. The first section considers how the particularities of conflict zones affect our ability to conduct evaluations. The second section undertakes a selective review of the literature to better understand how ethical issues have been addressed both in evaluation research and in evaluation manuals. The third section draws on a series of structured conversations with evaluators to probe more deeply into the ethical challenges they face in conflict zones—with a particular interest in the “ethical tipping points” of evaluators. The fourth section considers ways evaluation actors can manage ethical challenges in conflict zones, concluding with a brief discussion of how these issues might be located more centrally in evaluation research and practice.

Evaluation in Conflict Zones: Methodological and Ethical Challenges

This article explores the methodological and ethical challenges particular to the conduct and use of evaluations in conflict zones. It does this through examining the synergistic interaction of conflict dynamics and the four domains of evaluation — ethics, methodology, logistics, and politics. Drawing on evaluation theory and practice, as well as field experience, the article seeks to contribute to the building of a more methodologically self-conscious sub-field of evaluation in conflict zones — with implications not only for the field of evaluation, but also for researchers and practitioners in the fields of development, humanitarianism, peacebuilding, and private sector investment.

Learning to Read between the Lines

This book uses the term ‘ethnicity’ broadly to refer to the ‘subjective, symbolic, or emblematic use by a group of people of any aspect of culture in order to create internal cohesion and differentiate themselves from other groups’ (Brass 1991: 19). This understanding of ethnicity recognizes that the internal and external functions of group identity are cohesion and differentiation. Central to this sense of identity is a shared belief in common descent, birth or kinship which may be (but usually is not) based on biological fact.

Critical Juncture VI: February 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)

The episode analysed in this chapter differs from the others in this book, because it was still being played out as this book was being completed. While the selection of this episode allows for the testing of a two-level analysis on current events, the chapter may lack a more definitive sense of closure that is possible in historical cases. However, the contemporary character of the episode allows more latitude for probing inter- and intra-group political dynamics, for example, through direct interviews with observers and actors in Sri Lanka, and through the use of electronic sources of information absent in all previous cases considered in this book.2

Critical Juncture III: 1971 JVP Insurrection and 1987 JVP Resurgence

In the history of Sri Lanka, the only threat to state authority1 which exceeded the JVP insurrection of 1971 is the JVP resurgence of 1987–90. Although the conflict in the North and the East involves victims and combatants from all ethnic communities, it has never fundamentally threatened the state to the extent of the two JVP episodes.

Critical Juncture II: 1956 Election and the Premiership of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike

The year 1956 is pivotal in the ethnic politics of Sri Lanka. It is the year in which ethnic chauvinism was first employed by a political party to contest and win a general election and to form a national government. In the past, ethnic sentiments had been stirred and harnessed by politicians, but by and large, ethnic chauvinism was either an unstated element in elections or a relatively insignificant sideshow.’ This changed in 1956 with the campaign and election of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and his SLFP in an electoral coalition called the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP). The election politicized issues which continue to resonate, antagonize and mobilize today: the ‘rehabilitation and restoration’ of Buddhism to a pre-eminent position in society; the use of the indigenous Sinhala language; and the fostering of Sinhalese national identity by the state.

Beyond Billiard Ball Analysis

The purpose of the current chapter is to sketch out briefly some of the thinking and issues surrounding the linkages between identity, security and violent conflict as reflected in the dominant literature on ethnic or nationalist conflict. Chapter 2 builds on this overview by setting it in the Sri Lankan context.

Critical Juncture V: 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement

On 29 July 1987, India and Sri Lanka signed an agreement which had as its stated purpose the establishment of ‘peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka’ — that is, to end the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict. The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was wholly unanticipated until just before it was signed in Colombo1 It formalized the indo-centric reality of South Asian politics, most conspicuously by providing for the introduction of an IPKF on to the island ‘to guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities’ including the disarming of all Tamil militant organizations. However, the Agreement contained one overwhelming and ultimately fatal flaw: it was premised on the compliance of non-signatories.2 The LTTE, the most powerful Tamil paramilitary organization, had been excluded from the drafting of the Agreement and was presented with a fait accompli. Its initial acquiescence and long-term commitment to the Agreement were questionable from the start. Put another way, the Agreement was a bilateral solution to a problem which was multilateral in structure (incorporating Sri Lanka-India conflict, Sinhalese-Tamil inter-group conflict, Sinhalese intra-group conflict, and Tamil intragroup conflict). The initial IPKF of 6,000 to 7,000 rapidly grew to 60,000–80,000 troops, and by October 1987 it was militarily engaged with the LTTE in both the North and East.3