Kenneth F. Schaffner

The Watson-Crick Model and Reductionism

There are a number of interrelated problems that cluster around the issue of reduction in the sciences. The logical analysis of theory, the meaning of theoretical terms, the nature of scientific explanation, and various theses concerning the nature of scientific progress, are all closely connected with the problem of intertheoretic reduction. The recent influential and important works of T. S. Kuhn (1962) and P. Feyerabend (1962) are a testimony to the centrality of the analysis of reduction in philosophy of science.

Ethical and Legal Issues Related to the Use of Computer Programs in Clinical Medicine

As computer programs are used with increasing frequency in the clinical setting, ethicists, lawyers, computer scientists, clinicians, and patients must confront a group of problems: In what situations is it appropriate to use a medical computer program? Who should use these programs and how should they be used? What is the legal status of a computer program that provides medical advice? Can a proper balance be achieved between confidentiality of patient information and shared access to records by health care personnel? How can regulatory agencies, physicians, and patients determine if a program is safe for human use? Will programs be able to communicate with users well enough to prevent clinically harmful misunderstandings? Because few if any definitive answers are yet available, these questions remain the subject of much discussion.

The peripherality of reductionism in the development of molecular biology.

ConclusionI have not attempted to provide here an analysis of the methodology of molecular biology or molecular genetics which would demonstrate at what specific points a more reductionist aim would make sense as a research strategy. This, I believe, would require a much deeper analysis of scientific growth than philosophy of science has been able to provide thus far. What I have tried to show is that a straightforward reductionist strategy cannot be said to be follwed in important cases of theory development in molecular biology, and that in at least one important case, the Jacob-Monod operon theory, the methodology followed was more biological than chemical. It should be noted in closing, however, that since biological systems are thought by molecular biologists to be nothing but chemical systems, in the long run detailed investigations of such systems will be in full accord with the dictates suggested by the general reduction model.

Reduction: the Cheshire cat problem and a return to roots

In this paper, I propose two theses, and then examine what the consequences of those theses are for discussions of reduction and emergence. The first thesis is that what have traditionally been seen as robust, reductions of one theory or one branch of science by another more fundamental one are a largely a myth. Although there are such reductions in the physical sciences, they are quite rare, and depend on special requirements. In the biological sciences, these prima facie sweeping reductions fade away, like the body of the famous Cheshire cat, leaving only a smile. ... The second thesis is that the “smiles” are fragmentary patchy explanations, and though patchy and fragmentary, they are very important, potentially Nobel-prize winning advances. To get the best grasp of these “smiles,” I want to argue that, we need to return to the roots of discussions and analyses of scientific explanation more generally, and not focus mainly on reduction models, though three conditions based on earlier reduction models are retained in the present analysis. I briefly review the scientific explanation literature as it relates to reduction, and then offer my account of explanation. The account of scientific explanation I present is one I have discussed before, but in this paper I try to simplify it, and characterize it as involving field elements (FE) and a preferred causal model system (PCMS) abbreviated as FE and PCMS. In an important sense, this FE and PCMS analysis locates an “explanation” in a typical scientific research article. This FE and PCMS account is illustrated using a recent set of neurogenetic papers on two kinds of worm foraging behaviors: solitary and social feeding. One of the preferred model systems from a 2002 Nature article in this set is used to exemplify the FE and PCMS analysis, which is shown to have both reductive and nonreductive aspects. The paper closes with a brief discussion of how this FE and PCMS approach differs from and is congruent with Bickle’s “ruthless reductionism” and the recently revived mechanistic philosophy of science of Machamer, Darden, and Craver.

Logic of discovery and justification in regulatory genetics

Abstract In the above pages I have sketched a history of the genesis and comparative evaluation of the repressor model of genetic regulation of enzyme induction. I have not attempted in this article to carry out an analysis of the more scientifically interesting fully developed Jacob-Monod operon theory of genetic regulations but such an analysis of the operon theory would not, I believe, involve any additional logical or epistemological features than have been discussed above. I have argued that the above account of the development of a theory of enzyme induction involved inferential moves and well-characterized desiderata, of both empirical and non-empirical character, in the genesis and evaluation of new hypotheses and theories. I have also contended that the reasoning displayed in the genesis of a theory is in a large measure identical to that utilized in evaluating a theory. Both of these conclusions are at variance with the views of philosophers such as H. Reichenbach, Sir Karl Popper, and C.G. Hempel who have argued that the genesis of new hypotheses is primarily an irrational affair and that only the context of justification is susceptible of rational reconstruction. In the alternative view presented here, scientific discovery and scientific justification represent the application in contexts, which are primarily telically distinguishable, of a fundamentally unitary logic of scientific inquiry.

The Dopamine Hypothesis of Schizophrenia: An Historical and Philosophical Analysis

The dopamine (DA) hypothesis of schizophrenia (DHS) has, since its inception over 30 years ago, been among the most prominent etiologic theories in psychiatry. This essay begins by summarizing the history of its emergence and efforts to empirically test it through the examination of (i) cerebrospinal fluid DA metabolites, (ii) neuroendocrine measures, (iii) clinical response to psychostimulants, (iv) brain levels of DA and its metabolites, (v) brain studies of DA receptors, and (vi) genetic association studies. We then examine how successful the DHS has been and by what criteria its performance should be evaluated. In this process, it is critical to distinguish the etiological DHS from the pharmacological DA hypothesis of neuroleptic action. Although the DHS stimulated much science, most efforts to empirically validate it have failed, in contrast with the well-supported pharmacological DA hypothesis of neuroleptic action. Nonetheless, the DHS has held the status of a scientific paradigm defended by some with great avidity. Like other temporally extended theories, the DHS in its most general form is relatively nonspecific and protean in nature. In its evolution through successive more specific forms, often embodying ad hoc modifications of subsidiary hypotheses, it became very difficult to falsify. Although stimulating much research, it has not produced a progressive research program generating various novel and confirmed predictions about schizophrenia. For most of its history, the DHS has lacked a viable competing alternative theory against which it could be incisively compared. Sociological factors, especially the rise to prominence of the biological psychiatry movement, and the conflation of the DHS and the DA theory of antipsychotic drug action have probably played an important role in its persistence. Psychiatry needs theories with higher levels of specificity and falsifiability. As the science of psychiatry matures, the field needs to become more self-critical about the validity of its theories.

Evolution of clinical ethics teaching at the University of Pittsburgh

&NA; The authors explain that several years of effort, by many faculty from a variety of disciplines, were required to expand medical ethics teaching at the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine beyond the preclinical years. Since 1986, faculty associated with the schools Center for Medical Ethics have begun a comprehensive ethics teaching program for all four years and the residency period; they also are attempting to develop an ethics consultation service. The authors describe the program, its promise and plans, and the significant difficulties involved in establishing and maintaining it, not only problems of long‐term funding but of the uninformed and negative attitudes of some students and faculty toward ethics teaching, especially in the clinical setting. Also discussed are the pros and cons of using cases in ethics teaching and the programs approaches to evaluation and to training clinical faculty in clinical ethics issues.

Theories, Models, and Equations in Biology: The Heuristic Search for Emergent Simplifications in Neurobiology

This article considers claims that biology should seek general theories similar to those found in physics but argues for an alternative framework for biological theories as collections of prototypical interlevel models that can be extrapolated by analogy to different organisms. This position is exemplified in the development of the Hodgkin‐Huxley giant squid model for action potentials, which uses equations in specialized ways. This model is viewed as an “emergent unifier.” Such unifiers, which require various simplifications, involve the types of heuristics discussed in Wimsatt’s writings on reduction, but with a twist. Here, the heuristics are used to generate emergent rather than reductive explanations.

Discovery in the Biomedical Sciences: Logic or Irrational Intuition?

The thesis that the process of scientific discovery involves logically analyzable procedures, as opposed to intuitive leaps of genius, has generally not been a popular one in this century. Since the advent of logical empiricism in the early twentieth century, the logic of science has been generally understood to be a logic of justification. Scientific discovery has been considered to be of interest to historians, psychologists, and sociologists, but has usually been barred from the list of topics that demand logical analysis by philosophers.

The Lorentz Electron Theory of Relativity.

This paper traces H. A. Lorentzs work on the electrodynamics of moving bodies from 1887 to 1909. His initial rejection of Michelsons 1881 interferometer experiment and the development of the “electron theory” as a modification and extension of Maxwells ideas are discussed. The 1892 article in which Lorentz proposes the contraction hypothesis (Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction) is analyzed, and the manner in which the hypothesis is integrated into the electron theory then, and later in the 1895 Versuch, is presented. A discussion of the Versuchs introduction of “local time” and the “theorem of corresponding states” follows, and it is then shown that Lorentz introduced second-order Lorentz transformations in an 1899 paper. The well-known 1904 paper is analyzed, and is shown to be presenting the latest modifications in transformation equations designed to prove a theorem of corresponding states for many electromagnetic phenomena to all orders of v/c. Using Lorentzs 1909 Theory of Electrons, it is argued th...