Kenneth H. Wathne

Opportunism in Interfirm Relationships: Forms, Outcomes, and Solutions

Much of the recent literature on interfirm relationships has focused on strategies for controlling opportunism. Somewhat surprisingly, little attention has been paid in this literature to the opportunism construct itself. Specifically, prior research has failed to recognize the different types of behavior that are hidden behind the general opportunism label. As a consequence, the knowledge of strategies for managing opportunism remains incomplete. The authors review the original and emergent conceptualizations of opportunism and illustrate them using actual industry cases. The authors also develop a conceptual framework of governance strategies that can be used to manage different forms of opportunism.

Relationship Governance in a Supply Chain Network

The authors examine how a firms strategy in a (downstream) customer relationship is contingent on how a related relationship outside of the focal dyad is organized. Drawing on emerging perspectives on interfirm governance and networks, the authors propose that the ability to show flexibility toward a (downstream) customer under uncertain market conditions depends on the governance mechanisms that have been deployed in an (upstream) supplier relationship. The governance mechanisms take the form of (1) supplier qualification programs and (2) incentive structures based on hostages. The authors develop a set of contingency predictions and test them empirically in the context of vertical supply chain networks in the apparel industry. The tests show good support for the hypotheses. The authors discuss the implications of the findings for marketing theory and practice.

Choice of Supplier in Embedded Markets: Relationship and Marketing Program Effects

Recent research has documented how exchanges between buyers and sellers are frequently embedded in social relationships. An unresolved question, however, is the extent to which such relationships protect incumbent suppliers from new competitors and their marketing programs. The authors develop a conceptual framework of how relationship and marketing variables influence choice of supplier and test the framework empirically in the context of business-to-business services. The results show that interpersonal relationships between buyers and suppliers serve as a switching barrier but are considerably less important than both firm-level switching costs and marketing variables. Moreover, unlike switching costs, interpersonal relationships do not play the frequently mentioned role of a buffer against price and product competition. Finally, the authors show that buyers and suppliers hold systematically different views of the determinants of switching.

Interfirm monitoring, social contracts, and relationship outcomes

This article examines the effects of monitoring on interfirm relationships. Whereas some research suggests that monitoring can serve as a control mechanism that reduces exchange partner opportunism, there is also evidence showing that monitoring can actually promote such behavior. The authors propose that the actual effect of monitoring depends on (1) the form of monitoring used (output versus behavior) and (2) the context in which monitoring takes place. With regard to the form of monitoring, the results from a longitudinal field study of buyer–supplier relationships show that output monitoring decreases partner opportunism, as transaction cost and agency theory predict, whereas behavior monitoring, which is a more obtrusive form of control, increases partner opportunism. With regard to the context, the authors find that informal relationship elements in the form of microlevel social contracts serve as buffers that both enhance the effects of output monitoring and permit behavior monitoring to suppress opportunism in the first place.

Franchisor–Franchisee Bankruptcy and the Efficacy of Franchisee Governance

Franchisors’ long-term viability is tied to the ongoing operations of their franchisees. To ensure the ongoing performance of franchisees, franchisors deploy multiple governance mechanisms. This study assesses how governance mechanisms deployed to enhance franchisee ability (via selection and socialization) and motivation (via incentives and monitoring) impact franchisee bankruptcy. The authors examine the individual and joint effects of deploying governance mechanisms that share the same underlying objective, namely, to enhance franchisee ability and motivation. They also assess how motivation-inducing mechanisms may serve to counter the motivation-dampening effect of an increased royalty rate. Relying on data from multiple archival sources, the authors identify all bankruptcy filings by franchisees and their franchisors across 1,115 franchise systems over a 13-year observation window. Their findings document a positive and significant relationship between franchisee and franchisor bankruptcy. They also find main and interaction effects of the ability- and motivation-influencing governance mechanisms on the likelihood of franchisee bankruptcy, and the existence of significant bankruptcy spillovers among franchisees within the same franchise system. They discuss implications for franchise theory and management.

Openness and Innovation Performance Revisited

Firms increasingly source new ideas and knowledge from alliances with external partners. Laursen and Salters (2006) seminal research shows that while such openness in innovation benefits firms, too much openness can have a negative effect on innovation performance. We provide a conceptual replication of this finding, relying on a unique longitudinal panel data set comprising three different innovation performance metrics: product and service innovations, process innovations, and marketing innovations.